(dissenting).
[¶ 32.] It is clear from this Court’s precedent that due regard should be given to a fact finder’s credibility determination, and we should respect the opinions of those who have seen, firsthand, the demeanor of witnesses. See Schneider, 2001 SD 70 at ¶ 14, 628 N.W.2d at 728; Johnson, 2000 SD 47, ¶ 22, 610 N.W.2d 449, 453-54; Mathis v. Mathis, 2000 SD 59, ¶ 11, 609 N.W.2d 773, 776; Belhassen, 2000 SD 82 at ¶ 17, 613 N.W.2d at 536; Hendricksen v. Harris, 1999 SD 130, ¶ 7, 600 N.W.2d 180, 181; Kurtz v. SCI, 1998 SD 37, 576 N.W.2d 878, 882; Petersen v. Hinky Dinky, 515 N.W.2d 226, 235 (S.D.1994); Foltz, 516 N.W.2d at 347 (Amundson, J., dissenting), Wendel v. Domestic Seed & Supply, 446 N.W.2d 265, 270 (S.D.1989). Moreover, it is not this Court’s job to search for reasons to reverse a lower court’s decision. See S.D. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 1999 SD 2, ¶ 25, 589 N.W.2d 206, 211 (finding this Court should not search for reasons to reverse); Fenner v. Trimac Transp., Inc., 1996 SD 121, ¶ 15, 554 N.W.2d 485, 489 (stating “[w]e do not look for reasons to reverse, even if we would not have made a similar decision ... but confine our review to a determination of whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision”); Peterson v. Beck, 537 N.W.2d 375, 379 (S.D.1995) (finding this Court should not “search out” reasons for reversal, but rather, should confine its review to determine if there is evidence to support the lower court’s decision).
[¶ 33.] A review of the record in this case shows the following findings of fact entered by the administrative law judge:
11. After Dr. Quinlan examined Claimant, Employer and Insurer offered to have Claimant examined at the Mayo Clinic. Claimant refused that request.
15. Dr. Blow also recommended Claimant attend a pain clinic. Dr. Quinlan made a similar recommendation several months earlier. Claimant refused to attend a pain clinic even though Insurer offered to pay for the program.
17. Dr. Small referred Claimant to Dr. Philip Johnson, an orthopedic surgeon in Fargo, North Dakota. This referral was at the request of Claimant’s attorney. Dr. Small noted: “I have been in touch with [Claimant’s] attorney and he also wants a second opinion from an out of state physician.”
22. In May 1995, Dr. Quinlan was provided with a two-page analysis describing the duties for a job in the repair kit area. Dr. Quinlan approved the position for Claimant[. 0]n May 15, 1995, Claimant received a job offer from Employer to work in this position, but refused to return to work based on a note from Dr. Johnson.
24. Employer and Insurer arranged for Claimant to be seen at the Mayo Clinic in April 1996. Dr. Keith Bengt-son examined Claimant. That physical examination was totally normal except for a “slightly decreased” range of motion and tenderness of the right shoulder and neck. Dr. Bengtson diagnosed chronic right shoulder group myofascial pain syndrome. He suggested Claimant refrain from repetitive activity with the right upper extremity, but otherwise agreed with the FCE performed by Sioux Valley Hospital. On April 19, 1996, Dr. Bengtson wrote, “I agree that [Claimant] has reached maximum medical improvement. Her permanent partial disability would be 0% according to AMA guidelines.”
34. In addition, Dr. Tountas noted Claimant did not have any neck or *146upper back spasm. Dr. Tountas stated he expected Claimant’s “right arm to be small given the fact that she demonstrated limited motion with pain complaints and pain over a period of over two years.” Dr. Tountas explained:
Well, if the pain were of sufficient magnitude so that the patient can hardly use the upper extremity to any degree, then one would expect either visible atrophy — that is, you frequently can see wasting of muscles if you look at a hand or extremity — or if it’s a subtle change, then you should be able to measure it. And again, this is done by just taking a tape measure. And I’ve done this thousands of times. And you can compare one with the other and get an idea as to whether there is an atrophy or wasting of the muscle that would account for the inability to use it; that is, the disuse.
. However, in this case, Dr. Tountas did not find any evidence of atrophy as to Claimant’s right upper extremity.
36. Based on his examination, Dr. Tountas was unable to reach a diagnosis as to Claimant’s condition. Dr. Tountas opined “the objective findings do not support a diagnosis.” Dr. Tountas stated:
There may have been some references to [trigger points or muscle spasms], but I don’t find those to be consistent enough to explain this very bizarre, nonanatomic sensory deficit.... I also find that in FCEs, we do have a great deal of exaggerated pain behavior. There has been no objective testing for a diagnosis that can account for this much pain....
So I, therefore, feel that there are insufficient findings to make this a diagnosis which causes this much disability or any impairment or inability to work.
In fact, Dr. Tountas could not find any anatomical reason for Claimant’s pain complaints.
37. Employer again offered Claimant a job in the repair kit area. This position included receptionist duties and was within the restrictions set by the FCE done at the Mayo Clinic.
39 All the doctors agree that objective tests reveal nothing that can explain Claimant’s complaints of pain. Under SDCL -62-1-15, “evidence concerning any injury shall be given greater weight of supported by [sic] objective medical findings.” No such support exists here.
41. Employer presented surveillance videos showing Claimant engaged in certain activities. The videos show Claimant pulling weeds in her garden and at other times, carrying items with her right arm. Claimant is shown moving with ease and at no time does she appear to be in any physical discomfort.
42. In addition, when Claimant attempted to return to work on January 30,1997, in the repair kit area she was videotaped performing the duties of the job. Claimant was able to work at her own pace and moved with ease. Claimant did not show any outward signs of pain. Claimant was instructed that she should get up and move around every twenty minutes. Claimant testified that her return to work effort “didn’t go very well” and she had to leave after approximately forty minutes. It is impossible to accept Claimant’s testimony that she was experiencing such extreme pain after viewing the video.
*14743. Every physician who treated Claimant before Dr. Small, including three specialists, felt she was capable of working. Claimant then saw Dr. Small, who took her off work. Not only has Claimant not returned to work since, she has not returned to any of the doctors who said she could go back to work.
48. Claimant is not a credible Witness.
Despite the majority’s finding that the Johnson ease is distinguishable, I find it very much on point. As the findings of fact above demonstrate, there was “substantial evidence to support the determinations of the hearing examiner and the Department that [Davidson] ... was not a credible witness, and, thus, her subjective testimony as to pain could also be determined not credible[,]” just like in Johnson. 2000 SD 47 at ¶ 26, 610 N.W.2d at 455.
[¶ 34.] The majority, in part, bases its decision on the fact that Davidson presented medical testimony of “several doctors” who agree Davidson suffers from a pain syndrome. But, every physician who treated Davidson prior to Dr. Small, including three specialists, felt she was capable of working. Thus, we should not emphasize the number of experts acknowledging Davidson experienced pain; but rather, we should look at whether it incapacitated her. Furthermore, it is a “long-accepted premise ... that the purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact and not to supplant it.” Id. at ¶ 25. “Experts do not determine credibility.” Id. We should focus on whether the record “definitely and firmly” demonstrates that the Department has made a mistake. Belhassen, 2000 SD 82, ¶ 11, 613 N.W.2d 531, 535 (citation omitted). It has not. Further, the expert testimony reviewed in this case “cannot rise above its foundation.” Schneider, 2001 SD 70 at ¶ 16, 628 N.W.2d at 730 (quoting Johnson, 2000 SD 47 at ¶ 25, 610 N.W.2d at 455) (other citations omitted). “The value of the opinion of an expert witness is no better than the facts upon which they are based.” Id. The Department held that the facts fed to the medical experts originated from a non-credible source. Therefore, I cannot join the majority opinion which has sought out reasons to reverse an administrative decision that I feel is firmly supported by the record. This might be a case where I would personally have chosen a different decision, but that is not the purpose of appellate review.
[¶ 35.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this dissent.