(dissenting).
[¶ 15.] I would affirm the circuit court. As such, I respectfully dissent. I do so because this Court fails to properly apply several rules of statutory interpretation.
[¶ 16.] When this Court examines workers’ compensation statutes, we start with the premise that when ambiguity is found, we liberally construe any ambiguity in favor of the injured claimant. Steinberg v. S. Dak. Dept. of Military, 2000 SD 36, ¶ 10 n. 1, 607 N.W.2d 596, 600 n. 1. “Language is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Estate of Jetter, 1997 SD 125, ¶ 20, 570 N.W.2d 26, 30-31. The language at issue here is indeed ambiguous, as the two statutes, viewed separately, reach conflicting results, as is acknowledged by the Court. Therefore, we must liberally construe these statutes in favor of the claimant.
[¶ 17.] If SDCL 62-7-35 is applied, Faircloth’s claim is precluded by the two-year statute of limitation. However, if SDCL 62-7-35.1 is applied, her claim will survive under the three-year statute of limitation provided therein. It is settled law that “when one of two statutes of limitations may be applicable ... if there is any doubt as to which statute applies, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer limitation period.” Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 SD 105, ¶ 11, 598 N.W.2d 550, 553 (emphasis added). I do not share the majority’s certainty that “no doubt over the limitations period exists.” When two statutes are ambiguous or conflict, doubt exists. In Zoss we found two conflicting statutes of limitations to be ambiguous. Because those statutes could be construed as both allowing and precluding the plaintiffs claim, we found that doubt existed as to which would apply. Id. Noting that each party’s arguments were equally valid, we applied the longer of the two limitations periods. Id. Like the situation in Zoss, each party here makes equally valid arguments over construction of these statutes. Therefore, as in Zoss, the longer statute of limitation should be applied.
[¶ 18.] In addition, “[w]hen the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539. WTiile the Court also applies this maxim, it has misapplied it in this instance. While focusing on the use of the term “any” in the phrase “any case in which any benefits have been tendered,” the Court improperly isolates it to the exclusion of the balance of the statute. Section 35.1 does not broadly apply to any and every workers’ compensation claim. It only applies to those cases where benefits have been paid. Rather, it is section 35 that applies to any and all workers’ compensation claims, where all or a portion of the claim for benefits has been denied from the outset of the claim. There is no limiting language in section 35 as exists in 35.1. Therefore, section 35 is the broader, more general of the two provisions, requiring us to apply the more specific terms found in section 35.1.
[¶ 19.] Further support for this conclusion is the principle that when two conflicting statutes pertain to the same subject matter, the more recent enactment prevails as the latest expression of legislative will. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619, 622 (S.D.1993); 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51.02 at 193-94 (6th ed. 2000). Section 35 was enacted in its present form in 1980. SL 1980, ch. 365, § 3. In contrast, section 35.1 was enacted in 1995. S.L. 1995, ch. 299, §§ 1, 3. The last expression of our legislature provides for a three-year limitation period when benefits have been paid. Because section 35.1 is more recent and more *204specific than section 35, the three-year limitation period should apply. See Ferguson v. Modern Farm Systems, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (finding that a product liability statute of limitation governed because it was enacted more recently and had a narrower scope of coverage than the real estate improvement statute of limitation).
[¶ 20.] The Court also adds language to section 35.1. When it harmonizes the two sections, it states that section 35 applies when there has been a formal notice of denial by the employer, while section 35.1 applies when no denial notice is given. I find this distinction unpersuasive, as there is no language in section 35.1 to support this theory. When we apply legislative enactments, we determine intent “from what the legislature said, rather than from what we or others think it should have said.” S.D. Subseq. Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., Inc., 2000 SD 11, ¶ 13, 605 N.W.2d 166, 169. Section 35.1 simply states that “[i]n any case in which any benefits have been tendered ... any claim for additional compensation shall be barred, unless a claim is filed within three years from the date of the last payment of benefits.” The only triggering event in the statute is that benefits have been paid and have been discontinued. There is no requirement that benefits be denied without notice or without a dispute. To hold otherwise judicially adds language to section 35.1 that was not intended by the legislature.
[¶ 21.] For these reasons, I would apply the three-year statute of limitation found in section 35.1 and allow Faircloth’s claim to proceed. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.