(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶24.] Although I generally agree with the majority’s holding on Issue 3, for reasons stated below, I dissent on Issue 1 and would not reach Issue 2.
[¶ 25.] The majority opinion gives a strained interpretation of certain specific provisions of the contract, without regard to the plain language and obvious meaning and intent of the contracting parties. “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.” Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2dCir.l944) (L.Hand, J., concurring).
[¶26.] Look at the clear provisions of the written contract. It is obvious that Article 8 does not create a right or entitlement to work in inclement weather. Rather it is a condition of employment — a limit upon the plenary powers of the District as enumerated in Article 4.
[¶ 27.] Article 4 is entitled “MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.” Section 4.02 is styled “Specific Management Prerogatives” and gives the District the right “[t]o utilize personnel, methods, and means in the most appropriate and efficient manner possible.” Section 4.02.01.
[¶ 28.] On the other hand, Article 8 is entitled “OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.” It creates no specific rights, as the majority tries to read into it. Section 8.02.02.01 does provide that “[c]us-todial and maintenance department employees are required to work” in inclement weather. But nowhere does the contract state, or even fairly imply, that those employees have a right to work in inclement weather. I challenge the majority to tell us what language in the contract gives the employees a right to work in inclement weather.
[¶ 29.] The Management Rights conferred in Article 4 must take precedence over the lesser Conditions of Employment created in Article 8. Section 4.01 recognizes the plenary. management power of the District in setting conditions of employment. The remainder of the contract must be read cognizant of such general authority. Nothing in the contract diminishes the power of the District, except where specifically limited by the contract. Section 4.02.01 plainly states the District has the right to utilize personnel in the most appropriate manner possible. Under that provision, the District has the right to utilize its personnel so as not to jeopardize worker safety.
[¶ 30.] To give the contract the literal interpretation of the majority strains com*818mon sense. Surely the contract cannot contemplate that even when weather conditions become so severe that the Governor and Mayor are closing roads, custodial and maintenance workers nevertheless have the right to go to work, despite the contrary instructions by the District! The contract certainly does not say this, and common sense tells us this is not what the parties intended.
[¶ 31.] In Issue 3 the opinion asserts that the agreed-upon bargain is a day’s work for a day’s pay. I argue that this bargain is a condition of employment, not an entitlement to employment. The majority opinion states that “[a]s the District could not insist on a day’s work for no pay, so an employee cannot insist on a day’s pay for no work.” (I agree!) It then concludes that those employees who did not come to work and did not make up the time or use accrued leave are not entitled to pay. (Again, I agree!) Interestingly, the majority’s rationale on Issue 3 recognizes the validity of my position, but at the same time it fails to appreciate the lack of its logic to its holding on Issue 1.
[¶ 32.] One must ponder, if there is truly a right to work in inclement weather, as the majority holds, then should not these same employees be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for absenteeism? In other words, there are corresponding responsibilities that accompany rights. Thus, if there is indeed a right to work in inclement weather, then there is a corresponding responsibility to be present for work. By following the rationale of the majority to its logical conclusion, the District would have a corresponding right to require them all to come to work, regardless of how serious the safety risks, or otherwise face disciplinary proceedings. This would be an absurd conclusion. It is equally absurd to hold that the District is prevented by the contract from notifying its employees that because of certain inclement conditions they should stay at home. Only by a stretch of the imagination would the employees have asked for — and the District have granted — such an absolute right to work.
[¶ 33.] In sum, the contract must be read with the understanding that the District has general, plenary authority over its employees, subject only to the conditions set forth in the contract. If the District deems the weather so adverse that it is not safe (or legal) for anybody to travel to work, that decision is within its power under Article 4. The trial court was correct; the majority opinion is not.