(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 50.] I respectfully dissent on issue three, which is whether we should permit a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on conduct occurring prior to the completion of a divorce, and if so, whether the elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress have been met. Based on my dissent regarding issue three, I do not believe we must address issue seven concerning punitive damages. I concur with the majority on the other issues of this case.
[¶ 51.] This Court has addressed the inclusion of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in a divorce action on two prior occasions. In Pickering, this Court held that a spouse couldn’t sue the *388other spouse for conduct arising out of the dissolution of the marriage. 434 N.W.2d 758 (emphasis added). In Henry I, this Court held that a spouse could sue the other spouse for conduct after the divorce is final. 534 N.W.2d 844 (emphasis added). We recognized in Pickering that the emotionally charged setting displayed in most divorces would almost always result in emotional distress; therefore it follows that a claim for emotional distress could be made in every divorce case. We further stated in Pickering that “[w]e do not believe that the law should provide a basis for such interfamilial warfare.” 434 N.W.2d at 762 (citations omitted).
[¶ 52.] In Henry I, however, we recognized that one should not be able to conduct himself or herself with impunity from suit at the expense of a former spouse. 534 N.W.2d at 846-47. In other words, one would not be deterred from emotionally harming a former spouse, knowing that he or she cannot be sued. In Henry I, we stated that “SDCL 25-4-1 provides that the effect of a divorce judgment ‘is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried persons.’” Id. at 846. As such, allowing a suit to go forward based on post-divorce conduct is allowable as the parties are no longer considered married. A couple is not considered divorced in the eyes of the law upon the filing of divorce. Rather, they are not legally divorced until the divorce decree is signed and filed by the trial court. SDCL 25-4-1.
[¶ 53.] It is important to note that in the Pickering type situation, the party suffering emotional distress can point out the aggressor’s conduct when determining fault, and alimony may be awarded to the aggrieved party. In such a case, the court has the authority to hold an individual in contempt. SDCL 15-20-19. Under the trial court’s broad contempt powers, it could find the party in contempt and/or grant terms to the aggrieved party. In the Henry I type situation, however, the party suffering emotional distress is no longer protected by the court’s jurisdiction if alimony was not originally awarded. See Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484, 489 (S.D.1991) (stating modification of alimony is a supplementary proceeding to original divorce suit).
[¶ 54.] The record in this case only discloses a trial wherein the divorce and tort claim were combined for hearing. It is impossible to discern from this record what evidence was presented to support each cause of action. Therefore, meaningful appellate review of the record regarding whether or not there is a viable post-divorce claim is impossible. Therefore, I would remand for further proceedings and would avoid making a determination on whether the elements for emotional distress have been met. Because the majority held that the elements have been met, however, I respond to their contentions with some concern.
[¶ 55.] The elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress include: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) severe emotional distress must result.” French v. Dell Rapids Community Hosp., Inc., 432 N.W.2d 285, 289 (S.D.1988) (citing Groseth Int’l, Inc. v. Tenneco, 410 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987)).
[¶ 56.] Element one, extreme and outrageous conduct, requires “conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and which is of a nature especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.” Stene v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 1998 SD 95, ¶ 32, 583 N.W.2d 399, 404 (citations omitted). The conduct required *389to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress “must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (citations omitted).
[¶ 57.] Connie argues that many of Michael’s actions amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct, including: telling Connie’s co-worker and friend that Connie had forged a $35 check when Connie had, in fact, deposited it in their joint checking account; accusing Connie of having a girlfriend or boyfriend; accusing Connie of stealing money from him; stating that Connie foolishly spent money; accusing Connie of taking out life insurance on him with the intent of later killing him; telling bank customers from Connie’s bank of employment that Connie had disclosed personal information about them; reporting Connie to Child Protection three times for investigation of abuse after finding bruises on their daughter, in addition to an array of other vindictive acts.
[¶ 58.] While Michael’s actions were definitely far from benevolent, these facts would not cause an average member of the community to “exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ”6 Offensive words and actions are not uncommon between feuding spouses. Furthermore, “even when the conduct of feuding spouses is not particularly unusual, high emotions can readily cause an offended spouse to view the other’s conduct as ‘extreme and outrageous.’ ” Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M.App.1991) (holding that various insults and outbursts during a marriage were insufficient to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress). While Michael’s actions may have been “childish, irresponsible, and inconsiderate ... it is doubtful whether his conduct constituted a sufficient basis upon which liability could be imposed, on the plaintiffs theory of the case.” Hassing v. Workman, 214 Neb. 154, 333 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff failed to provide adequate evidence to support a verdict for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Thus, element one requiring extreme and outrageous conduct was not proven.
[¶ 59.] Furthermore, the record does not show that Connie proved the fourth element required for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is severe emotional distress resulting from the defendant’s conduct. See French, 432 N.W.2d at 289 (discussing the elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Although physical symptoms are not required to prove severe emotional distress in South Dakota, the plaintiff must provide some type of evidence adequate to prove that severe emotional distress does, in fact, exist. See Stene, 1998 SD 95 at ¶ 30, 583 N.W.2d at 404 (indicating that a “manifestation of physical symptoms” is required for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but not for intentional infliction of emotional distress).7 Here, whether demonstrated by physical symptoms or not, the severity of Connie’s distress could have *390been proven with expert testimony from a psychiatric expert, or it could simply have been proven by lay witness testimony. See Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., Inc., 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1220 (1988) (citation omitted) (stating that expert opinions may be used to show severe emotional distress, but they are not “indispensable,” as lay persons may testify to significant changes in the plaintiffs emotional well being).
[¶ 60.] In Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed whether the plaintiff had adequately substantiated his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn.1983). In Hubbard the plaintiff testified that he had been depressed and physically ill in terms of vomiting and a skin rash, as well as high blood pressure. See id. The plaintiff, however, never skipped work for these conditions, nor did he claim worker’s compensation or visit a doctor. The court noted that “evidence as to Hubbard’s injuries is conspicuously absent from the record.” Id. Thus, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[¶ 61.] Much like in Hubbard, Connie faded to present evidence supporting her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only Connie and one other person testified on the topic, and neither witness proved the claim. Connie testified that she suffered from back problems and had a nerve problem in her hand. She further testified that a doctor in Aberdeen thinks that “maybe” these symptoms are stress induced. Connie also stated that she cries a lot and that she lost her job because of Michael’s actions. Aside from Connie’s own testimony about her emotional distress, the other witness on the topic was Bev Morrison, Connie’s friend and co-worker. Bev stated only that Connie displayed signs of stress and that Connie was worried about losing her job. Neither Connie’s nor Bev’s testimony, however, adequately proves that Connie suffered from severe emotional distress. The symptoms described do not appear to be more than the ordinary stresses of divorce.
[¶ 62.] Importantly, the Hubbard court acknowledged that trial courts must carefully scrutinize all of the plaintiffs evidence concerning the cause and severity of alleged claims of emotional distress. See id. n. 9 (citation omitted). Such scrutiny is required in order to avoid spurious claims for emotional distress. See id. This Court, too, should use careful scrutiny when analyzing whether severe distress has been proven. Without such scrutiny, burdensome litigation may become commonplace within the South Dakota courts and groundless claims for the tort will find their way into courtrooms more easily, thereby burdening judicial economy. See *391Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1324 (recognizing that the scope of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be very limited in the marital context).
[¶ 63.] The record is void of any evidence that Connie suffered emotional distress severe enough to validate recovery for emotional distress. She could have presented medical testimony of any counseling she obtained, but she did not. She could have presented adequate lay witness testimony proving severe emotional distress, but again, she did not. She should have presented eiddence that Michael was, in fact, the cause for the lost job claim, but she did not. Therefore, Connie clearly failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[¶ 64.] Finally, after reading the testimony offered at trial, the record is unclear as to what testimony goes with what cause of action. At a minimum, the convoluted testimony evidenced in this record only supports our decision that the two causes of action need their own forum. As a practical matter, the posture of this case makes it difficult to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Without distinct facts providing the basis for a particular cause of action, this Court must sift through the entire record and guess as to what the trial court relies upon to determine whether the trial court was within its discretion. In order to conduct a meaningful review, the tort and divorce action should be litigated separately from one another.
[¶ 65.] A trial for divorce and a tort claim should be bifurcated. The trial court should have bifurcated Connie’s claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress from her divorce claim. While this Court is mindful of the notion of judicial economy, “this concern does not outweigh the fact that a domestic relations forum is not the proper forum in which to litigate a tort claim.” Koepke v. Koepke, 52 Ohio App.3d 47, 556 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (1989); see also Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151, 158 (1988) (stating “a tort action is not based on the same underlying claims as an action for divorce”); Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 438, 553 A.2d 152, 154 (1988) (finding divorce, and tort are separate causes of action).
[¶ 66.] .The objectives of a tort claim are inconsistent from those sought in a divorce action. Koepke, supra at 1199. “The purpose of a divorce action is to dissolve the marital relationship and effect a legal separation of man and wife, while a tort action is brought to recover compensation for injuries suffered as a result of a civil wrong.” Id. In a tort action damages are recoverable, whereas in a divorce, damages are not available. Moreover, unlike a tort action, one is not entitled to a jury trial in a divorce action. See generally, Fox v. Burden, 1999 SD 154, 603 N.W.2d 916. Because the objectives of each cause of action are incompatible, they should not be tried together.
[¶ 67.] Based on the precedent established for this case and the scanty evidence in the record for this generous tort award, it would probably constitute legal malpractice if an attorney failed to file a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in all new domestic disputes. This will more than likely fall within what is commonly referred to as “opening the flood gates” in domestic relations law for tort claims. Therefore, I would have at least remanded back for a separate and fair trial on this newly embraced domestic relations tort, under which even “Mr. Wonderful” (Michael) is entitled to under our law.
[¶ 68.] MILLER, Retired Chief Justice, joins this writing.
. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965). The Restatement acknowledges that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. The facts must be such that "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " Id.
. This Court has previously stated:
As to intentional torts, this [C]ourt has held, [T]hat recovery can be had for mental pain, though no physical injury results, when the following elements are present: the act causing the anguish was done intentionally, the act was unreasonable and the actor should have recognized it as likely to result in emotional distress. Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D.1979); First National Bank of Jacksonville v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167 N.W.2d 381 (1969). See also, Gross v. *390United States, 723 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.1983); Gross v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 1085 (D.S.D.1981). It has also been said of this tort that 'there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.' W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 12 (4th ed.1971). Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d 608, 609 (S.D.1987) quoting, Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652, 654 (S.D.1984). The evidence must show extreme emotional distress. 'The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment j (1965). See also, Bethards v. Shiwers, Inc., 355 N.W.2d 39 (Iowa 1984).
Groseth, 440 N.W.2d at 280 (receded from by Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898 (S.D.1992) on other grounds). Just as in Groseth, a review of the evidence in this case leads to only one conclusion on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The only conclusion is that the evidence was insufficient to establish the claim.