(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 39.] I respectfully dissent as to some of the expenses approved by the majority.
[¶40.] As a preliminary matter, the controlling statutory law must be identified. The majority applies SDCL 30-23-1 through 30-23-3 as well as SDCL 30-26-3 and 30-25-28 to this guardianship accounting. However, on July 1, 1993, the prior law was repealed and replaced by SDCL ch 29A-5, the current South Dakota Guardianship and Con-servatorship Act. Although the new law specified that it would not have retroactive application to guardianship accountings, SDCL 29A-5-103, that does not mean that account-ings for the period after July 1, 1993, do not have to comply with the new law’s provisions. In fact, SDCL 29A-5-103 provides that guardians will retain the same duties they had with respect to financial decisions under the prior law except when the duties under the new law “are broader or more clearly expressed.”
[¶41.] SDCL 29A-5-405 provides, among other things, that the conservator shall “act in the protected person’s best interests and exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.” SDCL 29A-5-411 echoes that directive in providing that “[a] conservator, in managing the estate, shall act as a fiduciary and in the best interests ... of the protected person.” As a fiduciary, “the guardian is bound to manage and conserve the ward’s estate in the most advantageous manner; [the guardian] is held to a rigid aceountabili*31ty in the execution of [the wand’s] trust and is liable for loss occasioned by improper or unlawful expenditures of funds of [the] ward.” 39 Am.Jur.2d Guardian and Ward § 78 (1968). See also In re Conservatorship of Stensland, 526 N.W.2d 485, 486 (N.D.1995) (explaining that “[a] conservator is a fiduciary and, as such, owes a high degree of good faith to the ward, to the estate of the ward, and to other persons interested in the estate.”); In re Guardianship of F.E.H., 154 Wis.2d 576, 453 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1990) (stating guardian’s duty to manage ward’s estate in the ward’s best interest must be carried out “in good faith and with the due care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent person exercises in his or her own affairs”). Thus, Verlyne was required to act in the best interests of Harold and in good faith with regard to his estate and interested persons when she assumed the fiduciary duties of guardian.
[¶42.] Verlyne routinely withdrew large amounts of cash from Harold’s estate and the only accounting of the use of this money consisted of general ledger entries showing the date and amount of the withdrawals. Amazingly, these withdrawals amounted to over $36,000, but Verlyne was not able to provide any receipts, vouchers, or other documentation which would account for any of the money, nor did she explain how it was used to any degree of specificity. The court approved these undocumented disbursements because of the necessity of cash transactions in the community in which the Larsons lived and because this was the usual method of payment in the past.
[¶ 43.] Notwithstanding past practices and the payment methods of the community, Ver-lyne’s fiduciary duties required her to carefully and faithfully account for all expenditures made from Harold’s estate during her guardianship over him. SDCL 29A-5-408 requires accountings that include, among other things, “[a] listing of the receipts, disbursements and distributions from the estate under the conservator’s control ...” and of “[t]he services being provided to the protected person.” A general ledger entry showing only dates and amounts of expenditures falls short of any reasonable interpretation of South Dakota statutory requirements.8
[¶ 44.] This Court has upheld the rejection of alleged expenditures from wards’ estates when, among other defects, “no specific expenditure of their funds for the benefit of the wards was established” other than one small voucher. In re Guardianship of Severtson, 70 S.D. 85, 87, 14 N.W.2d 886, 887 (1944). Other jurisdictions agree that “[t]he conservator must ... keep meticulous accounts of his administration of the estate, accounting for ‘the source of every item of income and the purpose of every item of expense’.” In re Estate of Clark, 237 Mont. 179, 772 P.2d 299, 302 (1989) (citation omitted). “Normally, the account must be supported by receipts for each and every disbursement.” Regis W. Campfield, Estate Planning and Drafting ¶ 2357 at 52 (1984) (describing the accounting duty for guardians of incompetents). See also In re Kosmadakes, 444 F.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1971) (stating that a conservator “like other fiduciaries, is required to make a reasonable showing that an expense she alleges has, in fact, been incurred by her before she may receive therefor credit and allowance”); In re Conservatorship of Peters, 447 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa App.1989) (holding that the duty to give a full and accurate accounting requires “as much detail as possible, even if the details are not current and are difficult to obtain”); Green v. Lombard, 28 Md.App. 1, 343 A.2d 905, 911 (1975) (holding guardian failed to carry out his “fiduciary duty to keep full, accurate and precise records”). One court, confronting the failure of the conservator to account for cash transactions, held that although “[r]eeeipts may be difficult to secure in the quagmire of a family-fiduciary setting ... [they] most often will *32be necessary. Family relationships cannot excuse fiduciary’s duty to account for the estate’s assets.” In re Guardianship of Willbanks, 37 Or.App. 795, 588 P.2d 118, 120 (1978) (citation omitted).
[¶45.] When, as here, a conservator’s descriptions of her expenditures “are insufficient to support any conclusion respecting their necessity or reasonableness, the [conservator] has failed to discharge her duty adequately.” In re Estate of Moore, 189 Ill.App.3d 920, 137 Ill.Dec. 163, 165, 545 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1989) (citation omitted). There is no way to substantiate Verlyne’s claims that the cash was paid out for Harold’s care and benefit under the circumstances and I would hold the court’s contrary findings approving the accountings as to the cash distributions to be clearly erroneous. To affirm the trial court in this case, establishes a rule that no meaningful review of the conduct of a fiduciary can ever be performed.
[¶ 46.] Furthermore, the inadequacy of Verlyne’s method of handling Harold’s estate is shown by her commingling of Harold’s funds with her own funds. Verlyne admitted that she did not really segregate her money from Harold’s money or the money in the guardianship account. Such commingling constitutes a violation of Verlyne’s fiduciary duty to Harold’s estate. This duty has been described as follows:
“It is the duty of a guardian to keep his ward’s money, property, and investments separate from his own, and, as a general rule, ... a guardian is liable for the loss of funds of the ward which, in any way, are mingled with his own. Thus, a guardian is hable for the loss of funds of his ward where they were so mingled in a deposit with his own funds that it was impossible to distinguish them, or where the particular fund involved was deposited with other trust funds in such a way that it had no earmark to indicate that it belonged to the ward. If the account is in the guardian’s name, but other moneys are deposited therein and mingled with those of the ward any balance will be presumed to belong to the ward; and any other claimant, including the guardian, must clearly identify any part of the account in order to claim it.”
Lesnick v. Lesnick, 577 So.2d 856, 859 (Ala.1991) (quoting 39 Am.Jur.2d Guardian and Ward § 96 (1968)) (alteration omitted). Ver-lyne voluntarily undertook the obligations of a fiduciary and must not expect to be excused from her duties simply because it is inconvenient to carry them out or because the ward is a member of her family.
[¶ 47.] Verlyne’s decision to maintain country club memberships — one in California and two in South Dakota, was disputed by Children. The court concluded that Harold “was a longtime member of both country clubs in Sioux Falls and it is therefore understandable that those memberships were not relinquished during his life.” The court also approved of the country club membership in California.
[¶48.] I agree with the majority that the court’s decision to approve the California country club membership was not clearly erroneous. Harold may only have been able to use the membership in a limited capacity, but he did use it on certain occasions. Also, the maintenance of this membership served Harold’s interests in maintaining his pride, dignity, and standing within the community.
[¶ 49.] The memberships in Sioux Falls are another matter, however. Our review of this issue is hampered by inadequate findings as to the best interests of Harold with regard to the country club memberships in Sioux Falls. Verlyne testified that she maintained the full memberships because of Harold’s long history at Westward Ho and the possibility that they would go back to Sioux Falls to live again. Children contested the notion that there was any chance that Harold would return to Sioux Falls to live in his deteriorating condition. I would remand to the circuit court for findings as to whether it was in Harold’s best interest to maintain the Sioux Falls country club memberships, including the consideration of the likelihood of Harold’s return to Sioux Falls and his ability to make use of the memberships if he returned.
[¶50.] The court approved of Verlyne’s expenditure of guardianship funds for her trips on the theory that she and Harold had established a practice of taking six trips a year and thus Verlyne was entitled to main*33tain that lifestyle. The circuit court also concluded that Verlyne deserved the vacations to recover from the arduous task of caring for Harold.
[¶ 51.] Unfortunately, the court seems to be confusing the benefits granted under Harold’s trust, which would go into effect for Verlyne at his death, with the needs of Ver-lyne for support during the guardianship. As an example of this, the court stated: “I also find that Mrs. Larson is the primary beneficiary of the trust and that ultimately the money is hers to spend.” However, this conclusion is premature, since Harold had not died at the time of the expenditures. Had Verlyne predeceased Harold or passed away before she had consumed the trust in its entirety, Robert and Kathy would have received the remainder of the trust. Thus, Verlyne’s responsibility was as a guardian of Harold’s estate, notwithstanding her position as a potential beneficiary of Harold’s trust.
[¶52.] According to South Dakota law, Verlyne’s responsibility as guardian of Harold’s estate meant that she would
apply the income and principal of the estate as needed for the protected person’s support, care, health, and if applicable, ha-bilitation or therapeutic needs. A conservator also shall apply the income and principal as needed for the support of any legal dependents who are unable to support themselves and who are in need of support.
SDCL 29A-5-405. Thus, Verlyne should have been required to demonstrate that she was “unable to support” herself and “in need of support” from Harold’s estate as a prerequisite to her use of guardianship funds to pay for her personal trips and related expenses. See also In re Estate of Berger, 166 Ill.App.3d 1045, 117 Ill.Dec. 339, 347-48, 520 N.E.2d 690, 698-99 (1987), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 574, 125 Ill.Dec. 216, 530 N.E.2d 244 (1988) (finding when ward’s children made no showing of need for support, ward’s funds should not have been disbursed to them); In re Guardianship of Pruitt, 842 P.2d 771, 773 (Okla.Ct.App.1992) (holding that it is the wife’s duty to prove that she is in need of support and without assets of her own before an incompetent husband’s assets are used for her support). I would hold that the lower court’s findings allowing the expenditures for Verlyne’s trips are clearly erroneous because there was no showing that the trips were for Harold’s benefit, nor was evidence presented establishing Verlyne’s need for support.
[¶ 53.] Verlyne argues that she also was depositing money in the joint account and, therefore, she should have been able to use these funds for her personal trip expenses if she so chose. Once again, I must point out that this joint account commingled Verlyne’s personal funds with those of Harold’s. Not only was this money commingled, but Ver-lyne did not keep any sort of records that would establish how much of the money in the account was actually hers and how much properly belonged to the guardianship estate.
[¶ 54.] The trial court approved of the payment of attorney fees and expenses out of guardianship funds, including those incurred resisting the objections made to Verlyne’s final accounting. However, a reasonable reading of South Dakota statutory law mandates that attorney fees may not be awarded in a guardianship proceeding unless the services benefited the estate and were necessary as a result of the actions of the estate’s representative. SDCL 29A-5-116. See also In re Guardianship of Rich, 520 N.W.2d 63, 69 (S.D.1994); In re Guardianship of Jacobsen, 482 N.W.2d 640, 641 (S.D.1992). As I believe the record shows that not all of Ver-lyne’s actions were in furtherance of the best interests of the guardianship, I would hold that it was error for the court to grant all of the attorney fees requested by Verlyne out of the guardianship estate. This is because part of those attorney fees were incurred defending Verlyne’s inadequate accounting. This also holds true as to Verlyne’s personal expenses incurred in defending against the objections to her final accounting. I would hold the circuit court’s findings to the contrary to be clearly erroneous. Since no breakdown of specific attorney activities or the personal expenses of Verlyne has been provided that would enable this Court to determine what activities were in furtherance of the estate’s interest and what activities were simply to defend Verlyne’s inadequate *34accounting, I would remand to the circuit court to make appropriate findings in this regard. There is no question that this case involves a family feud, but in any contested guardianship or estate proceeding this seems to be the general rule. On the other hand, the law does not provide any exception where a family feud dilutes the authority of a court appointed guardian.
[¶ 55.] I am authorized to state that Justice SAJBERS joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.
. The majority asks a rhetorical question concerning the need for "receipts for a hamburger, ice cream cone, or a tank of gas[.]” However, the fact that she did not provide any receipts for any cash expenses is just one consideration. Another consideration must be that she does not even document or begin to explain how she spent the money. The majority also makes allowance for "the difficulty of attempting to make purchases in California on checks drawn on a Sioux Falls, South Dakota bank.” This begs the question of why Verlyne did not use a bank in California for purposes of writing checks; it does not excuse her lack of explanation for her expenditures.