(dissenting).
[¶ 24.] In determining whether a request to withdraw an alleged involuntary plea is meritorious, the “court should look to the reasons why a defendant seeks to withdraw the plea.” State v. Thielsen, 2004 SD 17, ¶ 17, 675 N.W.2d 429, 433 (citing State v. Bailey, 1996 SD 45, ¶ 12, 546 N.W.2d 387, 391). Goodwin did not testify or even allege that his plea was involuntary because he was never informed of his rights, that he misunderstood his rights, or that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea. This is understandable because no one disputes that Goodwin *856was fully and adequately advised of each of those matters by Judge Trimble at the arraignment. Moreover, there is no dispute that Goodwin affirmatively indicated on the record that he understood his rights at that time. Finally, there is no dispute that Judge Trimble expressly found that Goodwin’s subsequent plea, entered 89 days later, was “freely and voluntarily” given. Given those facts and the trial court’s finding, our inquiry is narrow, and we should be constrained to review the court’s finding under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶ 16. That requires that we determine whether the trial court exercised its discretion “to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Engelmann, 541 N.W.2d 96, 100 (S.D.1995)). Considering the evidence that is in this record, no such abuse of discretion occurred.
[¶ 25.] Remarkably, however, this Court overturns the trial court’s finding, not upon any evidence that Goodwin misunderstood the rights he was given, but simply upon conjecture that the plea must have been involuntary because Goodwin was 19, had no criminal record, and 89 days expired between the time he was advised of his rights and the time he changed his plea (the Court gives no weight to the apparently inconsequential facts that Goodwin was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings and that he changed his plea pursuant to a written plea agreement indicating an eight-year penitentiary sentence would be requested). Consequently, we now have a new rule that even when there is no allegation that a plea is involuntary as a matter of fact, a guilty plea cannot be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given as a matter of law if there is a failure to re-advise certain defendants of their rights 89 or more days following their arraignment.4 I dissent because this new rule is unsupported by precedent. I also dissent because, when reviewed under the required “objective standards,” this record does not reflect that Goodwin’s change of plea was involuntary.
Under the totality of the circumstances, a change of plea, entered pursuant to a written plea agreement, may be entered with the assistance of counsel 89 days after the initial advisement of rights.
[¶ 26.] Our cases have established four rules that we apply when considering this issue. First, when a defendant enters a guilty plea without full knowledge of the consequences of doing so, the court will apply an objective standard to determine if the defendant’s mistaken impression was reasonably justified, thereby rendering the guilty plea involuntary. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Engelmann, 541 N.W.2d at 101). Second, it is not necessary to re-advise defendants of their constitutional rights between the time of plea and the time of sentencing if the plea is before the same judge and the record shows that the defendant had knowledge of those rights and the consequences of the plea when entered. In re Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d 575, 577 (S.D.1985) (citing Clark v. State, 294 N.W.2d 916, 919 (S.D.1980)). Third, if there is a question of voluntariness, “[t]he fundamental test is whether the plea of guilty was an intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Hofer v. Class, 1998 SD 58, ¶ 26, 578 N.W.2d 583, 588 (citations omitted). Finally, in determining whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily *857entered, we look at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 686, 688 (S.D.1984).
[¶ 27.] In examining the totality of the circumstances, we should begin with the fact that Goodwin was first advised of his rights at his initial appearance on the charge of aggravated assault. He appeared before a magistrate, was advised of his rights, and signed a written acknowledgement of his understanding of those rights. In that written acknowledgement, Goodwin affirmatively indicated that he understood the following rights:
1. right to counsel
2. right to speedy public trial by an impartial jury
3. presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
4. right of compulsory process
5. right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
6. right against self-incrimination
7. a right to preliminary hearing (specifically advising that this was an additional safeguard “to make sure you are not being compelled to defend yourself against a false or unfounded charge”).
Goodwin answered “yes” to the question “do you understand these rights?” Moreover, he signed this form and retained counsel.
[¶28.] Goodwin was again advised of his rights by Judge Trimble at his arraignment. On October 25, 2001, Goodwin appeared before Judge Trimble with counsel. Judge Trimble informed Goodwin of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, the right to trial by jury, and the right against self-incrimination as mandated by Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198 (1970) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969).5 Judge Trim-ble also advised Goodwin of the additional statutory rights outlined in SDCL 23A-7-4 (South Dakota’s equivalent of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)).6 Goodwin stated that he understood his constitutional and statutory rights, he understood the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and he entered a plea of not guilty. His attorney also informed the court that plea negotiations were taking place.
[¶ 29.] A plea agreement was subsequently reached. It was an “open” plea agreement. The agreement was “open” because the “amount of incarceration in the penitentiary” and “[Goodwin’s] share of restitution” were left to be determined “as ordered by the Court.” (Emphasis added.)
[¶ 30.] On January 22, 2002, Goodwin appeared with counsel before Judge Trim-ble to change his plea in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement. Although he was not re-advised of his rights, Judge Trimble inquired whether the plea was voluntary and if a factual basis existed for it. Judge Trimble first inquired if the plea was voluntary, stating, “Has anyone threatened, coerced or promised you any*858thing, other than what you have heard here in open Court, to get you to enter this plea?” Goodwin responded, “No, sir.” With respect to the factual basis, Goodwin admitted kicking Feickert in the head while he was on the ground. However, when the court asked if the kick caused injury to Feickert, Goodwin replied “I don’t think so.” Consequently, the court inquired further, asking, “Does anybody know what the injuries were?” Goodwin’s attorney and the State’s Attorney responded, “He had a ... broken jaw, your Hon- or.” Judge Trimble then determined that the plea was voluntary and that a factual basis existed for the plea. The court ultimately accepted the plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
[¶ 31.] On April 8, 2002, Goodwin was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary and ordered to pay restitution in the full amount of the victim’s medical expenses ($55,149.17). At that time, Goodwin raised no objections to the sentence or the restitution, and he expressed no misunderstanding of his rights. However, approximately 50 days after being sentenced, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even then, Goodwin did not allege that factually, his plea was involuntary. Instead, he alleged that his plea was presumptively involuntary because he had not been re-advised of his rights during the change of plea hearing.
[¶ 32.] In considering this allegation, it is important to reiterate that Judge Trim-ble’s advisement at the arraignment specifically included the rights that this Court now concludes are absent from the record, i.e.: Goodwin’s right to a trial, right to confront witnesses against him, right against self incrimination, the penalties that could be imposed, and the consequences of a plea. In fact, the “record evidence” clearly reflects that those rights were given:
THE COURT: I’m going to go over your rights with you here, and if you have any difficulty hearing me or understanding me or have any questions, feel free to stop me at any time. Mr. Goodwin, you have a right to be -represented by an attorney at all stages of the proceedings against you. And you are here represented by Mr. Speck here today. Any money spent for court-appointed counsel fees is a bill or a lien against any property that you own.
You are presumed innocent until the State has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You are entitled to a jury trial composed of a jury selected from here in Pennington County, the county in which you are charged. A jury trial is a trial' to 12 jurors, whose decision must be unanimous, that is, agreed upon by all 12. The jury determines the facts, they determine guilt or innocence. You may, if you wish, select a court trial. A court trial is a trial to the judge alone. The judge determines the facts and determines guilt or innocence. You are entirely free to choose whether you want a court trial or a jury trial.
You are entitled to be present at all stages of the proceedings against you, and either in person or through your attorney to confront the witnesses presented against you by the State. It is your right to cross-examine these witnesses or ask them any questions concerning testimony that they give against you.
You have a right to subpoena witnesses to come into Court to testify on your behalf. This means that if there is someone to help you present your side of the situation, they can be ordered to appear and tell what they know. They cannot be told what to say, but they can *859be told to appear and tell what they know about the particular situation.
In addition, you have a right against self-incrimination. This means that you cannot be forced to testify or answer any questions about any fact or matter that is at issue in the criminal case pending against you. I want to caution you that anything that you say can and will be used against you in subsequent hearings or proceedings. You have an absolute right to remain silent. Neither the State nor the Court can ever comment on the fact that you have not testified or answered questions. It is not an inference of guilty that you have refused to do so.
Mr. Goodwin, do you understand your rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In addition to the rights that I have advised you of, you have several pleas available to you. First of all, you may enter a plea of not guilty. This is a denial of the charge or charges against you. It protects each and every one of your constitutional and statutory rights that I have advised you of and puts the State to its proof.
You may, if you wish, enter a plea of guilty. A plea of guilty on your behalf is an unqualified admission that you did in fact commit the offense or offenses with which you ■ have been charged. Most importantly, it is a waiver or a giving top of each and every one of the rights that I have discussed with you, but specifically, your right to a trial, your right to confront the witnesses against you, and your right against self-incrimination. If you enter a plea of guilty, you will come before the Court for sentencing.
In addition, there are several pleas allowed by statute. A plea of nolo con-tendere is a statement by you that you do not wish to contest the charge against you. It allows the State to come forward on the Indictment filed, and substantiate it with the evidence that they have. Even though there is. not a determination of guilt, you still face a statutory maximum fine or sentence.
Pleas of not guilty by reason of mental illness and guilty but mentally ill are significant in that if it takes a specific mental intent to commit the offense and you are unable to form that intent at the time, you may have a defense or a partial defense to the charge or charges filed against you. There are also provisions for psychiatric and psychological care and counseling in addition to a statutory maximum fine or sentence.
It may well be that there are lesser included offenses involved in the main charges filed against you. The significance of a lesser included offense is that it carries a smaller maximum, fine or sentence than the charge with which you are faced. You ivould want to discuss with your attorney the significance of any lesser included offense.
In addition, a question of restitution may develop if there is a finding of guilt. You must resolve any issues surrounding the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, or I would deem that you have waived your right.
Mr. Goodwin, you are charged with aggravated assault. The charge is that on the 26th day of May this year, in this county, Pennington, that you assaulted a Joshua Feickert, with the intent to commit bodily injury, ivhich resulted in serious bodily injury.. This carries a penalty of up to 15 years, and/or a $15,000 fine. Do you understand what you are charged with and what the maximum penalty is?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: What’s the plea on this?
*860THE DEFENDANT: Not guilty.
(Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding this record evidence and Goodwin’s affirmative acknowledgment that he understood his statutory and constitutional rights, he now contends that the failure to re-advise him of those rights at the change of plea hearing violated SDCL 23A-7-4 and rendered his plea involuntary.
[¶ 33.] Judge Trimble’s initial advisement was, however, clearly adequate to satisfy all of the presumptions and protections required by our Constitutions. Although Boykin requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, Boykin does not require the 89-day re-advisement rule that the Court adopts today. It must be remembered that Boykin involved a case in which there was no record that the defendant was ever advised of his constitutional rights. Consequently, Boykin merely invalidated pleas based on silent records. “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Id., 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
[¶ 34.] Here, however, the recorcl reveals that Goodwin was advised of, and affirmatively indicated his knowledge and understanding of his rights on two occasions. Therefore, even giving Goodwin all the presumptions and protections possible under our Constitution, this record affirmatively reflects that the required constitutional protections were afforded. Indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision, in the closely related area of the waiver of counsel rights at plea hearings, confirms that the law ordinarily considers such waivers knowing, intelligent, and sufficient “if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances ... [and that] the State may [] prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional minimum.” Iowa v. Tovar, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1389, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261). Clearly, the two advisements of rights provided in this case satisfied the constitutional minimum required by Boykin.
[¶ 35.] Moreover, Goodwin’s advisement of rights was objectively sufficient because SDCL 23A-7-4 only requires that an advisement take place “before” a defendant’s plea is accepted. There is certainly no bright line rule or requirement that an advisement must always take place a second time when a change of plea is requested by a defendant. On the contrary, a judge who, as in this case, fully canvasses a defendant at the arraignment has advised a defendant before accepting the plea within the meaning of this statute. The real question in such cases is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the plea is either unknowing or involuntary when judged by objective standards. Thielsen, 2004 SD 17, ¶ 22, 675 N.W.2d at 434.
[¶ 36.] There is no bright line re-advisement rule because SDCL 23A-7-4 only requires “substantial 'compliance.” State v. Richards, 2002 SD 18, ¶ 8, 640 N.W.2d 480, 482 (citing State v. Nikolaev, 2000 SD 142, ¶ 10, 619 N.W.2d 244, 246). Therefore, this Court has specifically held that “[i]t is not necessary to readvise a defendant of his rights immediately prior to pleading guilty if the record shows the defendant had knowledge of his rights and the consequences of his plea when entered[.]” Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d at 577. For the same reason, this Court has repeatedly upheld similar guilty pleas where the same judge informed and canvassed the defendant, and at a later time accepted a plea without a re-advisement of rights. See Singletary v. State, 88 S.D. 655, 227 *861N.W.2d 424 (1975) (upholding a trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea when the defendant had not been recanvassed); Clark, 294 N.W.2d 916 (same); Stacey v. State, 349 N.W.2d 439 (S.D.1984) (same). As long as the same judge is involved, the trial court may look to its entire record to verify substantial compliance with SDCL 23A-7-4 and the advisement of Boykin rights. See Quist v. Leapley, 486 N.W.2d 265 (S.D.1992). The rule is simply that “[t]he trial court must be able to determine from its own record that the accused has made a free and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights before a guilty plea is accepted.” Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
[¶ 37.] Judge Trimble made that determination from the record, and his specific finding was that Goodwin’s plea was “given freely and voluntarily.” Therefore, we should pay heed to our prior warning that “this Court, acting in our appellate function on the cold ... record before us, cannot presume greater insight into the defendant’s ‘understanding of his rights ... and his plea of guilty than that of the [trial court] that [has] considered this case.’ ” State v. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d 803, 808 (S.D.1994) (holding that guilty pleas previously entered by Moeller were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing) (quoting Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 4, 92 S.Ct. 759, 761, 30 L.Ed.2d 755, 759 (1972) (White, J., dissenting)).
[¶ 38.] This Court, however, declines to follow this admonition. Moreover, in examining the circumstances of this plea, this Court only relies upon age, prior criminal history, and time between advisements in determining that the plea must have been involuntary. This analysis misapplies other important factors and the totality of all circumstances when judged by objective standards. The Court first determines that Goodwin’s lack of experience with the system and his age “mitigates against him having made a free and intelligent waiver of his rights.” However, even though Goodwin was 19 at the time of the assault, “this cannot be said to adversely affect his plea since he was over the age of minority.” State v. Bolger, 332 N.W.2d 718, 721 (S.D.1983). Furthermore, “[t]here is no indication in the record that he [was] anything other than a person of at least average intelligence and comprehension.” Gregory v. State, 353 N.W.2d 777, 780 (S.D.1984). In fact, Goodwin claims to have been an “above-average student.” This Court then relies upon the fact that Goodwin had no prior criminal record. However, he was represented by counsel at both the arraignment and the change of plea hearings, a highly significant fact to which this Court gives no apparent importance.
[¶ 39.] But probably most significantly, Goodwin changed his plea after entering into a plea agreement. Under those circumstances, we have specifically held that a defendant can hardly be heard to say that he pleaded guilty without knowing the full consequences of his plea:
The fact that appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement with the prosecuting attorney, further establishes that his guilty plea was made with full knowledge of its consequences .... Equipped with counsel, appellant can hardly be heard to say that he pleaded guilty without knowing the full consequences thereof.
Clark, 294 N.W.2d at 920 (emphasis added). The Court attempts to distinguish Clark by stating that unlike Clark, the specific terms of Goodwin’s sentence were not stated. The Court is incorrect. Here, the written plea agreement, sent to Goodwin well before the change of plea, stated that “the amount of incarceration in the penitentiary [was] up to the Judge. The *862State will recommend the penitentiary, but no specific time.” That letter also indicated that the State would “oppose a suspended imposition of sentence ... but could see nothing short of an eight year sentence.” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, Goodwin could not have had any illusions about the lengthy penitentiary sentence he was facing.
[¶ 40.] Finally, contrary to the majority opinion, the amount of time between the arraignment and the guilty plea was not excessive. See Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d at 578 (noting that “we have upheld guilty pleas where the same judge informed and canvassed the defendant once, and then later accepted a guilty plea without read-vising the defendant, where the time lapse was five hours ... 26 days, and ... 30 days.” (internal citations omitted)).7
[¶ 41.] Despite our cases permitting pleas without a re-advisement of rights, the Court contends that Goodwin’s plea of guilty must be deemed involuntary. However, in reviewing the Court’s opinion, it must not be lost that neither Goodwin nor his trial counsel8 testified (in support of the motion to withdraw the plea) that factually the plea was involuntary because Goodwin failed to understand his rights or the consequences of his plea. This, of course, he could not do because at his arraignment, Goodwin told Judge Trimble that he understood his constitutional and statutory rights, the nature of the offense, its maximum penalty, and the consequences of pleading guilty.9 Goodwin’s failure to assert a factual lack of knowledge of his constitutional and statutory rights, coupled with the trial court’s explicit recitation of those rights at the arraignment and its specific finding that the plea was voluntary, undercuts this Court’s assertion that the record fails to indicate that Goodwin had the requisite knowledge of his rights and the consequences of a guilty plea.
[¶ 42.] Finally, the Court’s reliance upon the absence of record evidence to support a finding of a voluntary plea is misplaced in cases like this where there is record evidence of the rights having been given. In such cases, a defendant must seek to withdraw his plea contending that he misunderstood those rights, and the record must show that some circumstances reasonably justified the defendant’s mistaken impression.
Where the record shows that “circumstances as they existed at the time of the guilty plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression,” a defendant must be held to have entered his plea without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily.
State v. Wahle, 521 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1994) (citing United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24-25 (3d Cir.1976)); Thielsen, 2004 SD 17, ¶ 22, 675 N.W.2d at 434 (re*863quiring that the review of the voluntariness by judged by objective standards).
[¶ 43.] Here, the record, when judged by objective standards, does not indicate that Goodwin misunderstood his statutory and constitutional rights. On the contrary, the totality of the circumstances reveals that Goodwin’s plea was an intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Hofer, 1998 SD 58, ¶ 26, 578 N.W.2d at 588. Indeed, the judge who observed Goodwin throughout these proceedings specifically found that Goodwin’s plea was “given freely and voluntarily.” And, at the subsequent withdrawal of plea hearing, Judge Trimble reiterated the fact that he had fully advised Goodwin of his rights at the arraignment. Therefore, we should follow our precedent in Singletary, Clark, and Stacey, and decline to reverse a plea simply because a third advisement of rights was not given. We should certainly, from our appellate perspective, decline to divine greater insight into Goodwin’s actual understanding of his rights and plea of guilty than the trial court ascertained from its personal interaction with Goodwin throughout these proceedings. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d at 808.
[¶ 44.] I therefore dissent.
[¶ 45.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, joins this dissent.
. The Court acknowledges that 30 days is acceptable. Apparently, however, even under an objective standard utilizing the totality of the circumstances, 89 days can never pass muster.
. Boykin holds that a guilty plea is only valid if a defendant is shown to have "freely and intelligently waived his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, waived his constitutional right to trial by jury, and waived his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d at 577 (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d at 279-80). These rights were concededly given.
. The other advisement included: the right to be represented by an attorney; the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings; the right to enter a plea of guilty; the fact that if a guilty plea was entered, all of his rights would be waived; and the nature of the charge of felony aggravated assault, including its maximum penalty.
. Although the Court cites Garritsen for the proposition that a 57 day delay is excessive, that case is inapposite. The Garritsen plea was reversed because a different judge presided at the plea hearing. Id.
. Appellate counsel did not represent Goodwin until the motion to withdraw his plea.
. Goodwin limited his argument at the withdrawal of plea hearing to the assertion that he was simply not guilty of aggravated assault because his blow to the victim's head was not the blow that fractured the victim’s jaw. Although there was a passing reference to SDCL 23A-7-4 (Rule 11), there was no argument that his plea was involuntary because he failed to understand his constitutional and statutory rights (the only exception being a belated assertion that he did not understand the difference between a felony and misdemeanor; an assertion that is clearly refuted by the record evidence at the arraignment).