United States v. Hamid

PRYOR, Chief Judge,

dissenting:

I cannot agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting the writ of error coram nobis in this case. As this court has stated recently, the writ is an extraordinary remedy which should only be granted “under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.” United States v. Higdon, 496 A.2d 618, 619 (D.C.1985) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511, 74 S.Ct. 247, 252, 98 *647L.Ed. 248 (1954)). These circumstances must involve errors of fact on the part of the trial court which are so fundamental so as to render the proceeding itself irregular and inyalid. Higdon, supra, 496 A.2d at 619; Moon v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303, 272 F.2d 530, 532 (1959). The writ of coram nobis is intended to correct errors of fact not apparent on the face of the record and unknown to the trial court. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69, 35 S.Ct. 16, 19, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914); see Watwood v. District of Columbia, 162 A.2d 486, 487 (D.C.1960). There is a presumption that the proceeding in question was without error, and the petitioner seeking coram nobis relief bears the burden of showing otherwise, i.e., that there was an error which if uncorrected would lead to a miscarriage of justice. Higdon, supra, 496 A.2d at 619-20; Moon, supra, 106 U.S.App.D.C. at 303, 272 at 532.

The majority finds that petitioner has carried his burden of demonstrating that evidence of duress was present but unknown to the trial court which, if unaddressed, would lead to a miscarriage of justice.1 A review of the record and long procedural history of this case indicates, however, that petitioner merely recasts in the guise of his petition for coram nobis relief arguments seeking reduction of sentence which have been heard and rejected by this court on several previous occasions.

After a jury trial, appellee Abdul Hamid and eleven other defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and eight counts of kidnapping while armed, arising from his participation in the so-called “Hanafi” hostage siege of B’nai B’rith and several other sites in the District on March 9, 1977. Appellee was sentenced to an aggregate of 36 to 108 years in prison, and appealed. This court upheld the verdicts on direct appeal in Kkaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S.Ct. 1059, 62 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980).

Appellee subsequently filed a motion to reduce his sentence with the trial court, pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35(b), which was granted. The United States then sought, and this court granted, a writ of mandamus ruling that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdictional powers to reduce sentence under Rule 35 because more than 120 days elapsed from receipt of our order affirming the convictions before the trial court acted on the motion for reduction. United States v. Nunzio, 430 A.2d 1372 (D.C.1981).2 The trial court then vacated its January 8, 1981 order reducing appel-lee’s sentence. Appellee then filed a motion pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in that the attorney did not file the motion to reduce sentence within the 120-day limit. The trial court granted the motion, and reduced the sentence to time served. The government appealed, and this court again reversed the trial court in United States v. Hamid, 461 A.2d 1043 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046, 104 S.Ct. 718, 79 L.Ed.2d 180 (1984) holding that the Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel did not extend to post-conviction motions to reduce sentence. The original sentence was subsequently reinstated.

It was at this point, September 13, 1983, that appellee petitioned the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the leader of the Hanafis, Hamaas Abdul Khaalis, prevented him from presenting an adequate defense at trial and mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing due to threats, intimidation, and other forms of duress. On May 30, 1985, appellee also filed for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court considered the petitions jointly and after a hearing concluded that both writs should be granted.

*648In this case, appellee did not file his petition for writ of error coram nobis until more than three years after his unsuccessful Rule 35 motion, and more than two years after his first § 23-110 motion.

While it is true that the passage of time is not an absolute bar to a claim for coram nobis relief, see United States v. Morgan, supra, 346 U.S. at 507, 74 S.Ct. at 250; Farnsworth v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 232 F.2d 59 (1956), 62 A.L.R.2d 423 (1958), it is also true that undue delay or lack of diligence in prosecuting the claim is a factor to be considered, and places the claimant under a heavier burden of proof. See Farnsworth, supra, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 63, 232 F.2d at 63; 62 A.L.R.2d at 438. Indeed, the function of the writ does not relieve the petitioner of his burden of apprising the court of facts within his knowledge in a timely fashion. See Dearing v. State, 631 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo.1982) (en banc); Fuller v. State, 344 So.2d 216, 217-18 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). Thus, a delay of this kind is particularly damaging when the claimant has knowledge of facts which he desires to bring to the court’s attention, but fails to do so.

Looking at the total circumstances in this case, I respectfully conclude that petitioner has not satisfied the burden which would warrant the grant of the extraordinary writ of error coram nobis.

. At the outset, I must observe that I tun unpersuaded by the government's assertion that the only means of collateral attack available to appellant is to be found in D.C.Code § 23-110. Rather, we have recently reiterated the availability of the writ of coram nobis if its requisites are met. See Higdon, supra. I conclude that the requisites are not met here.

. In 1984, Rule 35 was changed to its present form, which provides that the 120-day limit is no longer jurisdictional, but a filing deadline, and gives the court a reasonable time thereafter to act on the motion.