(concurring in part and concurring in result in part).
[¶ 83.] I concur with the lead opinion on all issues except its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Berman to testify that in his opinion, Sharon Guthrie did not commit suicide. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of this testimony as (1) it is not ultimate issue testimony in this case, and (2) even if it were, under Daubert and our standard of review it is admissible.
[¶ 84.] The standard under which we review this case plays a critical role in its final determination. A trial court is granted broad discretion when a decision to admit testimony is reviewed on appeal, and its decision will stand absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Edelman, 1999 SD 52, ¶ 4, 593 N.W.2d 419, 421. We will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if “we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.” Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1995). Under the abuse of discretion standard, “we must be careful not to substitute our reasoning for that of the trial court.” State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.1994). Only with these principles in mind can we properly resolve this issue.
[¶ 85.] Expert testimony, when relevant, is admissible if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and if it “rests on a reliable foundation.” SDCL 19-15-2; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2799, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The lead opinion correctly concludes that Dr. Berman’s testimony as to Sharon’s state of mind was relevant, helpful to the jury, and based on a reliable foundation. And yet, the lead opinion concludes the trial court abused the broad discretion bestowed upon it by allowing Dr. Berman to testify that in his opinion, Sharon Guthrie did not commit suicide. I respectfully disagree.
[¶ 86.] The lead opinion states it does not reach the ultimate issue determination. Instead, it concludes that Dr. Berman’s ultimate opinion is unreliable under Dau-*430bert.17 Yet, Dr. Berman’s prior testimony, where he explained common risk factors of suicide victims and compared those factors to the present case, was reliable under Daubert. While the lead opinion couches its decision in terms of reliability, it is quite clear that Dr. Berman’s ultimate opinion is unreliable because it is perceived as an ultimate opinion.18 Because remnants of the ultimate issue rule form the foundation for the lead opinion’s conclusion, and are directly addressed by the dissent, it is necessary to address it here.
[¶ 87.] The ultimate issue of fact for the jury to determine in this instance is whether William Guthrie murdered his wife, Sharon. Guthrie stipulated to no elements of the charge. Therefore, in this circumstantial evidence case, the State shoulders the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove each element of murder, the State must disprove all other manners of death, including suicide or accident. While a jury determination of suicide would result in an acquittal, a finding to the contrary does not automatically result in a conviction. The testimony by Dr. Berman helped exclude one manner of death.19 The State was still required to prove Sharon did not die accidentally, as well as the identity of the perpetrator. As in State v. Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 38, 552 N.W.2d 817, 823, here there is no basis to conclude that the expert testimony “ ‘devoured the issue before the jury.’ ” Rather, as in Barber, here the disputed testimony stops well short of expressing the opinion “that [Guthrie] was guilty of the offense charged.” Id.
[¶ 88.] In 1993, South Dakota repealed the ultimate issue rule with the adoption of SDCL 19-15-4,20 which provides: “testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Prior to the adoption of that statute, South Dakota was the only state in the nation which still adhered to the prohibition against testimony by an expert on an ultimate issue of fact. State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 11 (S.D.1992) (Wuest, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 2 Gregory P. Joseph & Stephen A. Salzburg, Evidence in America: The Federal Rules In The States, ch 53, 1 (1987)). Since the *431adoption of 19-15-4, we have limited the rule such that, in general, an expert cannot testify as to the credibility of another witness.21 State v. Raymond, 540 N.W.2d 407, 410 (S.D.1995). We have also held that an expert cannot testify as to legal conclusions. Robbins v. Buntrock, 1996 SD 84, ¶ 8, 550 N.W.2d 422, 425; Zens v. Harrison, 538 N.W.2d 794, 796 (S.D.1995). In addition, we have stated that an expert can testify as to ultimate issues, “as long as the witness is not asked whether the defendant is innocent or guilty.” Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 38, 552 N.W.2d at 823.
[¶ 89.] In both Zens and Robbins the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was to preclude the evidence. Thus, the posture of the issue on appeal before us was whether the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the evidence. Robbins, 1996 SD 84, ¶8, 550 N.W.2d at 425; Zens, 538 N.W.2d at 796. However, here the question before us is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting, rather than excluding, the evidence. “The test is not whether we would make a similar ruling, but rather whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could have reasonably reached the same conclusion.” Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 14, 552 N.W.2d at 820. “[Abuse of discretion] is the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.” State v. Chamley, 1997 SD 107, ¶ 51, 568 N.W.2d 607, 620 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting) (citing Martha S. Davis, Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 SD Law Rev. 468, 480 (1988) (alterations in original)). As such, it is not surprising that neither the lead opinion nor dissent is able to cite to a single case in which this Court reversed the admission of expert testimony under the restrictive theories of admissibility they now advocate.
[¶ 90.] In both Robbins and Zens, no abuse of discretion was found to exist as the precluded evidence sought to directly inform the jury as to which party was negligent. We found that testimony im-permissibly entered the realm of ultimate legal conclusions. 1996 SD 84, ¶ 8, 550 N.W.2d at 425; 538 N.W.2d at 796. While negligence is a legal conclusion, suicide is instead a factual determination. Suicide is statutorily defined as “the intentional taking of one’s own life.” SDCL 22-16-36. Clearly, no legal conclusion is required to find suicide, therefore neither Zens nor Robbins mandate a finding of abuse of discretion in this instance. The testimony at issue here is more similar to that expressed in Barber, where the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. In that case, an expert concluded that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking operations. Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 38, 552 N.W.2d at 823. We held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that testimony. Id.
[¶ 91.] Despite the mandate of SDCL 19-15-4, and the deference owed the trial court, the lead opinion finds the trial court abused its considerable discretion when it allowed Dr. Berman to state “[i]n my opinion Sharon Guthrie did not die by suicide.” Under the lead opinion’s analysis, only the admission of that statement was an abuse *432of discretion, while all non-ultimate issue testimony was properly admitted. I see no basis under SDCL 19-15-4 or Daubert to accord one standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, but employ another, more stringent standard before ultimate issue testimony will be admitted. In light of the explicit statutory abrogation of the ultimate issue rule, this result could lead to confusion, and at worst, eventually result in a judicial annulment of SDCL 19-15-4. If the non-ultimate issue testimony is relevant, reliable and helpful enough to be admissible under Daubert, the ultimate issue testimony should also be found relevant, reliable and helpful enough to be admitted. See State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192, 210 (1993) (noting that if post-traumatic stress disorder evidence is reliable and admissible for one purpose, it is reliable and admissible for all purposes). To hold otherwise will resurrect the “irreconcilable confusion” and “embarrassing inconsistencies” that resulted under the ultimate issue rule. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 12 (Wuest, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The lead opinion’s framework will once again require the bench and bar to wrestle with what the ultimate issue of fact is in a given scenario. Id. at 11 (Wuest, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case, is the ultimate issue Sharon’s suicide? Or, is it William’s guilt or innocence as to the crime charged? If an expert will testify as to an ultimate issue of fact, is another Daubert hearing required to judge the reliability, relevance, and helpfulness of the ultimate issue testimony? This resulting legal quagmire is the precise situation SDCL 19-15-4 sought to remedy.
[¶ 92.] The lead opinion determines Dr. Berman is qualified as an expert as to his non-ultimate issue testimony, yet he is unqualified to discuss this issue of “ultimate fact”. This conclusion is prefaced by noting that Dr. Berman’s ultimate fact opinion was based on “observation and experience, not traditional empirical studies.” Lead Op. ¶ 41. An expert may be qualified by his “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.... ” SDCL 19-15-2. Because the disjunctive or is used in the statute, an expert can be qualified under any one of the five categories listed. Nickles v. Schild, 2000 SD 131, ¶ 10, 617 N.W.2d 659, 661. Yet, under the lead opinion’s analysis, Dr. Berman’s experience and observation are not enough to allow him to testify that in his opinion, Sharon Guthrie did not commit suicide. Have we created two classes of experts, one qualified to testify on ultimate facts, the other not? Must there be a separate Daubert hearing on the qualifications of ultimate issue experts? The lead opinion also finds Dr. Berman’s testimony relating common risk factors to Sharon’s situation to be “relevant, helpful and admissible” and thus rehable, yet his ultimate conclusion is unreliable. Have we now also created two classes of reliability, one for ultimate issue testimony and one for non-ultimate issue testimony? Again, the bar and bench will be confronted with issues that should have been laid to rest with the adoption of SDCL 19-15-4. This result is clearly contrary to the “uniform procedure for addressing expert testimony” envisioned by Daubert. Rogen v. Monson, 2000 SD 51, ¶ 26, 609 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Konenkamp, J., concurring).
[¶ 93.] Other jurisdictions have allowed psychological autopsy evidence to be admitted in cases, such as the case at bar, where the decedent’s state of mind is at issue. Horinek v. State, 977 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex.App.1998); U.S. v. St. Jean, 1995 WL 106960 *2 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.1995); In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill.2d 402, 185 Ill.Dec. 866, 615 N.E.2d 736, 744-45 (1993); Jackson v. State, 553 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Harvey v. Raleigh Po*433lice Dep’t, 85 N.C.App. 540, 355 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1987); Campbell v. Young Motor Co., 211 Mont. 68, 684 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1984). See also Kostelac v. Feldman’s, Inc., 497 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1993) and Terrell State Hosp. v. Ashworth, 794 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.App.1990) (discussing psychological autopsies as used in the ease, without discussing admissibility as an issue on appeal).22 In addition, this Court has noted that “[psychological autopsies have been admitted where the victim’s state of mind was relevant.” Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 5. More recently, this Court allowed a psychiatric expert to testify as to a decedent’s testamentary capacity. In re Estate of Dokken, 2000 SD 9, ¶44, 604 N.W.2d 487, 499. Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, how can we draw a distinction between an opinion that a decedent was legally capable of executing a will and an opinion that a decedent did not commit suicide?
[¶ 94.] The lead opinion creates a two-tiered reliability analysis, which results in a bifurcation of the Daubert requirement of reliability. On one tier is expert testimony, which is examined under Daubert principles. On the second tier is ultimate issue expert testimony, or “inferences” thereto, which apparently is subject to a higher scrutiny. Such a result might be acceptable if there were any legal authority to support it. However, the only conceivable authority is the ultimate issue rule, which was repealed in 1993.
[¶ 95.] I agree with the lead opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Berman to testify regarding common risk factors of suicide victims and relate those factors to Sharon Guthrie. As the lead opinion concludes, that testimony is reliable under Daubert However, I cannot conclude that Dr. Ber-man’s opinion that Sharon Guthrie did not commit suicide was somehow unreliable, or inadmissible under SDCL 19-15-4.23 The *434ultimate issue prohibition was put to rest in 1993, there is no need to exhume it now.
[¶ 96.] For the above reasons I would outright affirm the trial court on this issue. As there is no majority opinion regarding the rationale for adjudication of this issue, resolution of the conflicting theories set forth in the various writings of this case await a future decision of this Court.
[¶ 97.] MILLER, Chief Justice, joins this special writing.
. The lead opinion states that psychological autopsies are a "relatively new, unrefined, and unresearched clinical technique," and therefore are unreliable. It should be noted that the lead opinion’s legal authorities for this proposition are law review articles published six and eight years ago respectively. Moreover, the author’s concern is apparently not shared by appellate courts as not a single jurisdiction is cited as being in subsequent accord.
. The lead opinion declares:
A few courts have allowed psychological autopsy evidence in cases where the question before the jury in a homicide prosecution was whether the deceased died from suicide. In those cases, however, the experts did not opine with scientific certitude that the deceased did or did not commit suicide.
Lead Op. ¶ 40.
. I question the lead opinion's conclusion that Dr. Berman's testimony "approached the impermissible” and created an "inference” as to Guthrie's guilt. Before the enactment of SDCL 19-15-4, experts were not allowed to testify on ultimate issues. Are they now prohibited, despite the adoption of that statute, from testifying as to "inferences?” In certain instances it is difficult enough to determine what constitutes an ultimate issue let alone an "inference” of such. The use of this novel standard will only serve to further confuse this issue.
. Thus, reliance upon cases such as State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674 (S.D.1990) by the dissent are not particularly helpful in an analysis of the issue now before us which is controlled by the 1993 enactment of SDCL 19-15-4.
. The lead opinion states that experts are generally permitted to testify that a victim’s behavior is "consistent with" that of known victims. Lead Op. ¶ 41. The cases cited for this proposition all limit the expert's testimony because any "ultimate" conclusion would tend to buttress the credibility of the victim or another witness. Under our case law, the admission of such testimony would clearly be an abuse of discretion. See Raymond, infra. However, Dr. Berman's opinion does not weigh on the credibility of any witness in this case. Therefore, the concerns expressed by those cases, while valid, are inapplicable to this case.
. The legal issue involved in these cases is entirely irrelevant under the Daubert reliability standard. If psychological profiles are reliable enough to be admitted in a worker’s compensation proceeding or will contest, why are they not reliable enough to be admitted in criminal proceedings?
The lead opinion claims that Horinek and St. Jean support its conclusion, and not one case cited above "allows giving an opinion like the one Dr. Berman gave here.” In St. Jean, the trial court limited the expert testimony to "the profile of one who is, psychi-atrically speaking, suicidal or a suicidal risk.” 1995 WL 106960 *1. In Horinek, the expert testified "that it appeared very unlikely that this individual would be the sort of person to kill herself.” 977 S.W.2d at 701. In both cases, the decision of the trial court was affirmed under an abuse of discretion standard. Two lessons can be drawn from those cases. First, the psychological autopsy evidence was admissible. Second, the trial court’s decision was affirmed under the proper standard of review.
As noted previously, other cases exclude conclusions that tend to weigh on a witness’s credibility. That concern is not an issue in this case.
Moreover, it should also be noted that no case cited by the lead opinion adopts or even supports the bifurcated reliability analysis which is now proposed.
. In addition to creating this two-tiered analysis, the lead opinion constructs an unacceptable rationale when it concludes this testimony was harmless error because the jury had already heard "the absence of [Dr. Ber-man’s] suicidal indicators and the totality of the evidence offered at trial.” Under the lead opinion’s analysis, the ultimate conclusion was harmless because Dr. Berman testified as to how he reached his conclusion. Therefore, as long as an expert testifies as to the basis of his conclusion before stating that ultimate opinion, how can there ever exist reversible error? As long as an expert’s testimony avoids the pitfalls of legal conclusions and comments on a witness’ or victim's credibility, reversible error will only exist if the entirety of the expert’s testimony is "In my opinion, X happened.”