(dissenting).
[¶ 42.] I respectfully dissent. The policy issued by General Casualty provides in pertinent part:
We will pay all sums the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an ‘uninsured’ or ‘underinsured motor vehicle.’ The damages must result from ‘bodily injury’ sustained by the ‘insured’ caused by an ‘accident.’ The owner or driver’s liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the ‘uninsured’ or ‘underin-sured motor vehicle.’
Included in the definition of ‘insured’ is “anyone else ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ or a temporary substitute for a covered ‘auto.’ “ The policy defines “occupying” to mean “in, on, upon, getting in, on, out, or off.”
[¶ 43.] I agree with the majority opinion’s determination that “occupying” as used in the insurance contract is ambiguous. I also agree with the majority opinion’s application of the four-part test, as set forth in Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005, 1009 (1984), to resolve the ambiguity of “occupying” in this context. That test requires this Court to consider whether:
(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle;
(2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it;
(3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and
(4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.
[¶ 44.] Where I part company from the majority opinion is the determination that Roden was “vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time.” In addressing this issue the majority opinion determines that because Roden “had his head in the truck and was talking company business with his immediate supervisor” the vehicle was his “sole orientation,” thereby supporting its determination that Roden was “occupying” the vehicle.
[¶ 45.] The majority opinion’s discussion is more suited to a workers’ compensation claim than an underinsured motorist claim. Roden has already settled with the negligent tortfeasor, presumably he could also have filed a worker’s compensation claim against his employer, now he is seeking to recover from his employer’s motor vehicle insurance company for underin-sured motorist coverage. Roden relies heavily upon the fact that the vehicle was an “office on wheels,” as characterized by the majority opinion; however, Roden is attempting to recover from a motor vehicle liability policy and not an office liability policy. Nevertheless, the majority opinion is persuaded by this characterization in determining Roden was occupying the vehicle as a matter of law because the vehicle was somehow related to his work. While that may be relevant it is not determinative. In my opinion, the majority opinion’s interpretation to the contrary is erroneous.
[¶ 46.] In determining if Roden was vehicle oriented the following facts are particularly relevant: (1) Roden was not assigned use of this vehicle; (2) Roden was not traveling in the vehicle; (3) Roden was *632not using the vehicle as a vehicle whatsoever; (4) Roden did not go to work that day in the vehicle; (5) Roden was not using the vehicle in his work; (6) Roden was not working on the vehicle; (7) Roden was not attempting to use the vehicle for transportation to leave work; and, (8) Ro-den was not engaged in any act essential to the use of the vehicle. Instead, Roden was standing on the ground next to the vehicle, leaning against the vehicle and talking to its actual occupant.
[¶ 47.] Clearly, Roden was seriously injured, however, that does not mean that the terms of the underinsured policy should be rewritten and interpreted so that a third insurance coverage is provided so that there is another pocket to dig into.
[¶ 48.] For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.