(dissenting).
[¶ 24.] I vote to affirm Issue 1 because there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate C.C.H. a delinquent under SDCL 22-13-1 because he “intentionally cause[d] serious public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to [another] person, or ereate[d] a risk thereof by: (1) engaging in ... threatening behavior [.] ” (emphasis added).
[¶.25.] GORS, Acting Justice, delivers the majority on Issue 2, which reverses the trial court’s finding that C.C.H. is a child in need of supervision.
[¶ 26.] C.C.H. cannot be adjudicated6 to be a Child in Need of Supervision. No ChINS petition was filed. Therefore, C.C.H. had no notice that he was being tried as a ChINS. C.C.H. could not defend against what he was not charged with, tried for, or alleged to be.
[¶ 27.] If C.C.H. were an adult, this would not be permitted. In State v. Tschetter, 337 N.W.2d 829, 830 (S.D.1983), this Court held that a trial court could not enter a. judgment of guilt for an offense other than that upon which the verdict was based. Here, the trial court entered an adjudication for another offense (ChINS status) that it thought also fit the facts. Although this Court upheld a ChINS adjudication when the evidence was insufficient to sustain a delinquency petition in In re T.K., 462 N.W.2d at 895, a trial court does not have the authority to fit a child’s conduct into an uncharged category, and then adjudicate and punish the child. It is a fundamental tenet of due process that when a person is charged with something, that person is entitled to notice of what the charge is and a hearing on the charge. *709City of Pierre v. Blackwell, 2001 SD 127, ¶ 13, 635 N.W.2d 581, 585 (“Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article VI, § 2 of the South Dakota Constitution, ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.’ Due process guarantees that notice and the right to be heard are granted in a ‘meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ Such guarantees are fundamental.”) (citations omitted). The only notice C.C.H. received of the charge was when he was adjudicated to be a ChINS. He had no hearing on the ChINS allegation. The ChINS adjudication was used as a catchall: C.C.H. must have done something wrong, so this must be it.
[¶ 28.] If the record is too limited to determine whether C.C.H.’s comments to the teacher were a “true threat” to support an adjudication for disorderly conduct, then the same insufficiency exists regarding the ChINS adjudication. A child in need of supervision is defined in SDCL 26-8B-2 as follows:
In this chapter and chapter 26-7A, the term, child in need of supervision, means:
(1) Any child of compulsory school age who is habitually absent from school without legal excuse;
(2) Any child who has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian;
(3) Any child whose behavior or condition endangers the child’s own welfare or the welfare of others; or
(4)Any child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or regulation for which there is not a penalty of a criminal nature for an adult, except violations of § 34-46-2(2), or petty offenses.
C.C.H. is not a truant under subdivision (1) or beyond parental control under subdivision (2) or a status offender under subdivision (4). Subdivision (3) proscribing “behavior [which] endangers the child’s own welfare or the welfare of others” is the only provision that fits the trial court’s finding that “B.C.’s and other persons welfare was threatened.” The burden of proof is the same for ChINS and delinquents-beyond a reasonable doubt. SDCL 26-7A-K2) and 26-7A-86; In re T.K., 462 N.W.2d at 895; In re Interest of A.M., 438 N.W.2d at 558 (S.D.1989). If it has to be a “true threat” to be disorderly conduct, then it also has to be a “true threat” to endanger the welfare of other people because the same conduct and the same burden of proof is being considered for both adjudications.
[¶ 29.] One troubling aspect of this procedure is apparent. C.C.H. was held in pretrial detention for 66 days. A ChINS cannot be held in pretrial detention for more than 24 hours unless the child has violated a valid court order.7 SDCL 26-7A-14, 26-7A-15, 26-8B-3. Similarly, a ChINS cannot be placed in post-trial detention as a disposition,8 except under the very limited circumstances set forth in SDCL 26-8B-6(3) for violators of valid court orders, which is not applicable here.
[¶ 30.] Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the *710most that can be said of C.C.H. is that when his teacher asked him what was wrong, he told her: He made no threats and- created no disturbance. He took no steps to carry out his statement. It is not a ChINS offense to have bad thoughts. It is also not a ChINS offense to articulate bad thoughts, unless they are a “true threat.”
[¶ 31.] Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s ChINS adjudication.
[¶ 32.] SABERS and KONENKAMP, Justices, concur as to Issue 2.
[¶ 33.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice and AMUNDSON, Justice, dissent as to Issue 2.[¶ 34.] ZINTER, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was .submitted to the Court, did not participate.
,. "Adjudication” in juvenile court is the functional equivalent of the "guilt or innoqence” phase in adult court. SDCL 26-7A-l (2).
. The exception to the 24 hour limit to pretrial detention of a ChINS, for a child who has violated a valid court order, is not at issue here. SDCL 26-8B-3.
. “Disposition” in juvenile court is the functional equivalent of sentencing in adult court. SDCL 26-7A-R17), 26-8B-6 and 26-8C-7. If C.C.H. had been tried as an adult, the maximum sentence would have been thirty days in jail and a $200 fine. SDCL 22-13-1 and 22-6-2(2).