(concurring in result).
[¶ 23.] I concur in Issue 2 but concur in result only in Issue 1 for the following reasons.
[¶24.] There was no defect during the proceeding in which Anderson entered his guilty plea. The trial court properly advised Anderson of his constitutional right to “a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.” SDConst art. VI, § 7 (emphasis added); Croan v. State, 295 N.W.2d 728, 729-30 (S.D.1980). The State alleged that the grand theft charge to which Anderson pled guilty transpired, in part, in Minnehaha County. Anderson was advised that he had a right to jury trial in Minnehaha County. For plea purposes, it is only necessary for the State to allege the county where the crime transpired, not to prove that it was the only county. Therefore, the use of this conviction to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender was proper.
[¶ 25.] Under Croan, supra and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the right to be advised of the constitutional right to a jury trial in the county in which the offense was alleged to have been committed cannot be waived by virtue of a guilty plea. Therefore, this ease does not present a waiver issue as indicated supra ¶ 9. Since there was no defect in the plea proceedings, we can and should affirm on the merits.