(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
[¶ 40.] I dissent on issue one and would hold that the search violated Fourth Amendment protections. I concur on issues two and three.
[¶ 41.] Law enforcement lacked probable cause for the search and seizure of Bu-cholz’s urine. Furthermore, even assuming probable cause, exigent circumstances to excuse the necessity of obtaining a warrant did not exist.
[¶ 42.] “ ‘[T]he definition of ‘probable cause’ employed by the court is a question of law, not of fact or of discretion, and, as such, is fully reviewable de novo, with no presumption attaching] to the determination of the circuit court.’ ” State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 630 (S.D.1991) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Byrd, 398 N.W.2d 747, 749 (S.D.1986)). Buchholz was arrested for possession of controlled substances (SDCL 22-42-5). The arresting officer observed nothing which indicated that Buchholz had ingested or was under the influence of any substances. The officer issued a warning ticket for the broken headlight. It goes without saying that if the officer thought she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, he would certainly have so charged her. Instead, the officer’s reason for testing Buchholz for drug use was simply because she was arrested for possession of methamphetamine. On direct examination, the officer testified:
Q: And when you arrest somebody for methamphetamine, do you usually have them take a urine test?
A: Yes.
This testimony reeks of law enforcement conducting a search as part of “standard procedure” with no facts to support the search. This same type of search was found unconstitutional in State v. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶ 20, 548 N.W.2d 792, 797. Under the facts of this case, there simply was no probable cause or clear indication that a urine sample would provide evidence of drug use. This is not a case where defendant was arrested for being under the influence of any substances. Therefore, the search obtaining the urine sample violated Buchholz’s rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
[¶ 43.] In addition to the lack of probable cause, exigent circumstances to excuse the necessity of obtaining a warrant did not exist. In Schmerber, the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of obtaining a search warrant prior to obtaining a blood sample:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusion into the human body are *907concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search “be drawn by a,neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1511-12, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence is indisputable and great.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. However, the Supreme Court determined that because the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, and because a certain level of intoxicant must be present to support a criminal charge, an emergency or exigent circumstances rationale required the taking of Schmerber’s blood without warrant. Id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
[¶ 44.] After stating its holding, the Supreme Court emphasized its narrowness:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States’ minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908.
[¶ 45.] While the State argues the existence of exigent circumstances, the officer’s testimony does not support such a claim. With regard to the amount of time methamphetamine can be detected in urine, the officer testified he was unknow-ledgeable as to the length of time methamphetamine will stay in the urine but that it was “crucial you get the urine test right away.”
Q: Based on your [seventeen] years experience and your drug training, do you know how long methamphetamine will stay in urine?
A: No.
Q: Is it crucial that you get the urine test right away?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know why that is?
A: Well, the sooner you get the urine test, you can get the results back and you can see how those results are [and then you] could determine previous to the time that they were stopped there might have been some usage.
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Q: [States attorney] asked you how long methamphetamine stays in the human body, and I believe your answer was that you don’t know?
A: That’s correct.
Further, according to the officer’s testimony, when a person is arrested for metham-phetamines, exigent circumstances automatically exist. On cross-examination, the officer stated:
Q: And your exigent circumstance is that you weren’t going to let her go until she produced a urine sample?
A: Yes.
Even .the state’s attorney, in her closing argument, acknowledges the length of time it takes methamphetamines to be metabolized by the body, “So we know that in the last 72 hours that the defendant used methamphetamine.”
[¶ 46.] For exigent circumstances to exist, there must be evidence to support such a claim. This record is devoid of support for exigent circumstances. Without requiring such support, the term “exigent circumstances” is merely pretextual, becoming a blanket exception to the warrant requirement regardless of what crime the person is arrested for, or, the ability of law *908enforcement to obtain a warrant before evidence is destroyed. See State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 1998) (holding no exigent circumstances where police did not seek a warrant because they had been instructed that exigent circumstances always exist in vehicular manslaughter or aggravated assault cases where the person is suspected of driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol).
[¶47.] Unlike the evanescent nature of blood alcohol levels, the presence of methamphetamine in urine can be detected for an extended period of time. United States v. Pond, 36 MJ 1050, 1058 (AFCMR 1993) (“We take judicial notice that urine tests indicates methamphetamine use some 24 to 48 hours after consumption of the drug.”). Buchholz remained in police custody after her arrest for possession. Under such circumstances, the officer could have obtained, or at least sought, a warrant within this time frame without any risk of losing evidence of methamphetamine use.
[¶ 48.] “There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a' function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance. in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.” Rawlings v. Police Department of Jersey City, New Jersey, 133 N.J. 182, 204-05, 627 A.2d 602, 614 (N.J.1993) (O’Hern, Justice, dissenting) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617, 109 S.Ct. at 1413, 103 L.Ed.2d at 660 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987))). “The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence be obtained.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (emphasis added). The unreasonable seizure of bodily substances is a protected constitutional right.
[¶49.] As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S.Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). “It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.” Law enforcement forced Buchholz to submit to a urine test on the mere chance there would be evidence of use. The officer observed no behavior indicating Buchholz was under the influence of drugs. Such evidence was not necessary to convict Buchholz of the crime she was charged. It bears repeating that this is not a case where defendant was arrested for being under the influence of a drug. Moreover, the State has completely failed to show the existence of exigent or emergency circumstances. Therefore, considering all of the foregoing, this search violated the Fourth Amendment.
[¶ 50.] Evidence illegally seized must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶ 21, 548 N.W.2d at 796 (citing State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 125, 142 N.W.2d 240, 247 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). “The rationale for this rule is to deter police from violating constitutional protections.” Shearer, 1996 SD 52 at ¶ 21, 548 N.W.2d at 796 (citing State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 826 (S.D.1988)).
[¶ 51.] Although it was error to admit the results of the urine test, State argues such admission is harmless error.
In order to find error harmless, it is necessary for the appellate court to find that the admission of the erroneous evidence did not prejudice the defendant’s case. “Prejudicial error, when constitutional questions are being considered, is error which would have some likelihood of changing the result.” State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d 613, 618-19 (S.D.1991) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). A constitutional violation may constitute harmless error, and thus *909not require reversal, if the court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless and did not contribute to the verdict obtained. State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 819 (S.D.1987) (emphasis added).
State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 570 (S.D.1993). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); accord State v. Helmer, 1996 SD 31, ¶ 37, 545 N.W.2d 471, 477; State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 735 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 52.] A review of closing arguments discloses that the state’s attorney relied almost exclusively on the urine test results to prove a critical element of the crime, knowledge.3 I conclude, after reviewing the entire record, use of this inadmissible evidence clearly resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new fair trial.
. States Attorney argued:
We know there was methamphetamine in the car. We know there was methamphetamine in the defendant's system.
Why is it important to know about the urine? And that goes to knowledge. She knows what it is. She’s a user. She knows what methamphetamine is.
And why is that important? Well I might show this brown powdery stuff to somebody on the street. They don’t know what it is. I probably wouldn’t know what that is if I was just looking at it without my training and background as the States Attorney, but an ordinary person probably don't, but a user of methamphetamine knows what that is. They know how to ingest it. They know how to take it.
Same thing with these vials. There are residue amounts in there. A user knows that by looking at them.
Look at these other items. Here is a broken light bulb, right? Well, to a user, to a person that’s using methamphetamine, you know that is something that is burnt and used to inhale methamphetamine. Heard that from the expert witnesses. You heard that from a trooper. You know that because you use drugs.
Same thing with this test tube. This is a little more obvious. Some people might know that that is used for drugs, but it’s a lest tube; a little burnt on the end and a little hole in the middle. Not everybody is going to know what that is, but if you’re a user — you have it in your system, you’ve been using — you know what that is and it goes to knowledge. You know what that is.
And that's why the urine test is important. We know that she knows what it is. She’s seen it before. She used it before. She has knowledge of that controlled drug.