In Re the Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier

GILBERTSON, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

[¶ 27.] I would affirm the Board’s decision to deny Meier the conditional use permit and thus affirm the trial court. I would not remand for further proceedings before the Board as I see no reason to march the troops up the hill to again march them down. Proeedurally Meier was allowed to present his evidence in full as to why the circuit court should reverse the Board. Meier failed in his attempt and the trial court granted a directed verdict against him at the close of his case. *531To now remand for the remainder of the trial does no more than require the County to put on its evidence in a case that it has already won on the merits.

[¶ 28.] As to the legal issue, it is clear the granting of a conditional use permit is discretionary with the Aurora County Board of Commissioners as defined in the Aurora County Zoning Ordinances: “Such uses may be permitted in such zoning districts as conditional use is made in this Ordinance.” (emphasis added). Given that the Board has this discretionary authority, “[t]his Court is not warranted in directing the manner in which the Commission should exercise its legal discretion.” Coyote Flats v. Sanborn County Comm’n, 1999 SD 87, ¶ 42, 596 N.W.2d 347, 356-57 (citing Breckweg v. Knochenmus, 81 S.D. 244, 251, 133 N.W.2d 860, 864 (1965)). The only question the court must decide is whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously. See Schrank v. Pennington County Bd. of Comm’n, 1998 SD 108, ¶¶ 16-19, 584 N.W.2d 680, 682-83 (a reviewing court must determine the legality, not the propriety, of a board’s decision). If it did not, it must be affirmed.

[¶ 29.] “A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is ‘not governed by any fixed rules or standard.’ ” Smith v. Canton Sch. Dist. No. 41-1, 1999 SD 111, ¶9, 599 N.W.2d 637, 639-40 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 104 (6th ed. 1990)). The fixed rules that guide the Board’s decision here are provided by the Aurora County Zoning Ordinances, particularly § 515 governing performance standards for commercial feedlot operations and § 1107B governing conditional uses generally. The Board determined Meier’s plan to construct two hog confinement facilities did not comply with the standards specifically addressing feedlot operations in Aurora County and set forth its reasoning in its denial of Meier’s conditional use permit. There is no showing that this decision was made arbitrarily or capriciously. There is no reason to remand this action back to the Board that denied the permit in the first place to consider additional, broader elements when it denied the permit based on specific ones.

[¶ 30.] I agree with the majority that the constitutional issue need not be reached. “Principles of judicial restraint dictate that when an issue effectively disposes of the case, other issues that are presented should not be reached.” Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 248 (S.D.1994). “This principle is especially applicable when constitutional issues are involved.” Id. (citing State v. Devericks, 77 S.D. 509, 94 N.W.2d 348 (1959) (citing Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943))).