(concurring specially).
I.
[¶ 25.] The dilemma we face today arises all too frequently when a potential for termination of parental rights occurs in an ICWA case. Understandably, many tribes, often having limited resources, do not want to move children into their court systems unless it appears that termination of parental rights is inevitable and a tribal court placement will be required. Tribes are also reluctant to transfer cases if they do not have viable placement opportunities available. Circuit courts, not wanting to prolong disruption, decline to transfer children to another court system if a child’s case has been pending for a long time and is about to reach permanency. Beyond any doubt, both sides have children’s best interests in mind.3
*775[¶ 26.] ICWA, through 25 USC § 1911(b), requires a state court to transfer child custody proceedings to tribal court upon the petition of a parent or the child’s tribe, unless either parent objects or the court finds good cause to the contrary. The Act does not define good cause. Nonetheless, the BIA Guidelines offer examples of good cause, but caution that socioeconomic conditions or the perceived adequacy of tribal social services or court systems may not be considered in determining whether good cause exists. To assist in this decision, the Department of Interior — Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) promulgated interpretative “Guidelines for the State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings.” BIA Guidelines, 44 FedReg 67,584, et seq. (Nov. 26, 1979). These “administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important but not controlling significance.” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 53 L.Ed.2d 448, 456 (1977).
[¶ 27.] Here, once again, we face the question whether a tribe made a timely request to transfer. The Court properly places emphasis on not only when the state proceedings first began, but also when the tribe first received notice that termination of parental rights was the intended disposition. The BIA Guidelines provide that good cause to deny transfer of a child custody proceeding to tribal court exists if, among other things, the proceeding is at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer is received. BIA Guidelines, § C.3.b at 67591. This provision governing timeliness is “designed to encourage the prompt exercise of the right to petition for transfer in order to avoid unnecessary delays.” BIA Guidelines § C.3 commentary at 67591. Implicit in this provision is the consideration of a child’s need for-permanence and stability in determining whether good cause exists. In re S.G.V.E., 2001 SD 105, ¶ 33, 634 N.W.2d 88, 94; In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363-64 (Minn.1994).
[¶ 28.] The good cause exception to the transfer of cases to tribal court continues to be a source of conflict. We have encountered this issue on appeal many times. See, e.g., In re D.M., 2003 SD 49, 661 N.W.2d 768; In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317 (S.D.1990) (petition filed four years into litigation); In re A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.1989) (petition filed one year after actual notice to the tribe). South Dakota is not unique in seeing this recurring problem of untimeliness in petitioning for transfer. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 171 Ariz. 104, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ct.App.1991) (tribe filed the petition two years after receiving notice of dependency proceeding); In re Robert T., 200 Cal.App.3d 657, 246 Cal.Rptr. 168 (CalCt App 1988) (petition filed one year into litigation); In re J.W., 528 N.W.2d 657; 660 (Iowa App.1995) (case at advanced stage and petition not filed until seven months after tribe received notice); In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (petition filed two years into litigation); In re Wayne R.N., 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (Ct.App.1988) (petition filed six months after service of parties); State ex rel. State Office for Serv. to Children and Families v. Lucas, 177 Or.App. 318, 33 P.3d 1001 (2001); In re Cody S., 2000 WL 1184586 (Wis.Ct.App. Aug.22, 2000).
[¶ 29.] In response to these cases, some legal commentators have characterized state court ICWA decisions as founded in bias and distrust. Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 *776Legal Stud F 619 (2001) (criticizing state courts for failing to transfer eases to tribal courts, ignoring statutory placement preferences, and creating judicial exceptions to ICWA); see also Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 Iowa L Rev 585 (1994); Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 Santa Claea L Rev 419 (1998). Others find fault with ICWA itself. Michele K. Bennett, Native American Children: Caught in the Web of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 16 Hamline L Rev 953 (1993) (criticizing ICWA and recommending that state courts continue to consider children’s best interests, including child’s need for permanency). Recommended solutions include enactment of local legislation to override state court rulings, congressional amendments to ICWA, and a more active role for federal courts in overseeing state court decisions. See, e.g., B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts, 73 ND L Rev 395 (1997). These solutions, for the most part, have not taken hold or have been unsuccessful.
[¶ 30.] As one scholar put it, “To the extent the ICWA is interpreted to compel decisionmakers to select among irreconcilable interests, the tensions engendered by the Act will only increase.” Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 Em-ORY L J 587, 589 (2002). Nonetheless, this same commentator found that contrary to the suggestion that ICWA is being evaded, “today most state courts and state child welfare agencies seem to be making broad-based efforts to comply with the statutory directives, although the occasional blatant flouting of the Act undoubtedly occurs.” Id. at 622.
[¶ 31.] To the extent that the good cause exception to the transfer of cases to tribal court continues to create conflict, the answer lies not in faultfinding. The most promising solutions have been those outside of litigation.4 In addressing this issue head on, the Conference of Chief Justices concludes that the keys are communication, cooperation, and comity. Stanley G. Feldman and David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154 (November 1995). As the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out, “Although mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation cannot be legislated, much can be accomplished by person-to-person communication and sharing information among tribal and state judges and court staff.” Id. at 156.
[¶ 32.] With these goals in mind, several states have created the position of statewide ICWA coordinator. These individuals work with state agencies and tribes to resolve differences and to facilitate and expedite the handling of cases of Native American children. Presently, ten states have statewide coordinators: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. These coordinators implement and help to enforce a statewide ICWA compliance plan. They maintain a database of children’s cases to document and monitor compliance. They assist in training and coordination between attorneys, social workers, and courts.
[¶ 33.] Congress created ICWA so that, as a general principle, Indian tribes would *777have authority to determine custody issues involving Indian children. See generally Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1610, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). In adherence to this principle, this Court has repeatedly upheld or ordered transfers of custody cases to tribal courts, except in instances where the requests to transfer were untimely or where ICWA prohibits transfer. In re K.D., 2001 SD 77, ¶¶ 8-10, 630 N.W.2d 492, 494 (reversing the trial court’s decision to transfer case to tribal court because the mother objected to the transfer); In re S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53, 56 (S.D.1982) (under ICWA, objection by either parent will keep jurisdiction in state court).
[¶ 34.] Conflicts between state and tribal officials over Native American children must not continue. For the sake of the children, we must find a resolution to this recurring problem. After all, who should be hearing these custody cases has already been decided. “We must defer to the experience, wisdom, and compassion of the ... tribal courts to fashion an appropriate remedy in Indian child welfare cases.” Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)). The answer lies in communication, cooperation, and comity.
II.
[¶ 35.] Lastly, it must be noted that the Court here employs a questionable standard of review in deciding whether good cause existed not to transfer. Abuse of discretion is the most relaxed standard and improper considering the intent of Congress and the burden imposed on those who oppose an ICWA transfer. Absent good cause to the contrary, 25 USC § 1911(b) creates presumptive Tribal Court jurisdiction in foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings. The burden of establishing good cause to deny a transfer is upon the party opposing the transfer. BIA Guidelines, § C.3.d at 67591. If the presumption is in favor of tribal jurisdiction, then mere discretion to override an ICWA transfer is unacceptable.
[¶ 36.] In enacting the jurisdictional provisions of ICWA, Congress intended to have Indian tribes determine custody issues involving Indian children. In re G.R.F., 1997 SD 112, ¶ 14, 569 N.W.2d 29, 32 (citations omitted). It is true that some other courts, like ours, have used the abuse of discretion standard. However, the better reasoned decisions hold that the determination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of good cause. In re A.P., 25 Kan.App.2d 268, 961 P.2d 706, 713 (1998) (clear and convincing standard); In re Adoption of S.W., 41 P.3d 1003, 1013 (OklaCivApp 2001) (same); In re 195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (1981). Considering the firm congressional intent behind ICWA, the standard most consistent with the Act requires clear and convincing evidence of good cause for a state trial court to refuse to transfer to tribal court. Athough this issue was not briefed and thus should not control the outcome today, henceforth we must abandon the abuse of discretion standard in deciding good cause.
[¶ 37.] MEIERHENRY, Justice, joins this special writing.
. The term “best interest of the child” has a broadened meaning under ICWA, incorporat*775ing preservation of the Indian child’s cultural and tribal identity, preferably within the jurisdiction of the child's tribe.
. See, e.g., Maty J. Risling, Esq., The Indian Child Welfare Act, California Judges’ Ben-chguide, Section V: Practical Solutions, Using the Act Creatively, p 92-94 (2000).