(dissenting).
[¶ 20.] I respectfully dissent.
[1121.] I agree with the Court that SDCL 23-3-19.3 on its face provides support for admission of the lab report into evidence. However, the Court seeks to go beyond this evidentiary issue and enters the realm of constitutional law by engaging in confrontation clause analysis. The confrontation clause rationale relied upon by this Court was never raised at the revocation hearing nor was it properly raised by Beck in this appeal.
[¶ 22.] At the revocation hearing, Beck did not seek an opportunity to exercise his rights under the confrontation clause by confronting and cross-examining Stacy Ell-wanger of the State Health Laboratory who authored the report, despite the fact that confrontation rights are specifically recognized by SDCL 23-3-19.3. Beck’s objection was limited to foundational and chain of custody grounds:
Your Honor, I would object. I see no certification or signature from Stacy Ell-wanger, who’s reported to be the chemist on that. I also would object because there is a lack of sufficient foundation in regards particularly to the chain of evidence and chain of custody.
This Court has consistently held that issues should be handled by the trial court and not brought up for the first time on appeal to this Court. Satellite Cable Services, Inc. v. Northern Electric, 1998 SD 67 ¶ 10, 581 N.W.2d 478, 481.
[¶ 23.] Beyond that default at the hearing, the confrontation clause issue was also never properly raised by Beck in this appeal. SDCL 15-26A-60 states in part: “[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... (4)[a] concise statement of the legal issue or issues involved.... ” The issue as framed by Beck and discussed by this Court is as follows: “[i]s the evidence sufficient to sustain the revocation of Beck’s probation?” The issue as drafted by Beck makes no claim of a constitutional violation of any kind.
[¶24.] In addition, neither brief prepared by Beck makes any reference to either the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article VI section 7 of the South Dakota Constitution. There is also no citation in his first brief to any case law authority along this line. Failure to cite supporting authority results in a waiver of that claim. State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 22, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599 (citing to SDCL 15-26A-60(6)).
*254[¶ 25.] Understandably the State’s brief never mentions the words “confrontation clause” or anything akin to it and the Court’s citation in footnote one to the quote from the State’s brief is an admission as such. Thus, the reference to the comment by Beck in his rebuttal brief to the confrontation clause is in violation of SDCL 15-26A-62: “[t]he appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee. The reply brief must be confined to new matter raised in the brief of the appellee.”
[¶ 26.] Beyond the issue of proper application of the numerous procedural defaults in this case by Beck, most troublesome is the Court’s addressing the confrontation clause issue sua sponte. This denies us a properly developed record and the benefit of proper briefing and appellate argument. A review of the authority cited by the Court, Bayer v. Johnson, 349 N.W.2d 447, 449 (S.D.1984), and State v. Baker, 440 N.W.2d 284, 293 (S.D.1989) shows that the invocation of this doctrine has been used most sparingly and then only in important eases of permanent state wide implication. I respectfully submit that invocation of that doctrine in this case is not appropriate. The Court concedes that its recognition of a confrontation clause violation merely results in a remand for a new hearing at which time all the State has to do is little more than to produce the same document this time with proper authentication.
[¶27.] There is sufficient evidence to sustain the revocation. I would affirm the circuit court on all issues and for the above reasons respectfully dissent.
[¶ 28.] MILLER, Chief Justice, joins this dissent.