(dissenting).
[¶ 46.] I respectfully dissent for three main reasons: the Bank did not meet its burden of showing the absence of material fact; the Scotts’ response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient; and the Court’s detailed evidentiary analysis is unnecessary.
[¶ 47.] The controversy before the Court presents a classic example of a situation in which summary judgment is improper. As the Court correctly recites, in reviewing grants or denials of motions for summary judgment “[w]e will affirm only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and ... [a]ll reasonable inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party.” Mueller v. Cedar Shore Resort, Inc., 2002 SD 38, ¶ 10, 643 N.W.2d 56, 61 (citation omitted). In this case, the basic question is factual: what is the balance due on the promissory note? The Scotts’ contend that they have made sufficient payments to discharge their obligation on the note, and as we have previously noted “[s]ummary judgment is also improper where defendant’s defenses involve questions of fact.” Limpert v. Bail, 447 N.W.2d 48, 50 (S.D.1989).
[¶48.] In large part, the Court’s decision rests upon its analysis of which party bore the burden of establishing the amount due on the note. After concluding that SDCL 57A-3-308 shifted the burden of proof to the Scotts’, the Court holds that the Scott’s have failed to carry this burden. The presumption under SDCL 57A-3-308, however, is a trial presumption. Here, we are dealing with a summary judgment proceeding. Thus, the Bank as the moving party bore the burden of “clearly showing] an absence of any genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Mueller, 2002 SD 38, ¶ 10, 643 N.W.2d 56; See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility ... [to] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”).
[¶ 49.] In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Bank offered the promissory note along with three allonges and the extension agreement. Notwithstanding the burden shifting framework of SDCL 57A-3-308, the Bank’s offer of proof simply does not establish the absence of material fact. As the Court recognizes, the Scotts’ do not deny the validity of the note but, instead, dispute the amount owing on the note. Although at trial SDCL 57A-3-308 would require the Scotts’ to prove the affirmative defense of payment, during the summary judgment stage, the burden rests squarely on the Bank to show that no factual issues regarding payment exist. Therefore, at the summary judgment hearing, the Bank had the burden to present at least some evidence detailing payment on the note, and, given the fact the Bank admitted it did not have complete records concerning payment, the Bank clearly cannot carry this burden.12
[¶ 50.] I acknowledge that defendants do not bear the primary burden on summary judgment but that they are required to “be diligent in resisting the motion, and mere allegations and denials which do not set forth specific facts will not prevent issuance of a judgment.” Greene v. Morgan, Theeler, Cogley & Petersen, 1998 SD 16, ¶ 6, 575 N.W.2d 457, 459 (citations *659omitted). Thus, the Scotts’ could not rely on mere conclusory statements nor could they rest solely on allegations in their pleadings. SDCL 15 — 6—56(e); Casazza v. State, 2000 SD 120, ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d 872, 876; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
[¶ 51.] Here, the Scotts’ response was sufficient to resist the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. In addition to Michael Scott’s affidavit disputing the amount due on the note, the Scotts’ relied on the deposition of Kyle Repp, a Certified Public Accountant. In his deposition, Repp testified he prepared an amortization schedule in June 1996, and he believed the loan in question had been repaid in full. Although the Scotts’ clearly could not rely upon their pleadings alone, Michael Scott’s affidavit, taken in concert with Repp’s professional opinion in his deposition, sufficiently supports the Scotts’ defense of payment. Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover, 2002 SD 122, ¶ 18, 652 N.W.2d 756, 765 (“In sum, those resisting summary judgment must show that they will be able to place sufficient evidence in the record at trial to support findings on all the elements on which they have the burden of proof.”). While it is true that the Scotts’ assertions regarding the amount owing on the note may have been inconsistent,13 “[sjummary judgment is not a substitute for trial; a belief that the non-moving party will not prevail at trial is not an appropriate basis for granting the motion....” St. Onge Livestock Company, Ltd., v. Curtis, 2002 SD 102, ¶ 25, 650 N.W.2d 537, 544 (citations omitted).
[¶ 52.] Finally, the Court unnecessarily delves into a detailed evidentiary analysis of the amortization schedule prepared by Repp. This analysis is solely occasioned by the Court’s mistaken conclusion that the Scott’s bore the primary burden on the summary judgment proceeding because of the SDCL 57A-3-308 framework.. As noted above, this statute does not relieve the Bank of its burden on summary judgment to prove the absence of material fact. Because the Bank has not met this burden, any detailed analysis of the Scotts’ evidence is misplaced.14
. The Bank's predecessor in interest apparently destroyed most of the documents detailing the payment history of the note.
. The Scotts initially claimed they had paid the promissory note in full. After the summary judgment hearing, the Scotts filed a motion for relief from judgment and attempted to come forward with new evidence showing they actually owed $65,523.12 on the note.
. I also disagree with some portions of that analysis; however, because I believe the analysis is unwarranted, I decline to address this issue.