(dissenting).
[¶ 45.] A review of this record shows that the following errors polluted this proceeding so that a reversal is necessary.
[¶ 46.] 1. Whether a mistrial or new trial was required due to the fact that the Atkins improperly injected the issues of insurance and their financial condition into the trial.
[¶ 47.] In the present case, plaintiffs counsel asked the plaintiff (Atkins) “Did you have to borrow any money to just - did you receive any pay while you were sick?” In response, Atkins stated “[n]o. My dad’s company was smaller at that time. We didn’t offer insurance and I didn’t qualify for Workman’s [sic] Comp, so I had to borrow three thousand dollars from my father.” Atkins claims that Stratmeyer’s insurance coverage was not mentioned; therefore, it was not prejudicial to Stratmeyer’s case.
[¶ 48.] On the contrary, mentioning that Atkins did not have insurance or workmen’s compensation coverage was prejudicial, because it has the possibility of influencing the jury on the amount of damages Atkins suffered. The fact that Stratmeyer’s insurance was not mentioned is irrelevant. In Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, 66 S.D. 174, 176-77, 280 N.W. 209, 210 (1938), this Court reviewed statements made by the plaintiff about defendant’s insurance coverage and held:
The remarks complained of by defendant’s counsel are not based on any of *902the issues in the case. Therefore, they are not proper matter to go to the jury. The purpose of the trial is to ascertain the extent of plaintiffs injuries and the amount that will reasonably compensate her for such injuries. The fact that there is an insurance company that has bound itself by a policy of insurance to indemnify the defendant to the extent of any judgment that may be recovered against him [or borrowing of funds from a father] does not prove or tend to prove any of the issues in the case, (emphasis added.)
[¶ 49.] The question by Atkins about “did you have to borrow money” has no relevancy in proving the issue of Stratmeyer’s negligence. Further, Atkins’ comment concerning his reason for borroydng money is also irrelevant. In LDL Cattle Co., Inc., v. Guetter, 1996 SD 22, 544 N.W.2d 523, this Court held that because the party “failed to show the relevance of the introduction of insurance coverage as to a material issue in the case,” it was not error for the court to deny its presentment to the jury. 1996 SD 22, ¶ 29, 544 N.W.2d at 529. Similarly, there has been no reason presented by Atkins why the borrowing of funds is relevant to the issue of negligence of Stratmeyer. The allowance of such statement was prejudicial because it was not offered to prove any element of the case and could only have been inserted to generate sympathy. I would hold that the trial court erred in not granting the motion for mistrial.
[¶ 50.] 2. Whether the circuit court precluded the jury from finding Brad Atkins contributorily negligent by (1) allowing a highway patrol officer to testify, without foundation, that the vehicle was traveling the speed limit and (2) refusing to instruct the jury regarding over-driving the conditions.
a. Allowing a highway patrol officer to testify, without foundation, that the vehicle was traveling the speed limit.
[¶ 51.] We have often noted our preference for eyewitness testimony, but eyewitness testimony does not preclude the additional use of expert testimony. Buckley v. Fredericks, 291 N.W.2d 770, 771 (S.D.1980) (citations omitted). Under SDCL 19-15-2:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
[¶ 52.] In this case, Trooper Blomker, who investigated the accident, testified as follows:
Q: (Mr. Fuller) And isn’t it a fact that in those situations where you don’t have any data to actually arrive at a speed calculation, it’s your practice to give the driver the benefit of the doubt and just put in the speed limit, the prevailing speed limit at that time?
A: (Trooper Blomker) With no evidence, no skids, and nothing to indicate an excessive speed, that was my decision that night to go with the posted speed limit, yes.
Q: And you would agree, Trooper, that it could have easily been fifty-eight or sixty miles an hour as well as fifty miles an hour, based upon all of the stuff on the road?
A: It’s possible, yes.
His basis for testifying to the speed was that he gave the driver the benefit of the doubt of the posted speed limit.
[¶ 53.] Atkins’ counsel claims that the testimony of Blomker was only that of an initial investigator, not as an expert witness, such as an accident reconstructionist. Additionally, Atkins claims that he is a nonexpert who is allowed to give opinions as to speed. With this position, we do not agree.
[¶ 54.] Police officers are inherently looked upon as experts when testifying *903about police matters. See State v. Edmundson, 379 N.W.2d 835, 839 (S.D.1985) (holding that “the officer’s knowledge, skill, training, education and experience with past DWI arrests, was sufficient to qualify his opinion that Edmundson was intoxicated.”). Usually, the police officer testifies wearing his uniform, which depicts and reminds the jurors that the person testifying is a person with authority and experience in the matters to which he is testifying. To be admissible, the expert’s opinion must have foundation. See Edmundson, 379 N.W.2d at 840 (finding “sufficient foundation was laid to qualify the officer’s opinion that Edmundson was intoxicated.”). To support the foundation of the expert’s opinion, he must base his opinion on factual data. See Buckley, 291 N.W.2d at 772 (noting that the only question remaining was “whether there was sufficient factual data to support Dr. Nelson’s opinion”). Here, Trooper Blomker did not base his opinion on any factual data; instead, he gave the driver the benefit of the doubt by stating he was driving the posted speed limit. Such testimony lacks foundation for its admission and it was error for the trial court to allow its admission at trial.
b. Refusal to instruct the jury regarding over-driving the conditions.
[¶ 55.] Our standard of review for a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction is as follows:
On issues supported by competent evidence in the record, the trial court should instruct the jury. The trial court is not required to instruct on issues lacking support in the record. Failure to give a requested instruction that correctly sets forth the law is prejudicial error. Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole and áre sufficient if they correctly state the law and inform the jury. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. The burden of demonstrating prejudice in failure to give a proposed instruction is on the party contending the error.
State v. Shadbolt, 1999 SD 15, ¶ 9, 590 N.W.2d 231, 232-33 (citing Sundt Corp. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 1997 SD 91, ¶ 19, 566 N.W.2d 476, 480 (quoting Kuper v. Lincoln-Union Elec. Co., 1996 SD 145, ¶ 32, 557 N.W.2d 748, 758 (internal citations omitted))). We have often stated that “ ‘[a] trial court must present only those instructions to the jury which are supported by competent evidence and set forth the applicable law.’ ” Sundt, 1997 SD 91, ¶ 22, 566 N.W.2d at 481 (quoting State v. Johnson, 320 N.W.2d 142, 147 (S.D.1982)).
[¶ 56.] In the present case, Stratmeyer requested a jury instruction to explain to the jury that even if evidence established Atkins was driving the speed limit, he still could be found contributorily negligent based upon over-driving the conditions.8 Evidence was presented by witness Lundt, who arrived at the scene after the accident, that the conditions were foggy and visibility was impaired. He further testified that he was traveling slower than the posted speed limit and was able to see and avoid the three horses which had been hit by Atkins and were lying in the road. This evidence supported the giving of the requested jury instruction. The jury should have been allowed to decide the credibility of this version of the conditions at the time of the accident. It was reversible error to not give the jury instruction since it was supported by evidence. As to whether the conditions existed were questions for the jury, not the court.
*904[¶ 57.] This Court has previously stated that “[t]rials are a search for the truth as determined by the 'jury based upon all evidence” and instructions on applicable law. Tunender v. Minnaert, 1997 SD 62, ¶ 28, 563 N.W.2d 849, 855. Further, in McDonough Power Equip., Inc., v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]his Court has long held that ‘ “[a litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,” for there are no perfect trials.’ ” 464 U.S. at 553, 104 S.Ct. at 848, 78 L.Ed.2d at 669 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570-71, 36 L.Ed.2d 208, 215 (1973)) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484 (1968), and Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619-20, 73 S.Ct. 481, 490, 97 L.Ed. 593, 605 (1953)). After reviewing this polluted record, I am convinced that the trial court’s rulings inhibited the search for truth and denied Stratmeyer a fair trial.
. Stratmeyer's proposed jury instruction on that issue stated:
A statute in this state provides that it is unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle on the highway located in this state at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing, even if the driver is driving within the speed limit.
This statute sets the standard of care of the ordinary careful and prudent person. If you find Plaintiff violated it, such violation is contributory negligence.