(concurring).
[¶ 30.] I concur in the Court’s opinion and write only to comment upon the definition of an intentional tort.
[¶ 31.] As Justice Konenkamp points out, our cases have utilized a “substantial certainty” standard and a “virtual certainty” standard. See infra ¶¶ 34-35; compare Brazones v. Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900 (S.D.1992) and Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370 (S.D.1991), with Ham v. Cont’l Lumber Co., 506 N.W.2d 91 (S.D. 1993) and Fryer v. Kranz, 2000 SD 125, 616 N.W.2d 102. Even if it were time to reconcile that conflict, I would wait for a more appropriate case to do so. In this case, not only did the Court apply the “substantial certainty” standard, but McMillin has not argued that Ham and Kranz should be reversed. Therefore, I would not re-examine those cases until this conflict has been fully briefed and argued.