(concurring in part and concurring in remand for a best interests determination).
A.
[¶ 53.] I concur with the conference opinion on Issues One and Two. Insufficient evidence of parental unfitness exists in this record. As for abandonment, if Meldrum abandoned his child, it was primarily to the mother, not to the mother’s boyfriend. But that does not end our inquiry. On Issue Three, this ease must be remanded to allow Novotny to seek guardianship of T.D.M.
B.
[¶ 54.] A guardianship proceeding affords an established mechanism for considering claims by nonparents for the custody of children. It ensures principled decision-making, with some measure of certainty and predictability in this difficult and complex area. Our guardianship laws were rewritten in 1993, creating the new South Dakota Guardianship and Conserva-torship Act. With this enactment, our Legislature implemented a more expansive and protective approach toward the special needs of children.7 Among other things, this law allows for the separation, if necessary, of caretaking and money management functions.
*470[¶ 55.] Most important, as part of the revisions, the parental preference statute in our former guardianship law was repealed. See SDCL 30-27-23 (repealed 1993). There still exists a constitutional preference for fit parents, of course. The natural parent-child relationship is a protected fundamental right. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982). Yet, children are not property. They have rights of their own. Courts are beginning to recognize that “a child has an independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a person with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship.” Webster v. Ryan, 189 Misc.2d 86, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316, 331 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.2001) (addressing right to visitation). Our new guardianship laws give greater impetus to these rights.
[¶ 56.] Under South Dakota’s guardianship laws, both the person seeking guardianship and the child for whom guardianship is sought have a voice in how the matter should be decided. SDCL 29A-5-203 provides:
[A] petition for the appointment of a guardian, a conservator, or both, may be filed by ... an interested relative, by the individual or facility that is responsible for or has assumed responsibility for the minor’s care or custody,' by the individual or anyone the minor has nominated as guardian or conservator, or by any other interested person, including the department of human services or the department of social services.
Certainly, Novotny is an “individual ... [who] has assumed responsibility for the minor’s care or custody....” In a guardianship proceeding, a court must consider “the suitability of the proposed guardian or conservator, the minor’s current or proposed living arrangements, ... the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the extent to which it is necessary to protect the minor from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and if applicable, the minor’s need for habilitation or therapeutic treatment.” SDCL 29A-5-208. Moreover, under our guardianship laws, a court “shall” consider “the wishes of the minor if the minor is of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference.” SDCL 29A-5-202. See also SDCL 29A-5-304 (nominating or appointing guardian or conservator). The word “shall” in our statutes “manifests a mandatory directive,” conferring no discretion. SDCL 2-14-2.1.
[¶ 57.] Nonetheless, as we have said in several cases, before custody may be transferred to a nonparent, the parents must be proved unfit or there must exist extraordinary circumstances, reflecting on some serious detriment to the child. In Cooper v. Merkel, we wrote:
Before a parent’s right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in favor of a nonparent a clear showing against the parent of gross misconduct or unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstance affecting the welfare of the child is required, and an award cannot be made to [nonparents] simply because they may be better custodians.
470 N.W.2d 253, 255 (S.D.1991) (internal quotation omitted). Although abandonment and unfitness were not proved, the record contains considerable evidence of extraordinary circumstances.
[¶ 58.] We have never before defined the term “extraordinary circumstances.” Several other jurisdictions, however, have identified the extraordinary circumstances sufficient to overcome the constitutional parental preference. These circumstances must be only those that result in serious detriment to the child. They include the abandonment or persistent neglect of the child by the parent; the likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to the child *471if placed in the parent’s custody; the extended, unjustifiable absence of parental custody; the abdication of parental responsibilities; the provision of the child’s physical, emotional, and other needs by persons other than the parent over a significant period of time; the existence of a bonded relationship between the child and the nonparent custodian sufficient to cause significant emotional harm to the child in the event of a change in custody; the -substantial enhancement of the child’s well-being while under the care of the nonparent; the extent of the parent’s delay in seeking to reacquire custody of the child; the demonstrated quality of the parent’s commitment to raising the child; the likely degree of stability and security in the. child’s future with the parent; the extent to which the child’s right to an education would be impaired while in the custody of the parent; and any other circumstances that would substantially and adversely impact the welfare of the child. See Locklin v. Duka, 112 Nev. 1489, 929 P.2d 930, 934-35 (1996); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jenae K.S., 196 Wis.2d 16, 539 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Wis.Ct.App.1995); Burrows v. Sanders, 99 Md.App. 69, 635 A.2d 82, 85 (Spec.App.1994); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 (1976).
[¶ 59.] Substantial extraordinary circumstances exist in this case. The record contains uncontradicted expert testimony that a permanent return of custody to the father would cause serious emotional detriment. The child has been in Novotny’s custody for more than eight years. Much of that time the father acquiesced in the situation. There were many years where there was no contact between father and son. Even after the temporary order of December 26, 1995, granting Novotny physical custody of the child as against the mother, the father did not initiate any legal action to assert his right to custody until after the mother’s death in 1998. The child has a strong attachment to No-votny. He also has a strong attachment to his half-sibling in Novotny’s home. The child has maintained a consistent desire to remain with Novotny. The circuit court concluded that there were no extraordinary circumstances. That was clearly erroneous. The court must consider these vital issues on remand.
C.
[¶ 60.] Consistent with South Dakota law, a two-part test must be met before a court can grant custodial guardianship to a nonparent. Once extraordinary circumstances have been shown, then the best interests of the child must be considered. The circuit court never reached the question of the child’s best interests. In finding that there was no abandonment or extraordinary circumstance, the court held that Novotny obstructed Meldrum’s visitation and contact with his son. Yet this is only one factor in many to consider and balance in a best interests determination. Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 1999 SD 35, 591 N.W.2d 798. Furthermore, because T.D.M. has been living with his father in Illinois during the pendency of this appeal, the circuit court may wish to hear additional evidence on the child’s progress with his father.
[¶ 61.] Courts must never lightly intrude upon family integrity. The family relationship remains intrinsic to our religious, cultural, social, and economic substance. Even between loving parents, deciding who will maintain custody of a child will always be an onerous task. In most instances, when' family' integrity fails, we still depend on parental commitment to the child. But when even that breaks down, we must resort to some established legal process to prevent children from being *472buffeted by demands having little to do with their best interests. South Dakota’s guardianship process addresses the circumstances we face in this case. Parents have rights, of course, but children have rights as well, rights to care, stability, and love.
[¶ 62.] AMUNDSON, Justice, writing on Issue 3.
.Two statutory avenues are available for non-parents to obtain custody of a child in South Dakota, one is through the abuse and neglect laws, SDCL ch. 26-88, and the other is through the Guardianship and Conservator-ship Act, SDCL ch. 29A-5. Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W.2d 413, 418 (S.D.1996).