Harms v. Northland Ford Dealers

AMUNDSON, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[¶ 25.] I concur on Issue 1 and join Justice Gilbertson’s dissent on Issue 2.

GILBERTSON, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[¶ 26.] I concur with the majority opinion that summary judgment should be affirmed in favor of Harms. However, I respectfully dissent as to the reversal of summary judgment in favor of Moccasin Creek.

[¶27.] An essential element of any purported contract between Moccasin Creek and Northland Ford Dealers is consideration. SDCL 53-6-1. Moccasin Creek argues there was none flowing to it from Northland. When one searches the brief of Northland for authority to the contrary, only the following can be located:

With this backdrop, the facts establish that in February of 1995, Moccasin Creek received and accepted Northland Ford’s offer to sponsor a hole-in-one contest as part of their Dakota Tour tournament. Consciously or subconsciously, it did so because the size, number and quality of the prizes offered enhanced the prestige of the tournament. (emphasis added).

If this is a factual recitation based on the record in this case, it is in direct violation of SDCL 15-26A-64 which requires any reference to a part of the record, “shall be made to the particular part of the record, suitably designated, and to the specific pages thereof.” If it is a legal argument, it is a violation of SDCL 15-26A-60(6), which provides failure to cite supporting authority is prohibited and results in the issue being waived. State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 22, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599. In Hughes-Johnson v. Dakota Midland Hosp., 86 S.D. 361, 195 N.W.2d 519 (1972), which involved a contract dispute, we held a party who alleged payment of consideration could not rely on general allegations and general denials but must specify the details of the time and amounts of payment of consideration.

[¶ 28.] Based on the total void of factual and legal authority by Northland Ford, the majority opinion when addressing the issue of consideration to Moccasin is relegated to a single sentence, “[a] substantial prize offered for a hole-in-one assuredly enhances a tournament’s attraction and presumably increases registration.” The theory of a transfer of consideration from Moccasin to the tournament participants is interesting but was never argued by Northland. Apparently Moccasin will now be required to run the gauntlet of a trial based on a legal theory it never had the opportunity to defend against.

[¶ 29.] These legal theories are hardly appropriate for judicial notice under SDCL 19-10-2 that limits itself to facts:

(1) generally known within the ... jurisdiction of the ... court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

We have consistently held that we will affirm the decision of the trial court if there exists any legal basis to support it. De Smet Ins. Co. of South Dakota v. Gibson, 1996 SD 102, ¶ 5, 552 N.W.2d 98, 99. For the above reasons I would affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of Moccasin Creek and therefore respectfully dissent on this issue.