(dissenting).
[¶ 28.] I dissent on Issue 1. This majority opinion puts the final nail in the coffin of the 180-day rule. It effectively guts the 180-day rule and makes it a rule to be ignored.
[¶ 29.] “SDCL 23A-44-5.1 creates statutory rights in addition to a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State v. Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373, 374 (S.D.1987). The 180-day rule “serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society[J” State v. Cross, 468 N.W.2d 419, 420 (S.D.1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 420 A.2d 385, 387 (1980)). The purpose of the rule “is to further the prosecution of cases in an effective manner and to afford defendants a right to have their case tried within a reasonable time.” Cross, 468 N.W.2d at 422 (Henderson, J., concurring).
[¶ 30.] “Proof by the defendant that the 180 days has run establishes a prima facie case for dismissal. Absent a showing of good cause delay by the State, the case must be dismissed.” State v. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d 67, 69 (S.D.1988) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373, 375 (S.D.1987) (holding that SDCL 23A-44-5.1 “requires a disposition of criminal matters within 180 days lacking good cause for delay”). The burden is on the State to show good cause. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d at 71 (citing Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d at 375).
[¶ 31.] Hays was arraigned on December 27, 1996, and tried on December 22, 1997. Since this is 5 days short of a year maybe we should change the name of the rule to the 365-day rule. The majority opinion’s chronology clearly demonstrates that more than 180 days passed between Hays’ initial appearance and the date of trial but excuses the delay as attributable to Hays. However, in reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion’s liberal construction of the 180-day rule affords great deference to the State in calculating the periods to be tolled. The majority opinion even goes beyond what the trial court did and finds more time which it claims can be tolled and attributed to intentional delay by Hays. The result is inconsistent with the purpose of the 180-day rule, a speedy trial.
*601[¶ 32.] The 180-day rule was designed “to prevent delay, procrastinations, and dilatory practices.” State v. Hetzel, 1999 SD 86, ¶ 19, 598 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d at 376 (Wuest, CJ., concurring specially)). It is apparent that trial courts have failed to enforce this rule and have instead stretched the definition of good cause for delay too far. The majority opinion condones the acts of the State and the trial court and further erodes the already battered 180-day rule. As stated, it effectively guts the 180-day rule and, by liberal interpretation, turns it into a 365-day rule.