Fox v. Burden

SABERS, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[¶ 48.] I concur on Issues 1, 2, 3 and 5.1 dissent on Issues 4 and 6.

[¶ 49.] I would reverse and remand to permit the amendment of Mother’s answers to interrogatories and to require a jury trial, including the claim for setoff.

[¶ 50.] I dissent on Issue 4 because the trial court erred in denying a jury trial.

[¶ 51.] 4. The trial court erred in denying a jury trial.

[¶ 52.] The trial court erred in denying a jury trial because this claim is in essence a claim for money damages. Under the constitution, any person has a right to a jury trial on claims for money damages. This absolute right to a jury trial on money damage claims applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant. SD Const, art. VI, § 6; SDCL 15-6-38(a), (b); Knowles v. United States, 1996 SD 10, ¶¶ 9-10, 544 N.W.2d 183, 186-87; Haberer v. Rice, 476 N.W.2d 276, 277 (S.D.1991) (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Strain, 432 N.W.2d 259, 264 (S.D.1988)); First Western Bank, Sturgis v. Livestock Yards Co., 466 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 (S.D.1991); Nizielski v. Tvinnereim, 453 N.W.2d 831, 832-33 (S.D.1990). We have previously stated: “In cases where the pleadings seek equitable relief or where the legal relief is incidental, a jury trial is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Conversely, when the action is at law, either party has a right to a jury trial.” First Western Bank, 466 N.W.2d at 856 (quoting Nizielski, 453 N.W.2d at 832-33) (citation omitted). Mother is seeking legal relief and, thus, is “entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.” Id. (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473, 82 S.Ct. 894, 897, 8 L.Ed.2d 44, 48 (1962)). The trial court wrongfully denied her of this right.

[¶ 53.] I dissent on Issue 6 because the trial court erred in denying Mother’s motion to amend her answers to interrogatories.

[¶ 54.] 6. The trial court erred in denying mother’s motion to amend.

[¶ 55.] The trial court erred in refusing to permit mother to amend her answers to interrogatories because, in the absence of prejudice, amendments are to be granted liberally in all cases, in order to promote trials on the merits. SDCL 15-6-15(a); Noble v. Shaver, 1998 SD 102, ¶ 17, 583 N.W.2d 643, 647 (citing Jordan v. Duprel, 303 N.W.2d 796 (S.D.1981)). There is no showing of any prejudice in this case.

[¶ 56.] Therefore, I would reverse and remand to permit the amendment of Mother’s answers to interrogatories and to require a jury trial, including the claim for setoff.

[¶ 57.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this special writing.