(dissenting).
[¶ 27.] The majority has all but eviscerated general principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with this decision. No longer can an ordinary citizen avoid contact with law enforcement as he or she wishes.
[¶ 28.] The majority relies upon Maryland v. Wilson for the position that a passenger must submit to law enforcement’s authority for merely being part of the stop of the driver. In Wilson, however, there appeared to be an articulable individual suspicion for ordering the occupants out of the vehicle. In Wilson, the state trooper, with his lights activated, followed the vehicle for a mile and a half before it stopped. The trooper also observed the occupants ducking below sight level, and then reappear. In addition, instead of remaining in the vehicle, the driver met the officer halfway and upon returning to the vehicle the front-seat passenger was sweating and appeared nervous. Based on these facts, the Wilson court reasoned that the danger to the officer is greater when occupants are present; therefore, compelling occupants out of the vehicle for safety reasons did not offend Fourth Amendment protections. In the case before us, however, there is no factual basis to support a finding of a heightened danger to the officer’s safety due to an occupant fleeing the scene. Quite simply, there was no observed suspicious activity in the case before us.
[¶ 29.] In Wilson, a further distinguishable fact is that the trooper observed a crack vial fall from the passenger’s person when exiting the vehicle. Here, the contraband was not discovered until after Officer Nelson chased Hodges into a bathroom stall, placed her under arrest and subsequently searched her purse. The facts of this case do not support the rationale behind Wilsm that in order to preserve officer safety, all occupants must exit the vehicle when ordered to do so by law enforcement. Here, officer safety, whether real or apparent, is of no concern. If Hodges had already exited the vehicle and was moving in a direction away from the *213officer how is that rationale being fulfilled? I fail to see how the rationale enunciated in Wilson applies to the case before this Court.3
[¶ 30.] In addition, Officer Nelson had no individualized, particular suspicion attributable to Hodges other than her choice to avoid police inquiry. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Florida v. Royer, the United States Supreme Court announced that an involuntary detention, however brief, is not permissible even if the citizen acts in a way to avoid such contact:
The person approached [ ] need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324. Without a legal justification for the stop of Hodges, Officer Nelson had no authority to place her under arrest or search the purse.
[¶ 31.] This case is another example of this Court’s seemingly willingness to disregard basic constitutional protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. State v. Rinehart, 2000 SD 135, 617 N.W.2d 842 (adoption of a “community caretaking function” exception to probable cause to justify the detention of a slow moving vehicle). “In the absence of any basis for suspecting [one] of misconduct, the balance between public interest and [one’s] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). To do otherwise would allow the police to dictate one’s constitutional right to be left alone. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Wilson, “Today, however, the Court takes the unprecedented step of authorizing seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion whatsoever.” 519 U.S. at 422, 117 S.Ct. at 890. I agree with Justice Stevens that “Fourth Amendment protections to our citizens cannot be sacrificed.” State v. Sleep, 1999 SD 19, ¶ 24, 590 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Sabers, Amundson, J.J., dissenting) (citing State v. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶ 23, 548 N.W.2d 792, 797). As predicted, this Court again would rather continue on a path of eroding an individual’s'rights than protecting them. Just as in State v. Vento, the erosion continues.
[¶ 32.] Therefore, I dissent.
. The Wilson court was specifically asked by Maryland to hold that "an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the duration of the stop.” 519 U.S. at 415, n.3, 117 S.Ct. at 886, n. 3. The Court, however, decided to "express no opinion upon it,” as that issue was not directly before it. Id. For this Court to rely on Wilson as binding precedent or controlling is unpersuasive.