(dissenting).
[¶ 28.] I dissent to the majority opinion’s conclusion that Reetz should be denied unemployment benefits because she “failed to establish good cause for refusing continued employment with Colonial Manor.” The • Department of Labor (DOL) found that Reetz was not discharged for misconduct and that she had good cause to quit her job. The circuit court affirmed. We should also affirm.
[¶24.] When reviewing administrative appeals, the standard of review is governed by SDCL 1-26-37, which provides that we “shall give the same deference to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and final judgment of the circuit court as [we do to] other appeals from the circuit court.” Factual findings are sustained unless we find them to be clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Wernke v. State Dep’t of Social Services, 1999 SD 32, ¶ 4, 590 N.W.2d 260, 262 (citation omitted).
[¶ 25.] 1. Reetz left her employment at Colonial Manor with good cause.
[¶ 26.] The majority opinion reduces the cause of Reetz’ departure from LHS to “mere verbal exchanges and sparring among coworkers” and cites to Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Unemployment Compensation: Harassment or Other Mistreatment by Co-Worker as “Good Cause” Justifying Abandonment of Employment, 40 A.L.R.4th 304 (1985) as support. I disagree with this characterization because it is incorrect and trivializes the facts and the reality of this workplace. I also disagree with the majority opinion’s reliance on the above-cited A.L.R. because it limits its scope to problems between co-workers and does not apply to situations like this where Reetz was mistreated by her employer, not merely her co-workers. That simple fact distinguishes the cases the majority opinion relies upon as taken from that A.L.R.
*237[¶ 27.] Here, Reetz endured mistreatment by the administrative staff of LHS, a staff that had the ability to hire, fire and restructure the organization. In other words, Reetz was mistreated by her employer, not merely her co-workers. See James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Unemployment Compensation: Harassment or Other Mistreatment by Employer or Supervisor as “Good Cause” Justifying Abandonment of Employment, 76 A.L.R.3d 1089 (1977).
[¶ 28.] SDCL 61-6-13 provides that “[a]n unemployed individual who, voluntarily without good cause, left h[er] most recent employment ... is denied benefits[.f SDCL 61-6-13.1 provides five acceptable situations where “good cause” is established. The only reason potentially applicable here is the third situation, which requires Reetz to prove that “[t]he employer’s conduct demonstrate^] a substantial disregard of the standards of behavior that the employee has a right to expect of h[er] employer or the employer has breached or substantially altered the contract for employmentf.]” Here, Reetz proved it. The DOL found it as a fact. The circuit court affirmed on those facts and now the majority opinion uses the wrong standard of review to reach its desired result of reversal.
[¶ 29.] The substance of the e-mail Reetz read on March 19, 1998 is crucial. The subject line of the e-mail read “Suck-up letter - Reply.” The e-mail revealed a concerted effort between administrative employees to avoid using any language in a letter to Reetz that could be interpreted as a “guarantee of a position.” The sender, a LHS administrative employee, recognized that Reetz may go to “grievance” and reviewed the proposed letter to Reetz in an effort to “help [Holm] cover [her] butt so that we know that everything is kosher over there and never give [Reetz] that loop hole.” After reading this e-mail, Reetz was justified in believing that LHS was trying to get rid of her and any application she would submit for the other positions would be summarily rejected or received with bias or prejudice.
[¶ 30.] The time line here is also crucial:
03/15/98 Reetz was told that her job would be eliminated on April 1, 1998.
— She was also told that she could apply for other positions and was handed two job descriptions. She expressed that she would not consider a third job, the Nurse Educator position.
— She was also given the option of “waiting] until the dust settled] and take what is left over on the floor.”
03/16/98 —Reetz discussed the resident assessment position with Jean Witt, the Director of Nurses. Witt informed Reetz that she better apply if she wanted because her position would be terminated April 1,1998.
03/18/98 —Reetz filled out an application for one of the available positions.
03/19/98 —Before turning in her application, however, Reetz found the e-mail with the subject line reading “Suck up letter - Reply.”
— . Reetz did not turn her application in because she felt, after reading the e-mail, that LHS was trying to get rid of her.
— Reetz wrote a letter to the administrative staff requesting severance pay for failure to provide (1) a job offer when she was initially terminated and (2) adequate notice of termination, as required by the LHS handbook.
— The administrative staff, by Holm, responded in writing the same day. Holm informed Reetz that the available positions closed 3/19/98 at 10:00 a.m. The letter also extended her termination date to May 1, 1998 (thereby avoiding the payment of severance pay).
04/15/98 —LHS wrote a letter to Reetz denying her request for severance pay. LHS then offered her the Nurse Educator position without requiring her to complete the “standard application pro*238cess.” Interestingly enough, Reetz refused to consider applying for this job on March 15 “because of the stress and harassment to employees and because [she] has done staff education before.”
04/22/98 —Reetz declined to accept the Nurse Educator position and “resigned.”
[¶ 31.] Once this time line is considered, one must pause to consider whether Reetz was terminated or whether she voluntarily left. However, the time line reveals that it is obvious that Reetz had good cause to terminate her job with LHS. Reetz was terminated from her position on March 15, 1998 - this is indicated by her being allowed to “apply for” other positions. “Applying for” is substantially different from being “offered” a different position within the company. Thus, Reetz was informed, on March 15, of her termination, effective April 1. But Reetz did not surrender, quietly-
[¶ 32.] According to the Luthern Health Services employee handbook, employees are informed that “[ejlimination of a job is not considered termination if the employee is offered another position.” The handbook also informs employees that they will be given thirty-days notice before termination of their position due to restructuring. Based on these policies, Reetz requested severance pay. LHS responded that same day and extended the effective date of her termination to May 1, 1998 to obviously avoid having to pay her severance pay. This is a classic demonstration of an employer circumventing its policies for the company’s benefit. It evidences a “substantial disregard of the standards of behavior that the employee has a right to expect[.]” SDCL 61-6-13.1(3). See also Randolph v. New Mexico Employment Security, Dep’t., 108 N.M. 441, 774 P.2d 435, 438 (1989) (determining that the employer’s failure to provide paychecks to its employee on the designated payday established good cause for the employee to voluntarily quit employment.).
• [¶ 33.] On review, the question is whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Here, they are not. Therefore, the decisions of the DOL and circuit court that Reetz had good cause to leave her employment with Colonial Manor should be affirmed. Consequently, Reetz is entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
[¶ 34.] 2. Reetz is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
[¶ 35.] SDCL 61-6-15 provides:
If the [DOL] finds that an unemployed individual has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available suitable work when so directed by [DOL] or to accept suitable work when offered h[er], the claimant shall be denied benefits ....
[¶ 36.] The DOL determined that the intention of the e-mail, to “cover their butts,” extended to the reason the job offer was made to Reetz on April 15. Based on the above time line, it is obvious that Reetz was not offered a job until after she requested severance pay. It was at that point that LHS apparently realized that they had to “cover them butts” again to protect themselves from an increase in their experience rating account. LHS cleverly offered Reetz the same job that she declined to accept on March 15. In other words, LHS knew that Reetz would not accept the job they offered to her because she had previously turned it down once.
[¶ 37.] Additionally, the Nurse Educator position was a lower job classification than the Medicare plan coordinator position. Accordingly, there was a vast difference in the responsibilities between the two positions. “A discharged employee is entitled to a reasonable period of time to find work with a commensurate wage and benefits to h[er] previous job, before being required to accept lesser employment.” Johnson v. Virginia Employment Comm’n., 8 Va.App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989).
[¶ 38.] Given the facts that (1) LHS offered Reetz a position they knew she was *239not interested in and (2) the lapse of time between her discharge from her Medicare plan coordinator position and the offer of the Nurse Educator position was minimal, no “bona fide” job offer was ever made and Reetz is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. To conclude otherwise is to reward an employer for engaging in “damage control” after the fact. We should have no part of that.
[¶ 39.] Even if the job offer were legitimate, Reetz had “good cause” for declining the job. The majority opinion incorrectly implies that we adopt a narrow test to determine “good cause,” citing Murphy v. Employment Security Dep’t. of State, 47 Wash.App. 252, 734 P.2d 924, 926 (1987). However, this incorrect test was used in Murphy by the Washington Court of Appeals to determine whether “good cause” existed when an employee becomes voluntarily unemployed. Our statutes already provide the correct test for determining that issue and we are compelled to use it. See SDCL 61-6-13.1 and Issue 1, supra. Furthermore, the Murphy test is not the test that we use to determine “good cause” in declining suitable employment.
[¶ 40.] In establishing whether an employee has good cause for refusing suitable employment, we have stated:
Good cause ... must be deduced from the facts of each case ... and may cover reasons which are extraneous to the employment and strictly personal to the claimant, provided, however, such personal reasons involve real and substantial circumstances which compel the decision to refuse suitable work and rest on ‘good faith.’ ‘[G]ood faith, as used in this context, includes positive conduct on the part of the claimant which is consistent with the genuine desire to work and be self-supporting.’
Anderson v. Western Dakota Insurors, 393 N.W.2d 87, 90 (S.D.1986) (quoting Matter of Unemployment Appeal of Fickbohm, 323 N.W.2d 133, 135 (S.D.1982) (other citations omitted)). Once again, the majority opinion uses the wrong standard of review and test to reach its desired result of reversal.
[¶ 41.] The circuit court found that Reetz “was desirous of being employed and self-supporting.” This is not clearly erroneous as Reetz had every intention of applying for one of the two available positions before she found the “suck-up” e-mail. Therefore, Reetz demonstrated good faith. The same can not be said for LHS.
[¶ 42.] LHS had policies in existence in order to provide a sense of security to its employees and then violated those policies; for example, 30-days notice must be provided to all employees whose jobs will be eliminated due to restructuring. Only when Reetz challenged the actions of LHS and requested severance pay, did LHS extend the termination date to comply with this policy. Clearly, much more was involved here than “sparring” and “irreconcilable differences” between co-workers. This conduct evidences deception and a lack of good faith by LHS and we should not reward an employer for those qualities. Obviously, real and substantial circumstances existed which compelled Reetz to refuse the Nurse Educator position. Therefore, Reetz had good cause in refusing the position with LHS.
[¶ 43.] As the majority opinion points out, apologies were made to Reetz by the administrative staff, but Reetz was justified in thinking that those “apologies” were simply another effort to “cover their butt.” Reetz can not be criticized for her justifiable suspicion that the apologies were submitted as part of the LHS “damage control” plan.
[¶ 44.] There is substantial evidence to support the decisions of the DOL and the circuit court and we should affirm the award of unemployment benefits.
[¶ 45.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this dissent.