I dissent. In this case a deputy, acting at the request of the appellant, issued a certificate of the prothonotary certifying that an examination of the public records of the office had been made, and that for the period from January 2, 1976 to July 30, 1981 there were no open or unsatisified judgments of record against Helen Hulbert, 1300 1/2 Nobles Lane, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.1 The deputy issued the certification on prothonotary’s form No. 33 under the signatures of the prothonotary and the deputy, and under the seal of the prothonotary. Both of the signatures and the seal were affixed to the certificate by the deputy. The appellant paid a fee of $15.00 for the certification.
The certification that there were no open judgments for the period from January 2, 1976 to July 30, 1981 was erroneous. After the appellant purchased the 1300 1/2 Nobles Lane real estate, he received notice of a lien against that property in favor of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the sum of $13,415.17. An *45examination of the judgment docket in the prothonotary’s office revealed that the lien was recorded on December 18, 1978, squarely within the period certified to be free of unsatisfied and open judgments.
The appellant’s suit seeks to hold the prothonotary liable for the erroneous certification made by the deputy. In order to find liability on the part of the prothonotary, traditional principles of respondeat superior must be applied to render the prothonotary responsible for the negligent acts of the deputy. We have held, however, that in the ordinary course of official business, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the prothonotary, a public official. “The rule in Pennsylvania, as well as in other jurisdictions, is that a public officer is not liable for the negligence of his official subordinates unless he commanded the negligent act to be done.” Orris v. Roberts, 392 Pa. 572, 141 A.2d 393 (1958).2 Public servants in the “chain of command” should not be subject to suit on any theory of vicarious liability. Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
The majority, in holding that the prothonotary is liable for the negligent issuance of an erroneous certification by his deputy, cites the nineteenth century cases of Siewers v. *46Commonwealth, 87 Pa. 15 (1878), and Ziegler v. Commonwealth 12 Pa. 227 (1849). A reading of Siewers and Ziegler reveals that in neither case was the issue of respondeat superior considered.
J.H. Siewers was the Prothonotary of Carbon County and the court found that he personally made the erroneous certification for which he was held liable. In finding Prothonotary Siewers liable, the court cited the earlier case of Ziegler v. Commonwealth, supra.
Jacob Ziegler was the prothonotary of Butler County and, although the court opinion does not specifically say so,3 it is entirely likely that in 1849 the Prothonotary Ziegler had no employees and issued the erroneous certification himself. This likelihood is made clear by the fact that the court opinion discusses the case in terms of the prothonotary making the search and issuing the certification. In addition, the doctrine of respondeat superior was not mentioned by the court.
The prothonotary is always liable for any negligence of his own, or for negligent acts of his subordinates that he orders to be done. The prothonotary, however, has no liability for the negligence of a deputy who was not acting at the command of the prothonotary. In DuBree v. Commonwealth, supra., we said:
“[W]e believe it appropriate to protect from the possibility of suit a public servant who has not himself engaged in actionable conduct.”
481 Pa. at 545, 393 A.2d at 295. I see no reason to abandon that principle, or to deviate from it in this case. I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
. After receiving the prothonotary’s certification, the appellant entered into an agreement with Helen Hulbert to purchase the property at 1300 1/2 Nobles Lane.
. The majority states that Roberts is not controlling in that in Roberts the clerk who was negligent was not statutorily authorized to perform the duties of the prothonotary. On the other hand, in the instant case the deputy, in issuing the certification, was acting within his statutory authority.
The fact that the authority of the deputy derives from statute and is not defined by the prothonotary is reason enough to hold that the prothonotary is not liable for the negligence of the deputy unless the prothonotary commanded the negligent act to be done. ”[T]he rule is founded in considerations of public policy (citation omitted) has long been recognized, and is one of general application. The distinction generally turns upon the question whether the persons employed are his servants, employed voluntarily or privately, paid by him and responsible to him, or whether they are his official subordinates, nominated perhaps by him, but officers of the government; in other words, whether the situation of the inferior is that of a public officer or a private servant.’ In the former case the official superior is not liable for the inferior’s acts, in the latter he is ..." Orris v. Roberts 392 Pa. at 576, 141 A.2d at 395.
. The opinion, written by Justice Burnside, starts with the parenthetical phrase ‘‘(After stating the case)". In the second paragraph of the opinion the following bracketed sentence appears: "[His honour here stated the facts]". Apparently, although Justice Burnside recited the relevant facts of the case, those facts were not specifically set forth in detail in the published opinion.