(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
[¶44.] I dissent on Issue II. The trial court stated not once, but three times that the agreement was contingent upon Cheryl and Diane transferring their property interests. Additionally, the court ruled that if they did not voluntarily transfer those interests, the court would do it for them. When the trial court later correctly decided it was without jurisdiction to affect their interests in the trust property, there was no longer an agreement and it was error to vacate only part of the judgment.
[¶ 45.] When the parties were in court working out their settlement agreement, there was discussion on the record concerning what action the court could take if any party, including Cheryl and Diane, failed to make the transfers whieh were required under the agreement.
THE COURT: So, that’s the additional item I wanted to point out. That you, in order to make that [Land transfers] work, we need the agreement of your two sisters to transfer that to you.
MARVIN: Yes.
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MR. ROBY: ... I think there’s authority, too, for the court, if a party refused to enter into or sign a deed, the court can have the clerk of courts under the statute sign the deeds, and when we walk out of here today we want this binding and the court order that.
COURT: That has been my understanding of the law, yes. So that no matter whom or who wouldn’t execute the deed it would be binding upon them and the court would take such action to transfer the titles.
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COURT: ... So, that will be the determination of the court, that this was the time to litigate these issues, they have been agreed to and the parties are in default who have not appeared or are not objecting or contesting these other issues. Nevertheless, the agreement is subject to their interests being transferred in this, I think we’re talking about the Otto Kroupa Trust property_ All right. And, I want everybody to understand that that is part of the whole agreement that everyone has agreed to. And someone, first of all, is going to try to contact them....
(Emphasis added).
[If 46.] The court’s decision to order the transfer of Cheryl and Diane’s interests if their signatures were not voluntarily given is also evidenced in the judgment:
[I]n the event any party refuses to execute such deeds ... then, pursuant to SDCL 15-6-70, the Court shall direct the Clerk of this Court to execute such deeds ... and ... the execution by the Clerk shall have the like effect as if done by the disobedient party.
In the court’s memorandum opinion revising the judgment, Judge Anderson acknowledges that his “determination” was to order the transfer of Cheryl and Diane’s interests.8
*217[¶47.] Judge Anderson’s memorandum, coupled with the quoted material, indicates that the parties could rightfully walk out of the courtroom that day thinking that 1) efforts would be made to get Cheryl and Diane to transfer, and if those efforts failed 2) the court .would use its power to transfer their interests. Therefore, the majority' opinion’s statement at ¶28 is incorrect and unfair:
As the trial court pointed out, everyone knew that their consent was needed, and no one stated that the whole agreement would fall apart if their consent was not obtained.
No one had a reason to make any such statement, given the judge’s decision that he could and would force the transfers.
[¶ 48.] Vacating part of the judgment undermines the entire agreement and it is therefore error to say “the parties got what they bargained for.” Ex. A-l of Appellant’s Brief lists the property deleted from.Marvin’s share by virtue of the revised judgment. The only authority cited in support of vacating only a portion of the settlement is really no support at all:
Unless a defective compromise and settlement is capable of being reformed so as to comply with the reasonable expectations of the parties, the usual effect of invalidation of a compromise and settlement is to restore the parties to their antecedent positions.
15A AmJur2d Compromise & Settlement § 40, at 813 (1976). As noted, this agreement cannot be reformed to comply with the reasonable expectations of the parties; therefore, the parties must be restored to “their antecedent positions.” Here, that means starting from scratch.
[¶ 49.] Finally,9 the majority opinion states, “the law favors compromise and set-tlement_” (¶ 31). I agree; however, the parties should write their own agreement. The effect of partially vacating the judgment is the rewriting of this agreement. It improperly presupposes what the terms of the agreement would have been,if it had been established from the beginning that Cheryl and Diane’s interests were not to be considered. That is a mistake. “[I]t is not a function of the court to rewrite the parties’ agreements.” Hisgen v. Hisgen, 1996 SD 122, ¶ 17, 554 N.W.2d 494, 499 (citations omitted); see also Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 416, 421 (S.D.1993) (Wuest, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (“[A] court cannot make a contract for the parties that they did not make for themselves.”); accord Amdahl v. Lowe, 471 N.W.2d 770, 777 (S.D.1991) (“[W]e cannot create a contract for the parties which they did not intend.”). Without the transfer of Diane and Cheryl’s interests, there is no agreement and we should reverse and remand for vacation of the entire judgment.
[¶ 50.] GILBERTSON, J., joins on Issue II.
. The concurring opinion states, "At no point in the eighty-six pages of transcript in which the agreement is recited did any party suggest that the deal was contingent on Marvin obtaining his sisters’ interest in the trust acreage.” This statement is clearly refuted by the portion reproduced here. The trial court stated the agreement was contingent on those transfers — Marvin agreed— Marvin’s attorney, agreed — Greg’s attorney agreed — -Robert’s attorney agreed — Edwin agreed — not one party objected — not one attorney objected. It could not be more clear that the agreement hinged on the transfer of their interests.
The concurring opinion incorrectly states that the "end of their stipulation" came prior to the discussion of forcing the transfers. This ignores the court's statement after that discussion.
*217[T]his was the time to litigate these issues, they have been agreed to and the parties are in default who have not appeared or are not objecting or contesting these other issues. Nevertheless, the agreement is subject to their interests being transferred.... I want everybody to understand that that is part of the whole agreement that everyone has agreed to....
The transcript, and the court's plan to force the transfer of the trust property, further contradicts the concurring opinion’s characterization of Diane and Cheryl's interests as "ancillary” and "appurtenant.”
. The concurring opinion correctly states the standards of review for interpreting and enforcing settlement agreements. However, the claim that "sorting out what was agreed upon” is an enforcement rather than interpretation function is wrong. Obviously, one must "sort out what was agreed upon,” which is an interpretation function, before one enforces it or even reaches the enforcement function.
While it is true that many jurisdictions review the enforcement of settlement agreements under an abuse of discretion standard, the concurring opinion incorrectly lumps together "sorting out what was agreed from multiple representations” and “enforcing those essential terms." While the latter may fall under the court’s supervisory powers and is thus reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, "sorting out what was agreed upon” is synonymous with "contract interpretation” and should be reviewed de novo. Alverson v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 1997 SD 9, 559 N.W.2d 234.f