(dissenting). I do not perceive the issue in this case as do my colleagues.
I believe the learned trial judge stated the question involved with admirable clarity:
"If Weiss’s property is entirely unsuitable for trailer park purposes, the amended ordinance is simply a subterfuge to help the township keep out trailer parks. If this is true, the ordinance is invalid. Knibbe v City of Warren, supra [363 Mich 283 (1961)].”
The answer he gave in the nature of a finding of fact is inconclusive.
"There was no testimony as to whether the [Weiss] land was available for such purpose, or if it was possible to move the power company’s easement, or if it was possible to build a trailer park under the power lines. The court does not know one way or the other.”
Ordinarily I think this would require a remand for further testimony. In this case it seems to me that it mandates reversal. To me the ordinance as applied to plaintiffs’ property is clearly invalid as a mere token compliance with the settled law that trailer parks cannot be completely excluded.
It should be remembered that at the time this action was started, the defendant township had completely excluded trailer parks from its confines. The attitude of the township officials toward *440requests for permission to use land for this purpose was noted by the trial court:
"It became apparent the township was opposed to a [trailer] park in this area and no township board or official would consent to it. The zoning ordinance provided for no trailer park areas whatsoever.”
After plaintiffs called to the attention of the zoning officials the possible unconstitutionality of the ordinance in that form, the board suggested to plaintiff’s counsel that he draft an amendment that would cure the defect. Obligingly he did so, and submitted it to the board. Instead of adopting it the board drafted its own amendment. It was carefully drawn. Not surprisingly, it excluded trailer parks from plaintiffs’ land but permitted them in a small rectangular parcel not far therefrom. This latter parcel is referred to in the record as the "Weiss” property. Another subsection of the ordinance purports to permit mobile home parks "elsewhere in the township” under a special use permit and upon compliance with the township house trailer ordinance.
Thus the situation here presented is completely different from the factual setting in Paka Corp v City of Jackson, 364 Mich 122 (1961), cited as controlling by the majority. In this case, as I read the record, the township has in practical effect excluded trailer parks. It is not the burden of the challenging landowner to overcome the presumption of validity. Rather it is the burden of the governmental unit to justify the ordinance under the traditional tests of public health, safety, and welfare. See Bristow v Woodhaven, 35 Mich App 205 (1971). The township did not meet this burden. Although a parcel of land has been set aside under the present amended ordinance for trailer park *441use, such use is still conditional upon the approval of the township zoning board. Furthermore, the record indicates that the land so set aside may not, as a practical matter, be available for trailer park use at all — the land in question being crossed by electrical high power lines.
It is apparent that in many areas of our state, trailer parks will win no popularity contests as additions to a community. But they do have a legal right to existence under reasonable regulation.
This case seems to me to be a typical example of de facto exclusion with a little dash of de jure recognition.
I would reverse and hold the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs’ property.