(dissenting).
[¶ 25.] I respectfully dissent on issue two. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized another exception to the general rule that a search without probable cause is per se unreasonable. State v. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶ 18, *621548 N.W.2d 792, 796. The Court held that a police officer that lacks probable cause to arrest could conduct a pat-down search, “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. The Terry exception is narrow, “the sole justification of the search ... is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope of an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
[¶ 26.] The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1903, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (stating that the search and seizure of the defendant would have been justified if the officer had had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was armed and dangerous). Without specific and articula-ble facts supporting the officer’s conclusion that he feared for his safety, the pat-down search cannot be upheld. People v. Dickey, 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44, 46 (1994) (“Without ‘specific and articula-ble’ facts which show that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, these conclusions [“officer safety” and defendant “potentially may have been armed”] add nothing.”).
[¶ 27.] Officer Craig Babekuhl testified that he conducted a Terry search out of “fear for his safety” based upon the fact that a knife had been used in the robbery of which defendant was a suspect. However, a review of the facts fails to support the officer’s conclusionary statement at the hearing that he “feared for his safety.”
[¶ 28.] The stopping officer, Lieutenant Runyan, initially suspected the defendant and driver of the armed robbery of Omar’s Market. Lieutenant Runyan was aware that a knife had been used in the robbery. Yet, when Lieutenant Runyan pulled the two men over, he did not immediately frisk for a weapon, but simply requested that the driver step out of the car while the passenger remain in the car. Backup units arrived shortly thereafter. Officer Tim-merman was the first to arrive. Officer Timmerman also knew the two were suspected of the armed robbery in which the suspect had wielded a knife. Officer Tim-merman approached the passenger (Faulks), asked for identification, and, upon receiving it, returned to his patrol car. From his patrol car, approximately twelve to fifteen feet from defendant, Officer Timmerman ran a check on Faulks’ identification. For the next seven to ten minutes, Officer Timmerman sat in the patrol car and “wait[ed] to see what was going to happen.” At no time did Officer Timmerman conduct a pat-down search fearing a weapon.
[¶ 29.] Meanwhile, Officer Babekuhl, accompanied by recruit Officer Warrant, arrived at the scene. Officer Babekuhl approached Faulks and invited Faulks to sit in his patrol car where it was warmer. Officer Babekuhl testified as to no “fear for his safety” at this point, even though he was investigating a robbery. Officer Babekuhl sat in the driver seat, Officer Warrant sat in the backseat, and Faulks was seated in the passenger seat of the patrol car. For the next five to six minutes Officer Babekuhl spoke with Faulks, inquiring about Faulks’ whereabouts that morning. Following this inquiry, Officer Babekuhl and Lieutenant Runyan met outside the patrol cars to compare the stories of the two individuals. When the individuals’ stories did not match, Officer Babe-kuhl returned to the squad car. Again, Officer Babekuhl spoke with Faulks. Dur*622ing these conversations, which together lasted approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Faulks sat next to Officer Babekuhl in the passenger seat, was under no type of restraint and could freely move around. Following this second conversation, Officer Babekuhl asked if Faulks would accompany him to the detective bureau for further questioning. Faulks refused. At this point, despite the fact that Faulks had been in close proximity of the officers for the past ten minutes, and despite the fact that none of the officers had previously been concerned that the suspect was armed and dangerous, suddenly, as though struck by a bolt of lightening, Officer Ba-bekuhl claims he felt “fear!” Consequently, a Terry pat-down search was conducted.
[¶ 30.] Employing the proper terminology and appropriate conclusions does not obviate the necessity for “specific and ar-ticulable” facts that show the suspect may be armed and dangerous. See Dickey, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d at 46. Under the facts of this case, the Terry requirement of present dangerousness was clearly not satisfied. It was only when Faulks refused to accompany the officer downtown for further questioning, that Officer Babekuhl was struck by “fear.” The officers did not observe any suspicious bulges or protrusions in Faulks’ clothing or pockets. See Tilton, 1997 SD 28, 561 N.W.2d 660 (suspicious bulge, coupled with defendant’s belligerent attitude and attempt to conceal gave officer reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was dangerous). Faulks did not appear to be concealing a weapon and he was not wearing any concealing type of clothing, in fact, he was not even wearing a jacket. Further, Faulks was not conducting himself in a belligerent nor aggressive manner, but had been cooperative throughout the stop.
[¶ 31.] Considering all of the above, the Terry exception to a search conducted without probable cause simply was not met. While there is no question that officer safety is of the utmost importance, merely testifying to after-the-fact fear should not provide an excuse to end-run an individual’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Fear is not a catch phrase to be used by police to skirt around a citizen’s constitutional protections. This Court adheres to the notion that the “totality of the circumstances” must be taken into account when determining fourth amendment protections. See State v. Dreps, 1996 SD 142, 558 N.W.2d 339. The “totality of the circumstances” here dictates that the trial court erred by focusing its attention solely on the rehearsed responses of the officers. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the search violated Faulks’ constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶20, 548 N.W.2d at 796.
[¶ 32.] Under the exclusionary rule, illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed. State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. Ill, 125, 142 N.W.2d 240, 247 (1966) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). This rule deters police officers from violating constitutional protections. Shearer, 1996 SD at ¶ 22, 548 N.W.2d at 796. As this Court stated in Shearer:
[W]ere we to permit the fruits of this search to be admitted, there would be no effective sanction to deter police from employing similar unlawful methods in the future. Fourth Amendment protections to our citizens cannot be sacrificed.
1996 SD at ¶ 22, 548 N.W.2d at 797. Consequently, the suppression motion was erroneously denied.
[¶ 33.] I dissent.