[¶ 1.] Alfredo Garcia Chavez was stopped by a South Dakota highway patrolman for a traffic violation. While stopped, the patrolman engaged Chavez in questioning and had his drug dog sniff the exterior of Chavez’s vehicle. The dog allegedly alerted to the odor of illegal drugs. A search of the car revealed large quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Although drug charges were subsequently filed in federal district court, that court suppressed the evidence. After the federal charges were dismissed, the Lawrence County State’s Attorney initiated state drug charges. The state circuit court subsequently conducted a suppression hearing in which the State introduced evidence that was not presented to the federal court. The state circuit court declined to suppress the evidence. Chavez was ultimately found guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and one count of possession of marijuana. Chavez appeals. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[¶ 2.] On September 30, 2000, Chavez’s automobile was stopped by South Dakota Highway Patrolman Brian Swets. Although Chavez disputes the matter, Swets testified that he initiated the traffic stop because an object was hanging from the interior rear view mirror, which interfered with vision in violation of SDCL 32-15-6.1
[¶ 3.] There were three others in the vehicle: an adult male was in the front passenger seat, and an adult female and *93child were in the back seat. Swets testified that Chavez and the front seat passenger were extremely nervous. Swets indicated that Chavez’s hand was “significantly, noticeably” trembling when he handed his driver’s license to Swets. While conceding that most people who get pulled over react nervously to some extent, Swets stated that Chavez’s nervousness “was out of the ordinary ... greater than I would expect to see.”
[¶ 4.] In the course of checking Chavez’s driver’s license, Swets asked Chavez and the front seat passenger various general questions. In response, Chavez told Swets that Chavez was coming from Seattle, Washington and was traveling to North Carolina. Chavez also identified the male passenger as Aurelio Meja-Cas-tillo. Swets testified that Meja-Castillo “had a jacket in his hands and was rolling it in his hands.” Swets indicated that Meja-Castillo’s nervousness was also “unusual both in length and degree.” Swets indicated that “most people after the original stop, have relaxed, settled down some. Especially passengers, as they aren’t usually the focus.” Meja-Castillo, however, was “still nervous, agitated, rolling the jacket, very fidgety.” Moreover, when asked, Meja-Castillo told Swets that he did not have a “green card.” Based on this admission, Swets then asked Chavez if he had a “green card,” and Chavez replied “no.”- Swets asked Chavez “[i]f I call INS to check, are you going to be here legally,” and Chavez answered “no.”
[¶ 5.] Before this license, registration and INS check were completed, Swets informed Chavez that Swets had a drug dog. Swets then stated, “so if I take my drug dog around the car, is he going to tell me there’s drugs in the car.” Chavez shrugged his shoulders and said “probably, if he’s trained, probably but I don’t think so.” Swets then proceeded to have his dog (Crockett) sniff the exterior of the vehicle.
[¶ 6.] The officers on the scene contend, and the state court found, that Crockett “alerted” to the odor of an illegal drug coming from the vehicle. Swets testified that an alert occurred because he observed Crockett’s sniff intensify, increase, and his body posture tightened. Swets stated that the dog “locked up on the trunk. He did not go any further.” After the sniff, Swets told Trooper Michael Thomas that “Crockett showed some interest.” Trooper Thomas2 testified that he paid particular attention to Crockett’s sniff of the vehicle because of Chavez’s statement that the dog would probably alert to drugs in the vehicle. Thomas testified that the dog “sniffed a little bit more, stiffened up, and then [Swets] gave him a toy.” 3
[¶ 7.] After the dog sniff, the officers followed up on the occupants’ immigration status. Meja-Castillo indicated that he did not have INS documentation or an immigrant card. Swets asked how he was able to get a drivers license without these documents. Meja-Castillo did not answer, but he did consent to the trooper looking though his wallet. While looking through the wallet, Swets discovered what appeared to be a counterfeit social security *94card. Furthermore, while still at the scene of the traffic stop, the border patrol put a hold on both Chavez and Meja-Castillo.
[¶ 8.] With the further assistance of Crockett, the officers subsequently searched the vehicle. During the search, they removed a back portion of the back seat and some carpet padding that disclosed an access panel. Once that panel was removed, the officers uncovered a hidden compartment containing several cellophane wrapped packages. Field tests yielded positive results for cocaine and methamphetamine. The vehicle was then towed to the Spearfish Police Department while officers obtained a search warrant. The ultimate search produced packages that contained 450.1 grams of methamphetamine, over four pounds of marijuana, and 18.6 pounds of “almost pure” cocaine.
[¶ 9.] Chavez’s first criminal charges were initiated by indictment in United States federal district court. He was charged with: 1) knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and 2) knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. Following a suppression hearing, a United States magistrate concluded that Chavez was unconstitutionally questioned about his alienage, and therefore, Chavez’s answers should be suppressed along with all derivative evidence subsequently obtained. A United States district judge considered that decision and remanded the case to the magistrate for further findings on whether the dog actually alerted to the odor of illegal drugs during the initial sniff of the vehicle. On remand, the United States magistrate found that the dog did not alert to the odor of illegal drugs during the initial sniff of the vehicle. The United States district judge adopted the magistrate’s findings and recommendations, and suppressed all evidence from the vehicle. The United States government did not appeal that decision.
[¶ 10.] Upon dismissal of the federal criminal action, Chavez was indicted in state court on five drug counts. Chavez moved to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the case because of the evidence suppression and prior prosecution in federal court. Those motions were denied by Circuit Court Judge Timothy Johns. After a trial to the court, Judge Johns found Chavez guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana.
[¶ 11.] Chavez appeals, raising these issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Chavez’s motion to suppress, and specifically:
A. Whether there was a reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop Chavez’s vehicle.
B. Whether Chavez’s constitutional rights were violated by the questioning about his alienage when the stop was for a traffic offense.
C. Whether Chavez’s Miranda rights were violated in the questioning about Chavez’s alien-age.
D. Whether the drug dog alerted to the odor of illegal drugs during the sniff of Chavez’s vehicle.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Chavez’s motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral es-toppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy.
[¶ 12.] At the outset, we note that Chavez does not argue that the timing or the performance of the dog sniff during the traffic stop was unconstitutional. There*95fore, if the dog sniff provided probable cause for the auto search, we need not consider Issues IB and 1C. We need not consider those issues because the challenged questioning in Issues IB and 1C would not be necessary to prolong the stop or provide independent probable cause for the search.4 Because we ultimately conclude that the drug dog alerted and provided probable cause, we do not reach Issues IB or 1C. We affirm on Issues 1A (reasonable suspicion to stop), ID (drug dog alert), and Issue 2 (double jeopardy/collateral estoppel/res judicata).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 13.] We recently reiterated the standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress.
A motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right is a question of law reviewed de novo. We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Once the facts have been determined, however, the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.
State v. Hodges, 2001 SD 93, ¶ 8, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209 (internal citations omitted).
DECISION
[¶ 14.] 1A. Swets had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop Chavez’s vehicle.
[¶ 15.] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although this protection generally requires probable cause to search, “[t]he requisite level of suspicion necessary to effectuate the stop of a vehicle is not equivalent to probable cause necessary for an arrest or a search warrant.” State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13, 625 N.W.2d 275, 279. All that is required is that the police officer has “a reasonable suspicion to stop an automobile.” Id. Therefore, the factual basis needed to support a traffic stop is minimal. Id. State v. Sleep, 1999 SD 19, ¶ 7, 590 N.W.2d 235, 238.
[¶ 16.] While the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon “specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 7, 593 N.W.2d 805, 808 (quoting Spenner v. Pity of Sioux Falls, 1998 SD 56, ¶ 14, 580 N.W.2d 606, 611). Under these standards, it is well established that a traffic violation, however minor, creates sufficient cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95-96 (1996); State v. Kenyon, 2002 SD 111, ¶ 16, 651 N.W.2d 269, 274.
[¶ 17.] The trial court found that “based upon [Swets’] observation of the violation of SDCL 32-15-6 (object dangling from the rear view mirror), [he] *96initiated a traffic stop.” Chavez has not established that this finding was clearly erroneous. We agree that the trooper had a specific and articulable suspicion of a traffic violation sufficient to justify the initial stop of Chavez’s vehicle.
[¶ 18.] Chavez, however, argues the stop was pre-textual. He relies on a statement Swets made prior to the stop that “what the hell, I’m going to stop them anyway.” Chavez argues that this statement established “that Swets’ only purpose was to go on a fishing expedition of a non-Caucasian in an attempt to elicit incriminating evidence of a larger crime.” Chavez argues that “nothing is more telling nor true, in this case than Swets’ declaration prior to the stop.”
[¶ 19.] Chavez’s argument is taken out of content. It also ignores other evidence explaining why Swets made the statement. The record reflects that Swets originally followed Chavez’s vehicle because it did not have a front license plate. When Swets saw the rear license plate, he realized that the car was from North Carolina, and he determined that North Carolina did not require a front license plate. However, Swets also noticed the “dangling object.” Therefore, he decided (and made the statement) to stop the vehicle “anyway.” Consequently, Swets articulated specific non-pretextual facts which, taken together with’ rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the traffic stop. Kenyon, 2002 SD 111, ¶ 15, 651 N.W.2d at 273-274; Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 16, 625 N.W.2d at 279. This type of traffic stop, based on a “dangling object,” has been upheld on a number of occasions. State v. Ashbrook, 1998 SD 115, ¶ 13, 586 N.W.2d 503, 508; State v. Ramirez, 535 N.W.2d 847, 849 (S.D.1995); State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580, 585 (S.D.1993).
[¶ 20.] We finally note that because Swets was legally authorized to stop the vehicle, any additional “underlying intent or motivation” would not have invalidated the stop. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8thCir.1994) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113, 115 S.Ct. 1970, 131 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8thCir.1990). Even if Swets had other motivations to stop Chavez, those subjective reasons were not relevant. They were not relevant because this stop was objectively reasonable, and an objectively reasonable stop is not invalidated even if the stop was pretextual. State v. Lamont, 2001 SD 92, ¶ 21, 631 N.W.2d 603, 610 (citing Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 1878,149 L.Ed.2d 994, 998 (2001)).
[¶ 21.] ID. The drug dog alerted, which provided independent probable cause to search Chavez’s vehicle.
[¶ 22.] Although the videotape does not display Chavez’s vehicle, he argues, as the federal district court concluded, that “the videotape as a whole makes it clear that Crockett did not alert during the first sniff of the vehicle and therefore any reliance on the dog to justify the search of Chavez’s vehicle is without merit.” (emphasis added). On the other hand, the state circuit court found that “the dog alerted to the vehicle thereby indicating the presence of illegal drugs.” We first examine whether this state court finding of fact is clearly erroneous.
[¶23.] The circuit court heard considerable evidence supporting its finding. Moreover, a significant amount of that evidence was not available in the federal court hearings.5 The evidence heard by the circuit court included Swets’ sworn testimony that the dog alerted. Swets *97testified that he “saw and heard [Crockett’s] sniff intensify, increase, and his body posture tightened. He locked up on the trunk. He did not go any further.” Although the videotape does not provide video confirmation6 of this testimony, the alert was corroborated by three other witnesses who did not testify in the federal court proceedings.
[¶ 24.] The first additional witness was Kyle Heyen, the dog’s trainer.7 Heyen, a highly experienced dog trainer, described the behavior Crockett exhibited when he alerted to the odor of illegal drugs. He stated: “[h]is tab intensifies in its wagging and he gets an increase — -very intense sucking in through his nose that-^is very audible[.]” Although our untrained review of the audio portion of the videotape does not disclose an obvious “sucking sound,” there is some audio evidence of dog sniffing. Moreover, Heyen testified that he had listened to the videotape of the stop at least a dozen times. He opined that the dog had alerted because he “heard the dog’s increased breathing, which had not been present during whatever else he was doing around the vehicle .... his nose started inhaling, sucking in, and being a Hoover vacuum.”
[¶ 25.] Trooper Thomas further corroborated an alert. He testified that he observed Crockett alert on “dozens” of occasions. He further testified that he observed Crockett during this sniff and observed that the dog “sniffed a little bit more, stiffened up, and then [Swets] gave him a toy.” The videotape confirms that Crockett returned from' Chavez’s vehicle with the toy in his mouth. According to Swets, “that’s his praise or reward at the end of the search.” Swets testified that he would not give Crockett the toy if the dog did not alert to the odor of illegal drugs in a real life search situation.
[¶ 26.] Finally, confirmation of an alert came from Deputy Sheriff Mike Schafer8 and the fact that, shortly after the sniff, Swets stated to Meja-Castillo “[is] there any reason why my drug dog would alert to your vehicle today?” All of the foregoing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that an alert occurred.
[¶ 27.] Chavez, however, argues that Swets’ subsequent conversation with Deputy Schafer indicated that Crockett did not alert to the odor of an illegal substance. Chavez contends the conversation suggests that the officers searched the car based solely on the suspected false documents in Meja-Castillo’s possession. In that conversation the officers stated:
Swets: He’s got falsified documents.
Schafer: Yeah.
Swets: That’s a crime. We got probable cause for a search.
Schafer: Yeah.
Swets: I mean I think that, that’s what I’m gonna go ahead with.
However, these statements when viewed in context are equivocal. The statement “I think that, that’s what I’m gonna go ahead with,” actually raises two possible inter-*98enees. First, it could support the State’s position that Swets had probable cause to arrest Meja-Castillo for false identification, also had probable cause (from the dog sniff) for a search, and was proceeding to search on the dog sniff. Or, it could imply that the probable cause to search only developed from the discovery of the falsified document.
[¶ 28.] While we only have a cold transcript and inconclusive videotape to resolve this dispute, the trial court heard live witness testimony including extensive cross-examination on this very issue. The trial court heard direct evidence of the officers’ observations of an alert, defense counsel’s cross-examination of Swets about the equivocal statement, and Swets’ denial that the false document was the only source of probable cause for the search:
Attorney: You agree that before the search started that in your discussion with Shafer and/or Thomas that you never articulated to them that your dog had alerted as a probable cause for that search.
Swets: I never directly stated that, sir.
Attorney: In fact, it was a falsified social security card which was the only basis articulated in that discussion; correct?
Swets: No, sir.
(After Swets denied that the suspected false document was the only justification for the search, defense counsel began asking questions on an unrelated topic.)
, [¶ 29.] The trial court reviewed the tape, watched Swets testify, and listened to defense counsel’s cross-examination and suppression arguments. The trial court ultimately judged four witnesses’ credibility after listening to their live testimony. The trial court believed Swets, Thomas, Schafer and Heyen, and we do not. conclude that its findings were clearly erroneous by second-guessing the trial court’s credibility determinations.9 *99We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the drug dog alerted to the odor of an illegal substance. • ■
[¶ 30.] Based on the trial court’s finding of a drug alert, Swets had probable cause to search the vehicle. In State v. De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, 657 N.W.2d 683, we upheld a vehicle search based on a drug dog alert even though the officer had no other reason to believe that drugs were present. Other courts agree. See U.S. v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 875-876 (8thCir.1999) (A dog’s positive indication alone is enough to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance if the dog is rehable) (citing United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1stCir.1999); See also United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (10thCir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 863, 119 S.Ct. 151, 142 L.Ed.2d 123 (1998); United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6thCir.1996); United States v. Carrazco,. 91 F.3d 65, 67 (8thCir.1996); United States v. Delaney, 52 F.3d 182, 188 (8thCir.1995); United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 639 (9thCir.1993)).
[¶ 31.] Because Swets initiated a legal traffic stop, and because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that Crockett alerted to illegal drugs in the vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search. Because the officers had probable cause to search independent of any alleged incriminating statements made by Chavez and Meja-Castillo, we uphold the search.
[¶ 32.] 2. The trial court did not err in denying Chavez’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy.
[¶33.] Chavez argues that the state charges should have been dismissed under double jeopardy, res judicata, or collateral estoppel10 analysis because of *100the federal prosecution and the federal court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. However, we rejected this argument in State v. West, 260 N.W.2d 215 (S.D.1977).
[¶ 34.] With respect to double jeopardy, West held that when both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over a criminal act, the acquittal by one sovereign will not preclude a conviction by the other absent a statute to the contrary. Id. at 219. At the time West was decided, South Dakota had two statutes that prevented a prosecution in state court if the defendant had already been convicted or acquitted for the same criminal activity by another sovereign. However, immediately after the West decision, the South Dakota Legislature repealed those statutes.11 Therefore, under our analysis in West, there are “no statutes to the contrary,” and the principle of dual sovereignty12 permits these successive prosecutions.
[¶35.] Because double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions by dual sovereigns, we proceed to examine whether res judicata or collateral estoppel barred the state trial court from relitigat-ing the suppression issues. In that regard, “it is clearly established that collateral estoppel and res judicata,' although applicable to successive prosecutions for the same criminal act by the same sovereign (see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)), are not applicable to successive prosecutions by different sovereigns.” West, 260 N.W.2d at 219. The rule is that as long as the initial prosecution is by a different sovereign, there' is no reason “why the dual sovereignty doctrine should not leave states free to pursue prosecutions of their own criminal law unencumbered by either thé ‘same offense’ or ‘collateral estoppel’ branches of federal double jeopardy jurisprudence.” State v. Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d 115, 117 (1998). Other federal and state courts agree with this conclusion. Id.
[¶ 36.] A good example is People v. Meredith, 11 Cal.App.4th 1548, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 (1992). There, a state trial court found that the initial stop of Meredith was reasonable and that he consented to a search of his luggage. Those findings were dramatically at variance with a federal district court’s findings on the same factual issues. Id. at 289. Meredith argued that the federal court’s findings constituted a final determination on the merits of the reasonableness of the search, and the. state was barred by collateral estoppel *101from relitigating those issues. However, the California Court of Appeals held that the state was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of a search.
[¶ 37.] The California court rejected the defendant’s argument because “[a]n essential element for collateral estoppel [or res judicata] to apply is the requirement that the party sought to be bound by a prior determination must have been a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party.” Id. at 291 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). Because “the People of the State of California were not a party to the federal proceeding and were not in privity with the United States, the party against whom the federal ruling was made,” the relitigation was permitted. Id.
[¶ 38.] Chavez, however, asserts an exception to this rule, which was recognized in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-124, 79 S.Ct. 676, 678, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, 686-687 (1959). Chavez argues that under the exception, “if one sovereign’s prosecutors are merely a ‘tool of a separate sovereign’ or are a ‘sham and cover’ for another prosecution by the same sovereign, then the double jeopardy guarantee is implicated.” Chavez contends that in this case, “the United State’s Attorney worked closely with the state’s agents throughout the federal prosecution.” Chavez concludes that the state “was in privity with the federal government and must be bound by the federal court’s decision to suppress all evidence in this matter.”
[¶ 39.] Although some of the state law enforcement officers who made this stop testified in federal court, cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers does not, by itself, affect the identity of the prosecuting sovereign. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1096 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123, 79 S.Ct. at 678, 3 L.Ed.2d at 687). See also Meredith, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d at 292 n.7 (citing United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 834 (2dCir.1990)). Stated another way, “[m]ere participation in a prosecution is not enough to establish privity.” Londono-Rivera v. Virginia, 155 FSupp2d 551, 566 (D.Va.2001) (use of the same detective as witnesses in each prosecution does not create privity, where the detectives did not have the authority to act in the state’s name or to decide how the prosecution would proceed); Davis, 906 F.2d at 834 (defendant must show substantial participation); Stephens v. Attorney General of California, 23 F.3d 248, 249 (9thCir.1994). So also, the fact that the state provided assistance to federal authorities in the gathering of evidence does not create an estoppel. Shajranek, 576 N.W.2d at 117. The critical factor is whether or not the state was acting independently. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1096 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124, 79 S.Ct. at 678, 3 L.Ed.2d at 686-687). The tool-ofthe-same-authorities exception “may only be established by proof that the State officials had little or no independent volition in their proceedings.” Londono-Rivera, 155 F.Supp.2d at 566 (quoting In re Kunstier, 914 F.2d 505, 517 (4thCir.1990)).
[¶ 40.] Therefore, Chavez’s point that “the officers involved in the initial arrest and questioning of Chavez were state officials,” is of little consequence. The record here reflects that the state officials instituted and controlled the state court prosecution, while federal officials instituted and controlled independent federal court proceedings. As the circuit court stated “there are no factors in this case which would lead me to believe, from what I’ve heard so far, that there was any privity between the State of South Dakota, the State’s Attorney’s office and the United States Government in the prosecution of this case.” The trial court also found that, “the State of South Dakota made its own *102independent decision to prosecute and had no control over the prosecution of the federal case.” The trial court finally found that “[the State’s Attorney] and his office obviously did not have any control over the prosecution of the federal case, nor did their office have any participation in the decision not to appeal the decision of the federal district court judge.” Chavez has not established that these findings are clearly erroneous.
[¶ 41.] Chavez finally argues that we should defer to the federal court’s suppression ruling based on the doctrine of comity. Comity is a well established principle in our case law. The party seeking relief under this doctrine must satisfy four conditions precedent:
1. The foreign court actually had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties;
2. The decree was not obtained fraudulently;
3. The decree was rendered by a system of law reasonably assuring the requisites of an • impartial administration of justice — due notice and a hearing; and
4. The judgment did not contravene the public policy of the jurisdiction in which it is relied upon.
State v. Daly, 454 N.W.2d 842, 344 (S.D.1990).
[¶ 42.] Chavez is not entitled to comity under condition one because the State was not subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court in the prior proceeding. “It would of course be impossible for the federal prosecutor proceeding in a federal court to act as an agent for the State ... in the prosecution of crimes arising under the laws of this state. Neither the federal prosecutor nor the federal court would have authority to do that.” Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d at 117. Because the federal court did not have jurisdiction over the State of South Dakota in the prior proceeding, comity is inapplicable.
[¶ 43.] For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
[¶ 44.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, concurs. [¶ 45.] KONENKAMP, Justice, concurs in result. [¶ 46.] SABERS and MEIERHENRY, Justices, dissent.. SDCL 32-15-6 provides:
It is a petty offense for any person to drive any vehicle upon a highway with any object or gadget dangling between the view of the driver and the windshield of the vehicle.
. Trooper Thomas's testimony was not presented at the federal suppression hearing. Thomas testified at the state hearing that he had worked with Swets and Crockett several times and had observed how Crockett reacted when he detected the odor of illegal drugs. In addition, Thomas had assisted Swets when Swets practiced and trained Crockett.
. The evidence reflects that when Crockett alerts to the odor of illegal drugs, the officer gives the dog a toy. The arrest videotape does not show Chavez’s vehicle, but it does show that when Crockett returned to the officer’s car after sniffing the Chavez vehicle, Crockett had the toy in his mouth.
. Chavez argues that if the dog did not alert and provide probable cause, the officers had no justification to expand the traffic stop into a complete search of his vehicle. Chavez raises a number of arguments contending that the evidence obtained through questioning should be suppressed under Issues IB and 1C. Those contentions include: that the questioning concerning immigration status was unrelated to the objective purpose of the traf-fie stop; that the expansion of the scope of the stop was not permitted because Chavez and the passenger were not unusually nervous, did not tell conflicting stories about the purpose of the trip, and were not inconsistent about the passenger's residence; that the trooper should not have considered Seattle as a '"source city” for illegal drugs; and, that Chavez’s statements were obtained without required Miranda warnings.
. See the evidence in note 2 supra, and note 7 infra.
. A review of the videotape reveals no improper motive in the positioning of the video camera that was mounted inside Swets’ vehicle. Because Chavez made a 90-degree turn immediately before stopping, Swets’ vehicle and Chavez's vehicle were simply pointed in different directions.
. Heyen presented extensive testimony at the state suppression hearing explaining how Crockett had been trained; how Crockett reacted to the odor of illegal drugs; how Crockett had passed his recertification in 2000 without problem; and, that he had listened to the tape of Chavez’s arrest approximately a dozen times, and based on what he heard on the tape, it was his opinion that Crockett had in fact alerted to the odor of illegal drugs.
.See note 9, infra.
. We should be loath to reverse a trial court's finding that it believed four live witnesses, especially in the absence of any direct evidence contradicting their testimony. The dissent would nevertheless do so solely by the use of a rhetorical question and "appellate inferences" that it draws from the record. The appropriate scope of appellate review should leave such inference making to the fact finder who actually observed those witnesses being cross-examined on the very inferences now drawn by the dissent. Under the appropriate scope of review, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518, 528 (1985). Our clearly erroneous review of this factual dispute makes it especially difficult to agree with the dissent’s appellate inference that "it is clear that Trooper Swets did not believe the dog had alerted.” ¶ 66, infra, (emphasis added).
Other inferences of fact drawn by the dissent also demonstrate the impropriety of appellate second-guessing the fact finder’s credibility inferences on live witnesses. The first example is aptly demonstrated by the dissent's inference that Heyen proffered an "unsupportable” opinion that Crockett's breathing patterns, changed sufficiently to signal an alert. It is suggested that Heyen’s confirmation of an alert is unsupported because the videotape does not reveal an obvious sucking sound like a "Hoover vacuum.” 1167, infra. However, this criticism actually demonstrates the frailty of appellate second-guessing credibility determinations. It does so because the dissent’s inference drawn from Heyen’s opinion was specifically presented to the witness and the trial court. In fact, the videotape was played to the trial court while Heyen was required to identify the noises he relied upon to form his opinion. Heyen explained that he relied not only on the "sucking through the nose sound,” but also upon: the dog’s change in breathing; a lack of other "sniffing"; Swets' tap, whistle and other noise; Swets' use of the words "good boy”; and, the dog leaving with a toy. Although these facts are omitted from the dissent’s analysis, they were presented to the trial court.
*99Heyen was also able to answer other inferences rejected by the trial court, but adopted by the dissent. For example, Hey-en was able to identify for the trial court, the distinction between Swets' breathing and the dog’s breathing that the dissent finds missing. So also, Heyen explained to the trial court why Swets may not have orally emphasized an alert to all of the other officers.
Finally, it must be noted that Lawrence County Deputy Sheriff Michael Shafer provided evidence refuting the dissent's inference that Swets failed to tell anyone that the drug dog alerted. Deputy Shafer specifically testified that he arrived at the scene within minutes of the alert, and Swets immediately informed him upon his anrival that the dog had "showed interest,” which Schafer understood to be an alert. Moreover, Shafer's confirmation of Swets’ contemporaneous indication of an alert was corroborated by Shafer's written report prepared well before the issue of the alert surfaced in the federal proceedings. All of this evidence was considered by the trier of fact, and absent some direct evidence to the contraiy, we should not second-guess that fact finder.
In the final analysis, it is significant that the trial court initially expressed extreme reluctance to reconsider the federal court findings. Nevertheless, it proceeded after being told it would hear different evidence. Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of live testing of the witnesses on the dissent’s suggested inferences, but the trial court rejected them. It apparently did so because this record consists of the sworn testimony of four witnesses supporting an alert, with no contrary testimony. Under those circumstances, we are certainly not in a position to now make better inferences than the trial court, including a finding that four witnesses lied.
. “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall 'be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' South Dakota’s Constitution provides that 'No person shall . .V be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.' SD Const Art VI, § 9.” State v. *100Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 13, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43. "The principle of criminal collateral estoppel is embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment[.]” State v. Flittie, 318 N.W.2d 346, 348 (S.D.1982).
. SDCL 22-5-8 provided:
Whenever it appears that the accused has already been acquitted or convicted upon any criminal prosecution under the laws of another state, government, or country founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is upon trial, this is a sufficient defense.
SDCL 23-2-13 provided in part:
When an act charged as a public offense is within the jurisdiction of another territory, state, or country as well as this state, a conviction of [sic] acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to a prosecution therefor in this state.
West, 260 N.W.2d at 220.
. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine "successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments do not constitute double jeopardy.” Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 841 (8thCir.1977). The dual sovereignty doctrine was recently reaffirmed in United U.S. v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092 (8thCir.1999) (stating that a subsequent prosecution by a separate sovereign does not violate the constitution). Courts have consistently upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine. Id.