dissenting:
As the majority opinion correctly observes, the statutory language of section 24 — 24 of the School Code has been construed broadly so that a school district is immune from liability for ordinary negligence not only in matters of discipline, but also for negligence related to instructional activities which are part of the regular school program. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 172, 347 N.E.2d 705, 708.
I consider this cause to present a matter never expressly addressed by the Hlinois courts, although Kobylanski could be considered authority for nonliability as in that case a student was injured in a supervised gymnasium activity when she fell from “rings” onto the gymnasium floor, both the “rings” and the floor being part of the school premises. (See also Newby v. Lake Zurich Community Unit District 95 (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 92, 105-106, 482 N.E.2d 1061, 1071.) The plaintiff here was allegedly injured while engaged in a supervised instructional activity in the gymnasium. I do not believe that this activity, under the control and supervision of a teacher, can be separated from the physical condition of the school building. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff student lost his balance and fell from the gymnasium floor against an unpadded “concrete riser,” an adjoining concrete step.
The school district argues that the plaintiff’s activity at the time Of the injury was being directed by the teacher and under his supervision and that the central question is “why the student fell, rather than on what he fell.”
I do not believe that the “furnishing of equipment” exception to school district immunity developed in Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 should be expanded to this situation lest the exceptions destroy the rule of immunity which the General Assembly has stated is the public policy of Illinois. Any activity of a student involving physical movement could result in potential injury from •contact with parts of the school premises, as defendant argues, from contact with “edges on desks, protrusions on lockers, breakable glass, hardwood floors” and parts of the premises so numerous as to be limitless. Until now, the defective equipment exception to immunity has been limited to defective personal property furnished in connection with instructional or recreational activities. I do not believe it should be éxtended without legislative action.
Justice Karns replaces Justice Jones, who retired after the cause was taken under advisement.