(dissenting).
[¶ 28.] I dissent from the decision of the non-elected judicial super-board of the Canton School District.
[¶ 29.] It is apparent from a review of the circuit court’s decision reversing the Board’s decision, the circuit court imper-missibly sought out reasons to reverse. It is not the function of the circuit court or this Court to make decisions for a school board and to act as a “super-board.” The settled law requires the reviewing court to determine whether the decision of the school board was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d at 911; Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 892; Oldhauir-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 580; Maasjo v. McLaughlin School Dist. No. 15-2, 489 N.W.2d 618, 620 (S.D.1992); Moran, 281 N.W.2d at 599. While the majority opinion looks to outside sources to provide a definition of arbitrary and capricious, it is unnecessary to search any further than South Dakota settled law to receive the definition. This court has previously stated:
In determining whether the school board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, the circuit court must ascertain “whether there is substantial evidence to support the school board’s decision.” Moran, *643281 N.W.2d at 599. (emphasis added). Substantial evidence means such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We must determine whether Board was clearly eiToneous by examining the evidence supporting its decision.
Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 580-81 (quoting Maasjo, 489 N.W.2d at 620-21 (citations omitted))). When substantial evidence exists, we are bound to uphold the school board’s decision. Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶ 10, 562 N.W.2d at 911; Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 580-81.
[¶ 30.] 1. Whether the Petitioners are more closely aligned to the economic, social and religious life of the community into which they are being transferred.
[¶ 31.] The majority claims the school board mistakenly compared Sioux Falls with Canton. However, this conclusion misconstrues the school board’s finding. The school board merely looked at Petitioners’ contacts and concluded that Petitioners’ social, economic and religious alignment is with Sioux Falls, rather than Harrisburg. A review of the record supports this conclusion. The affidavits of Petitioners and their families recite that Petitioners are employed in either Sioux Falls or a vehicle dealership just south of Sioux Falls. Petitioners’ health care, social and extra-curricular activities are all centered in Sioux Falls. The affidavits of the Petitioners indicate that their center of life is Sioux Falls. Very little is said about any connection with Harrisburg other than it is closer to Sioux Falls and Twin Creek and, consequently, more convenient. Petitioners were not, as they claimed, aligned with Harrisburg, but instead with Sioux Falls. Thus, the Board’s finding is substantially supported by the evidence, and by definition cannot be arbitrary.
[¶ 32.] 2. Whether there is bus service to the residence?
[¶33.] There is no dispute Canton School District provides bus service to the Twin Creek area. Since Canton provides bus service, no mileage hardship would be suffered by Petitioners. Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 893; Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 584. Therefore, this factor favors Canton.
[¶ 34.] 3. Whether the district line which places their property in the current district was drawn in an arbitrary fashion?
[¶ 35.] There was no finding regarding this factor in the Canton School Board’s resolution. However, the circuit court. found that because the two hundred acres are entirely surrounded by Harrisburg School District, creating an “island” of land associated with Canton School District, the only rational conclusion would be that an arbitrary boundary was drawn in the past. This conclusion is without support in the record.
[¶ 36.] Factor number three states, “whether the district line ... was drawn in an arbitrary fashion.” Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶ 11, 562 N.W.2d at 911; Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 892; Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 581 (emphasis added). Therefore, we must consider the lines as they were originally drawn, not with the benefit of hindsight.
[¶ 37.] No evidence was presented by Petitioners suggesting how lines were drawn or which district was responsible for drawing the lines. Certainly, it is feasible that at the time the lines were drawn it was pursuant to agreement and the result of a rational decision. See Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶ 22, 562 N.W.2d at 912. Based on this record, there is simply no evidence presented by Petitioners establishing when line was drawn, who was responsible for drawing the line, and whether or not the line was’ the result of consolidation. Id.
*644[¶ 38.] Furthermore, an “island” condition is not per se arbitrary. If one consults a map of the area, there are many such “islands” carved out by the different school districts. Therefore, we should not establish a rule of law that an “island” by its subsequent creation is an arbitrarily drawn line. Petitioners have failed to show the lines drawn were arbitrary when originally established.
[¶ 39.] 4. Whether Petitioners’ children have special needs best met in the District Petitioners are attempting to join?
[¶ 40.] This was not an issue at the hearing.
[¶ 41.] 5. Whether the Petitioners live closer to the school district they are joining as opposed to the district they are leaving?
[¶ 42.] Although Petitioners live approximately five miles from Harrisburg and thirteen miles from Canton, this Court has previously affirmed a denial of modification determining that a difference of twelve miles does not result in substantially longer bus rides. Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 893 (citing Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 584). Therefore, we cannot say the Board’s conclusion was arbitrary. Instead, it is supported by settled law.
[¶43.] The record discloses Petitioners sought to have the same area of land redistricted in 1995 and were unsuccessful. Thereafter, they purchased this land with the knowledge the land was in the Canton School District, gambling on the chance the boundary lines would be changed. As stated in Colman-Egan:
[T]his is not a case like many others before this court where school district reorganization has thrust a family into the position of changing schools but a case where the petitioners voluntarily moved into the new school district with the full knowledge that a change in schools would be required unless a minor boundary change could be secured. In short, Jones gambled on the possibility of changing school district boundaries and lost. Thus, it is difficult to place any significant degree of emphasis on the ties Jones might have in Flandreau given their voluntary gamble with those ties.
520 N.W.2d at 893 (emphasis added). Petitioners gambled in the present case and through the decision of the super-board the gamble has paid off, notwithstanding the above precedent.
[¶ 44.] Essentially, the Board found the petition to be substantially grounded on the personal preference of Petitioners. The evidence shows Petitioners desired their children to attend school in Harrisburg because of its proximity to Twin Creek and Sioux Falls. While it may be more convenient, in Petitioners’ view, for Petitioners to be within Harrisburg School District, this Court has previously held that personal preference is not a sufficient basis for granting a boundary change petition. Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶27, 562 N.W.2d at 913; Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 582. Moreover, personal preference issues may be more readily redressed under open enrollment. See SDCL 13-28-40 through 13-28-47.
[¶ 45.] I would hold that under the settled law confining this Court’s scope of review, there is, “such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support” the Board’s disapproval of Petitioners’ boundary change petition. Oelrichs, 1997 SD 55, ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d at 911; Colman-Egan, 520 N.W.2d at 892; Oldham-Ramona, 502 N.W.2d at 581; Maasjo, 489 N.W.2d at 620; Moran, 281 N.W.2d at 599. For this Court to conclude otherwise, ignores settled law and creates a non-elected judicial super-board, never envisioned by the legislature under the statutory scheme. Therefore, I dissent.
[¶ 46.] I am authorized to state that Justice Gilbertson joins in this dissent.
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