(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 30.] This is a highly anomalous case. Here, the custodial parent is being forced to pay child support to the non-custodial parent, thereby precluding her from being able to afford a home for their child. It is axiomatic that child support is paid by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent, to be used to defray the expenses of caring for and raising their child. Why is it in this case, then, that our law would allow the custodial parent and her child to remain dispossessed, so that the non-custodial parent can receive his $330 monthly child support allotment?
[¶ 31.] SECTION F - THE JURISDICTIONAL PROVISION
[¶ 32.] Tristina has continuously argued that Section F applies only to child custody and visitation issues and not to child support. Tristina asserts that when the South Dakota trial court decided in December 1997 that Section F was not violative of public policy, that decision only bound jurisdiction of child custody and visitation matters to California. The court’s decision did not affect jurisdiction to decide child support matters. Therefore, when the trial court entered its Judgment and Decree of Divorce on the same date, it issued a valid new South Dakota child support order. She relies on the following phrase from the Stipulation and Agreement (Stipulation) that was incorporated in the divorce decree:
[I]t is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Stipulation and Agreement signed by the Plaintiff on the 13 th day of January, 1997, and the Defendant on the 7 th day of January, 1997, which Stipulation is attached hereto as Exhibit “1,” be and the same hereby is, incorporated herein by this reference as though fully set forth at length and each provision thereof shall be enforceable as an Order of this Court.
(Emphasis added.)
The purported South Dakota child support order created by the divorce decree is the one which Tristina now seeks to modify.
[¶ 33.] We agree with Tristina that Section F clearly is only intended to apply to child custody and visitation issues. The trial court’s statement on September 23, 1998, that “the issue regarding child support shall remain with California as it is a matter relating to ‘issues regarding the minor child’” (quoting Section F), is not supported by the record. What the record does show from the circumstances surrounding its execution is that Section F was intended to apply only to custody and visitation issues, not child support issues.
*27[¶ 34.] Concerning the interpretation of divorce stipulations, we have stated:
Divorce stipulations are governed by the rules of contract; their interpretation is a matter of law for the courts to decide. Houser v. Houser, 535 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1995). In Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863, 865 (S.D.1985) (quoting Huffman v. Shevlin, 76 S.D. 84, 89, 72 N.W.2d 852, 855 (1955)), we set forth the procedure for analyzing a property settlement agreement:
First, in determining the proper interpretation of a contract the court must seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. Chord v. Pacer Corp., 326 N.W.2d 224 (S.D.1982); Johnson v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 776 (S.D.1980); Huffman v. Shevlin, 76 S.D. 84, 72 N.W.2d 852 (1955). In determining the intention of the parties, a court must look to the language that the parties used. Johnson v. Johnson, supra; Berry v. Benner, 81 S.D. 610, 139 N.W.2d 285 (1966).
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If the intention of the parties is not clear from the writing, then it is necessary and proper for the court to consider all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing and the subsequent acts of the parties. Janssen v. Muller, 38 S.D. 611, 162 N.W. 393. The construction given by the parties themselves to the contract as shown by their acts, if reasonable, will be accorded great weight and usually will be adopted by the court.
Hisgen v. Hisgen, 1996 SD 122, ¶ 4, 554 N.W.2d 494, 496. In addition, “ ‘Ambiguities arising in a contract should be interpreted and construed against the scrivener.’ ” Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34, 588 N.W.2d 897, 904 (quoting Production Credit Ass’n v. Wynne, 474 N.W.2d 735, 740 (S.D.1991) (other citations omitted)). “ ‘This is a rule of construction to be applied against one who drafted an ambiguous contract.’ ” Id.
“ ‘Any doubts arising from an ambiguity of language in a contract should be resolved against the speaker or writer, because, he can, by exactness of expression, more easily prevent mistakes in meaning than the one with whom he is dealing.’ ” Id.
[¶ 35.] As proof that Section F only applies to custody and visitation issues, Trist-ina points to its location within the “Marital Settlement Agreement” (Agreement). The Agreement is arranged as follows:
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
EQUAL DIVISION OF PROPERTY
DIVISION OF OBLIGATIONS
CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Custody
B. Residence
C. Time Share
D. Visitation
E. Changes to Schedule
F. Jurisdiction
G. Transportation
H. Child Care
MEDICAL COVERAGE
CHILD SUPPORT
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
INCOME TAX RETURNS
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Execution of Documents
B. Future Acquisitions
C. Future Debts
D. Waiver of Inheritance
E. Reconciliation
F. General Release
G. Preparation of Agreement
H. Dissolution of Marriage Action
I. Divisibility of Provisions
J. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
K. Finality of Agreement
[¶ 36.] The Agreement, with its disputed Section F, was drafted by Todd’s attorney *28in California. In fact, a section of the Agreement reads:
G. Preparation of Agreement
This agreement has been prepared by Robert G. Nykodym, Attorney for Husband, who advises and informs Wife that he acts solely as counsel for Husband and does not advise or represent Wife in this settlement. Wife hereby acknowledges the fact that she has the right to secure independent counsel to represent her. However, Wife chooses to proceed with the signing of this agreement without consultation with independent counsel of her choosing. Wife has carefully read this agreement, fully understanding its terms and willingly signs it.
[¶ 37.] The Stipulation signed by both parties in January 1997 allowed Tristina to litigate whether Section F was binding. As part of that litigation, both parties submitted briefs to the court, and they are part of this record. The briefs submitted by the parties clearly indicate the issue was whether Section F was intended to apply to custody issues, not support issues. The initial brief submitted by Tristina was entitled, “Applicability of PKPA/UC-CJA,” 4 and discussed both of these custody-related statutes at length. Todd’s brief was likewise entitled, “Defendant’s Brief on Applicability of PKPA/UCCJA,” and presented an analysis of those two custody statutes in the context of this case. Tristi-na also submitted a “Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Applicability of PKPA/UCCJA.” In that document, she clarified to the court that: “The jurisdictional issue in dispute in this litigation is in the section called, ‘Child Custody and Visitation.’ This Court’s jurisdiction over other matters to be covered in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, such as child support, are not and cannot be in dispute.”
[¶ 38.] In hindsight, proceeding without the advice of an attorney might not have been the best strategy for Tristina. However, the fact remains that Todd drafted the Agreement, and he was in the best position to impart an exactness of expression and prevent mistakes. The jurisdictional provision was located under the general heading dealing with “Child Custody and Visitation,” not under “Child Support” or elsewhere as a general provision in the Agreement. In relation to the other provisions in the document, it is apparent that Todd intended the jurisdictional provision to only apply to child custody. Otherwise, he surely could have placed it elsewhere in the document. Since he was in the best position to impart an exactness in expression, but failed to do so, he cannot now claim that he intended that the jurisdictional provision would apply to issues of child support.
[¶ 39.] In addition to the arrangement of the Agreement, there is a more pragmatic reason that Section F cannot apply to issues of child support in this case. At the time the Agreement was drafted and signed in June of 1994, California and South Dakota both had URESA,5 rather than UIFSA, as the controlling law over issues of interstate child support arrangements. URESA recognizes the entry of more than one valid child support judgment throughout the several states. See In re Marriage of Taylor, 122 Cal.App.3d 209, 175 Cal.Rptr. 716, 719-20(1981) (URESA’s purpose is not to minimize or curtail effects of valid judgment of the several states even though they are participants in URESA); One Controlling Order, [October 1997] 5 FamL & Prac (Mat-*29thewBender & Co) § 48.03[3][b] (April 1999) (“Support orders entered under URESA exist independently, often resulting in multiple, conflicting orders governing the same parties and children ... ”). Therefore given URESA’s tolerance for multiple child support orders, it is unlikely that the California attorney who drafted the Agreement for Todd in 1994 would have intended to reserve jurisdiction over child support issues solely to California. This is especially likely, given that both parties were aware Tristina intended to move their daughter to South Dakota immediately upon signing the document. The fact that the law in effect at the time the Agreement was signed allowed the issuance of more than one child support order, serves as further proof that the parties intended Section F to apply only to the custody and visitation issues of their minor child.
[¶ 40.] Under the circumstances presented, it is clear the trial court’s December 1997 ruling that Section F did not violate public policy only applied to issues of child custody, and not to issues of child support. The expansion of that ruling with the court’s September 1998 statement that, “the issue regarding child support shall remain with California as it is a matter relating to ‘issues regarding the minor child’ ” (quoting Section F), was not supported by the extrinsic circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing, nor was it supported by a review of the Agreement in its entirety.
[¶ 41.] The trial court expressed concern about the public policy ramifications of bifurcating the child custody jurisdiction from child support jurisdiction. While this is a legitimate concern, it has not prevented other state courts from splitting custody jurisdiction from support jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Tonnessen, 937 P.2d 863 (Colo.App.1996) (Colorado has jurisdiction over marriage dissolution and other ancillary matters, but Arizona has jurisdiction over child custody issues.); In re Marriage of Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d 700 (Minn.App.1996) (Because UCCJA and UIFSA operate under different standards, it is not anomalous to award custody jurisdiction over all three children to one parent, but to award child support as to only one.); Chaisson v. Ragsdale, 323 Ark. 373, 914 S.W.2d 739 (1996) (UIFSA is intended only for child support issues; other issues such as visitation should therefore be decided either in the forum that granted the divorce or in the state where the custodial parent and the child reside.); and Schuyler v. Ashcraft, 293 N.J.Super. 261, 680 A.2d 765 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1996) (Although New Jersey can assert jurisdiction over custody and visitation matters under UCCJA and PKPA, it cannot assert jurisdiction over child support.), certification den’d, 147 N.J. 578, 688 A.2d 1054 (N.J.1997).
[¶ 42.] Even this Court has reasoned about the propriety of bifurcating child support and child custody jurisdiction:
“While the custody issue may be decided in another state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, we know of no legal or factual basis for the trial court’s deference to the Massachusetts court on the issues of maintenance and child support. Rather, to the extent of its jurisdiction to do so, the court must consider those issues in connection with the dissolution.”
Lustig v. Lustig, 1997 SD 24, ¶ 14, 560 N.W.2d 239, 245 (quoting In re Marriage of Doria, 855 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo.Ct.App.1993)) (citations omitted).
[¶ 43.] Further, a provision in our own child ’custody statutes recognizes that a bifurcation of proceedings is sometimes necessary: “The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if a custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.” SDCL 26-5A-7. See also Lustig, 1997 SD 24, ¶ 13, 560 N.W.2d at 243-44 (“This statute permits a court to either dismiss a ‘custody proceeding,’ or decline jurisdiction over a *30‘custody determination,’ but retain jurisdiction on other divorce issues.”).
[¶ 44.] I would therefore hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Section F applied to the child support issue in this case.
[¶ 45.] TWO CHILD SUPPORT DECREES HAVE BEEN ISSUED
[¶ 46.] I agree with the majority that by entering its Judgment and Decree of Divorce in December 1997, South Dakota created a new alimony support order. However, I take the majority reasoning one step further, and assert that the South Dakota court also created a new child support order when it entered the divorce decree.
[¶ 47.] As explained previously, the jurisdictional provision of Section F was improperly expanded by the trial court. Section F only applies to issues of child custody and not to issues of child support. Thus, when the trial court entered the divorce judgment, such judgment was only limited in its application to child custody issues. As to all other collateral issues, such as child support, alimony and property division, the new South Dakota judgment applied.
[¶ 48.] Like the provision governing alimony, the Agreement provision governing 'child support states that Tristina would pay Todd $330 per month in child support, “until the child attains age 18 and is not a full-time high school student residing with a parent, or attains age 19, or marries, dies, is emancipated, or further order of the Court, whichever occurs first.” (Emphasis added.) The Stipulation signed by both parties further provided that the Agreement would be “incorporated and become a final judgment of this Court as a part of the final Judgment and Decree of Divorce.” (Emphasis added.) Since Section F is properly limited to only issues dealing with child custody, the subsequent entry of the child support provision as part of the divorce judgment in South Dakota created a second child support order.
[¶ 49.] It must be conceded that the entry of a second child support order was arguably done in contradiction of UIFSA and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, or “FFCCSOA.”6 However, as the majority notes, Todd did not appeal the entry of the divorce judgment, which gave South Dakota jurisdiction over other collateral matters. Further, given the equities of this case (that a custodial parent is being forced to pay the non-custodial parent child support, and as a result is unable to provide the child with her own home), and the purpose behind such legislation as UIFSA and FFCCSOA, “to discourage continuing interstate controversies over child support in the interest of greater financial stability and secure family relationships for the child,” Full *31Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, PubLNo 103-383, § 2(c)(2), 108 Stat 4063, 4064 (1994), such entry of a second child support order is justified.
[¶ 50.] Since there are two child support orders in existence, they must be reconciled via SDCL 25-9B-207. That statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state or another state for the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the following rules in determining which order to recognize for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:
(1) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal is controlling and must be recognized.
(2) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, an order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child must be recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued is controlling and must be recognized.
[¶ 51.] Whether a state has “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” is determined by whether it is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued. SDCL 25-9B-205(a)(l). Here, both California and South Dakota would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction, since Todd resides in California, and Tristina and their daughter reside in South Dakota. According to subsection (2) above, in such situations, an order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child must be recognized as the one having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, the child has lived in South Dakota for five and one-half of her nine years; undoubtedly it is her home state. Under this analysis, then, South Dakota must be recognized as the state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child support issues.
[¶ 52.] I recognize there is a case recently decided by this Court that upholds the majority position in this case. However, it can and should be distinguished. In Freeman v. Sadlier, 1998 SD 114, ¶¶ 7-10, 586 N.W.2d 171, 172-74, we held the trial court erred in modifying a Utah child support order. In that case, the custodial parent and the child lived in South Dakota, and the non-custodial parent lived in Utah. There we held, despite the non-custodial parent’s failure to appeal the modification entered by the South Dakota court, subject matter jurisdiction to modify the order had not been conferred, because jurisdictional questions have no time limitations. Id.
[¶ 53.] In Freeman, unlike the present situation, the custodial parent was the ob-ligee, and was seeking an increase in child support from the obligor. Here, the custodial parent is also the obligor, and since the obligee does not have custody of the child, the custodial parent is seeking a reduction in her obligation. As stated previously, it is axiomatic that the non-custodial parent pays child support to the custodial parent, not vice versa. For this reason, I would limit our previous holding in Freeman to those (more common) situations where the obligee is the custodial parent and the obligor is the non-custodial parent. Because the case before us is an anomaly (the custodial parent is also the obligor), in my opinion equity demands that South Dakota, as the home state and residence of the child, retain jurisdiction over child support matters. Although Tristina Weekley may have made a “bad bargain” in the dissolution of her mar*32riage, I believe it incumbent upon our justice system to rectify the situation as much as allowed within the confínes of the law
[¶ 54.] For these reasons, I would hold the trial court erred in granting Todd’s motion to dismiss the proposed modification of child support,
[¶ 55.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this special writing.
. PKPA is the acronym for the "Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,” 28 USC § 1738A. UCCJA stands for the "Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,” codified at SDCL ch 26-5A.
. URESA is the acronym for "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Orders Act.” URESA and its revision, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Orders Act (RURESA), were in effect in California until January 1, 1998, when UIFSA was enacted. UIFSA became effective in South Dakota on July 1, 1994.
. A provision of UIFSA, located at SDCL 25-9B-204(a), states:
A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in another state only if:
(1) The petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state;
(2) The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state; and
(3)If relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
Further, SDCL 25-9B-205(d) provides: “A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has issued a child support order pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter.”
Finally, a provision of FFCCSOA at 28 USC § 1738B(a) directs:
(a) General rule. — The appropriate authorities of each State—
(1) shall enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this section by a court of another State; and
(2) shall not seek or make a modification of such an order except in accordance with subsections (e), (f), and (i).