(dissenting).
[¶26.] The, admissibility of expert testimony is governed by SDCL 19-15-2 (Rule 702). See State v. Edelman, 1999 SD 52, ¶ 6, 593 N.W.2d 419, 421 (quoting State v. Raymond, 540 N.W.2d 407, 409 (S.D. 1995)). Under SDCL 19-15-2,
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine'a fact in issue, a witness qualified , as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in- the form of an opinion or otherwise.
See Maroney, 1997 SD 73, ¶34, 565 N.W.2d at 78.
[¶ 27.] In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 480 (1993), the United States Supreme Court established specific standards for admission of expert scientific testimony. This Court followed Daubert in State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D.1994) when-we held that a trial judge must ensure that an expert’s testimony rests on both “a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” The trial judge - must also “make the initial decision on-whether the testimony will assist the trier .of fact.” Schaffer, 1996 SD 94, ¶ 8, 552 N.W.2d at 805 (citing Nebraska Depository Inst. Guar. Corp. v. Stastny, 243 Neb. 36, 497 N.W.2d 657, 670 (1993)).' The United States Supreme Court recently expanded: its Daubert gate-keeping decision to be applicable to “ ‘technical’ and ' ‘other specialized’ ” expert testimony, in addition to the testimony of scientific experts. ' See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249 (1999) (citing FedREvid 702). See also Estate of Dokken, 2000 SD 9, ¶ 51, 604 N.W.2d 487, 500 (Amundson, J., concurring specially) (quoting Kumho as expanding the Daubert gate-keeping function). This Court recognized in Kuper v. Lincolm-Union Electric Co., 1996 SD 145, ¶ 41, 557 N.W.2d 748, 760, that “when the trial court is ruling on the admissibility of an expert opinion, the trial court needs to exercise its gatekeeping function” to determine that the opinion has a rehable foundation and is relevant to the case at hand.
[¶ 28.] Nickles argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its role as “gatekeeper” 5 by permitting Boldus to testify as to what he “perceived to be applicable standards of care for golf course conduct by both Nickles and Schilds.”
[¶ 29.] Other jurisdictions have allowed an expert opinion on golfing etiquette, rules, and customs because they are “not of such common knowledge that a lay juror could form an intelligent and accurate opinion as an expert could.” Stephenson v. Redd, 1990 WL 751302, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.1990) (citing Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 339 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1986)). See also Boyd J. Peterson, Annotation, Liability to One Struck By Golf Club, 63 A.L.R.4th 221, 228 (1988) (stating that “[g]olf custom and etiquette may be important in showing the propriety of the swing, as well as other matters subject to such rules, and although not necessary, such rules may be more credible if presented by an expert witness”).
[¶ 30.] While this Court has never been confronted with expert testimony regarding a golf club accident, it is clear there was no error to allow expert golfer to testify as to the rules, etiquette, and customs of golf to assist the jury in understanding the issues and deciding the case. In the present case, however, Boldus not only testified as to golf rules, etiquette and *665customs, he also provided his opinion as to what he believed happened and concluded that there was a violation of a standard of care but failed to establish what standards control the determination of liability in a golfing incident.
[¶ 31.] In Robbins v. Buntrock, 1996 SD 84, 550 N.W.2d 422, this Court was faced with whether the opinion testimony from a police officer who investigated the motorcycle/automobile accident between Robbins and Buntrock was inadmissible. At trial, Robbins wanted Officer Sambo to “ ‘explain to the jury why [Buntrock] was negligent, and how that negligence caused this accident[.]’ ” Id. ¶ 8, 550 N.W.2d at 425. In holding the testimony inadmissible, we stated:
Trial courts possess broad discretion in ruling on the qualifications of experts and admissibility of their testimony.... Although SDCL 19-15-4 (Rule 704) has been revised, allowing witnesses to testify on ultimate issues, opinions must still help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine issues of fact. Resolving negligence questions is an elemental jury function and opinions couched purely in terms of negligence may confuse and misdirect, rather than assist the jury.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 32.] In Zens v. Harrison, 538 N.W.2d 794 (S.D.1995), Zens brought suit against Harrison after falling off Harrison’s roof while assisting him in reshingling. At trial, Zens called Steve Pelzl as an expert on roofing and roofing safety. Id. Pelzl testified that Harrison inadequately instructed and supervised Zens. Id. at 795. The trial court ultimately disallowed Pelzl from responding to Zens’ question of “whether Harrison was ‘negligent’ in his instruction and supervision of the workplace.” Id. In affirming the trial court’s disallowance of Pelzl’s testimony, we held:
In 1993 SDCL 19-15-4 (Rule 704) was amended to adopt verbatim the federal rule and abolish the ultimate issue rule....
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Thus, even with the abolition of the ultimate issue rule, certain expert opinions may be excluded as intrusive. “With respect to negligence actions, an opinion phrased in terms of negligence itself, involving not only the formulation of a legal standard by the witness but also one substantially immune to exploration, seems calculated to confuse or mislead rather than assist the trier.”
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“The law permits expert opinion testimony because the expert can draw inferences beyond the capability of lay jurors.” Determining negligence has always been the jury’s function.
Id. at 795-96 (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 33.] In the present case, we are not faced with the trial court’s disallowance of an expert’s testimony. On the contrary, we are faced with the trial court’s allowance of expert witness testimony regarding the violation of the standards of care in the game of golf after said witness admitted there was no such standard of care. While Boldus’ testimony regarding golf etiquette and customs may have been beneficial to the jurors, an opinion as to a violation of an unknown standard of care went too far. Based upon the prior testimony of Boldus that no standard existed, what standard was supposed to have been violated? The answer to that is a mystery. We have often stated determining negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are within the province of the jury. See Bland v. Davison County, 1997 SD 92, ¶ 27, 566 N.W.2d 452, 460; Gerlach v. Ethan Lumber Ass’n, 478 N.W.2d 828, 830 (S.D.1991). To allow the admission of this speculative and conjectural opinion would shift the responsibility of determining the negligence in this golf case from the jury to the expert witness. This is a classic example of intrusion by an expert in order to mislead the jury. Thus, *666the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Boldus’ opinion regarding the violation of a phantom standard.
[¶ 34.] I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
. Schild briefly mentions in a footnote in his brief that Nickles did not raise the Daubert gatekeeping issue before the trial court.