Lehmicke v. Lehmicke

*569WIEAND, Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

Although I concur with portions of the majority opinion, I am unable to agree with the majority’s decision to remand. The evidence showed that the wife-appellee did not contribute to the cost of the husband-appellant’s medical school education; and to the extent that she contributed to the support of the family while appellant attended classes, neither the Divorce Code nor principles of equity require restitution. Therefore, I would vacate and set aside the order directing appellant to pay appellee the sum of $64,-790.00.

Albert J. Lehmicke and Nancy Sipe Lehmicke were married on June 8, 1968, following Albert’s graduation from college. After a seventeen month stint in the army, Albert and his wife moved to Ohio, where Albert matriculated at Ohio State Medical School. Following graduation in June, 1973, both husband and wife moved to Philadelphia, where Albert served a medical internship. The parties separated in May, 1974, one child having been born of their marriage. A decree in divorce was entered on July 7, 1981. By that time, Dr. Lehmicke had become a Board Certified Pediatrician and, after two years of employment by the Media Clinic, had entered private practice in April, 1980. Nancy Lehmicke, meanwhile, had completed a two year nursing program at Philadelphia Community College and, in May, 1980, had earned a Bachelor’s Degree in nursing. At the time of the divorce, she lived with the parties’ son in an apartment in Philadelphia and was working as a registered nurse.

During their brief marriage the parties did not accumulate any significant marital property. The divorce court, however, determined that Dr. Lehmicke’s medical degree was marital property and awarded Mrs. Lehmicke the sum of $64,790.00 as her distributive share thereof.1 The majori*570ty concludes that the medical degree was not marital property. It remands, however, for a hearing to determine, on equitable principles, what amount should be awarded to Mrs. Lehmicke to reimburse her for contributions to family support made while her husband was attending medical school. I agree with the majority that Dr. Lehmicke’s medical degree was not marital property. I disagree that Mrs. Lehmicke is entitled to recover, on either equitable or legal grounds, the contributions which she made to the family’s support while her husband was unable to work because he was pursuing a degree in medicine.

. The Divorce Code2 does not compel or even recommend that an advanced academic degree be deemed marital property. An academic degree is personal to the holder; it can neither be transferred nor inherited. It does not have an exchange value. A person who has earned an advanced degree may or may not parlay it into a successful career in the same field. Thus, a value cannot readily be placed upon a degree which, in substance, is nothing more than a recognition of academic achievement. In short, the degree lacks any and all of those attributes which are usually associated with property.

An advanced degree, of course, creates a potential in the holder to earn money and acquire property in the future. A potential for increased earnings, however, “is not limited to situations involving formal education. [It] can be a result of on-the-job training, in-job experience, apprenticeships or a host of other factors which make the labor of an individual more valuable____” Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa.Super. 151, 156, 486 A.2d 951, 953 (1984). Whether the potential for increased earnings will be realized, of course, must necessarily depend upon personal variables not readily ascertainable in advance, such as industry, diligence, integrity, ability and intelligence.

In Hodge, a panel of this Court held that an advanced degree in medicine was not property. For similar reasons, most courts which have considered the issue have concluded *571that advanced, educational degrees are not marital property and cannot be divided between spouses. See: In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (master’s degree in business administration); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind.App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (future salary of college professor with Ph.D.); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982) (master’s degree in business administration); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ.App.1981) (medical degree); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980) (law degree).

It does not follow that a divorce court can ignore the investment which one spouse has made in the education or training of the other. The Divorce Code requires that a court which is called upon to divide marital property in an equitable manner shall consider “[t]he contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party.” Divorce Code of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, § 401, 23 P.S. § 401(d)(4). In the instant case, the parties were involved in a relatively short marriage during which little or no marital property was accumulated. Thus, there is no marital property to be distributed.

In the usual case, an advanced degree will also manifest itself in an increased earning capacity of the holder. In a sense, the spouse who contributes to the other’s obtaining of a degree has made a marital investment. One spouse has “postponed, as it were, present consumption and a higher standard of living, for the future prospect of greater support and material benefits.” Mahoney v. Mahoney, supra 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. This investment will make it possible for the holder of the degree to contribute more substantially to the support of the family, including the other spouse, whether in the form of support or alimony payments. See: Hodge v. Hodge, supra. This too failed to provide a satisfactory solution in the instant case, however, for Mrs. Lehmicke had achieved an educational degree in her own right and was able to support herself. Therefore, the court held that she was not entitled to an award of *572alimony. Mrs. Lehmicke did not appeal from that determination.

I also agree with the majority that where one spouse has contributed to the cost of an advanced degree or to training acquired by the other, a court may rely upon equitable principles to fashion a remedy. Where, as in the instant case, the investment has not manifested itself in acquired marital property and cannot be returned in the form of enhanced support, a court charged with doing equity may nevertheless order reimbursement to the investing spouse in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the student spouse. This, as Judge Brosky has pertinently noted, is authorized by the provisions of Section 401(c) of the Divorce Code which direct that courts shall have the power to do equity in all matrimonial cases. That courts shall enter orders as equity and justice may require is also suggested by Section 102(a)(6) which mandates that the Divorce Code be interpreted and applied by a court so as to “[ejffectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated.” The courts of other jurisdictions have achieved similar results. See: Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky.App.1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, supra; O’Brien v. O’Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979). See also: 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 898; Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 1294.

It must be emphasized, however, that there is no absolute right to reimbursement merely because one spouse has made contributions to the other’s education or training. Such contribution is merely a factor to be considered, among others, as a court seeks to achieve economic justice between the parties. If the contributing spouse’s investment in the education of the other has been realized by acquired marital property or the contributing spouse has shared in the fruits of the other’s education or training during long years of marriage, it is possible that economic justice can be effectuated solely by a division of marital property or by an award of support or alimony. In such instances, a separate reimbursement for contributions made *573to the other’s education will most likely be unnecessary to achieve economic justice. See: Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 78 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1969). See also: Divorce Code § 401(d)(4).

I am compelled to disagree with the majority, however, when it remands for the trial court to determine the amounts which the wife contributed to the support of the family while the husband was attending medical school. Since adoption of an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution in Pennsylvania, it is clear that each spouse owes to the other and to the children born of their marriage a duty of support. This “right of support depends not on the sex of [the spouse] but rather upon the need in view of the relative financial circumstances of the parties.” Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974). When spouses decide to separate or divorce, a nonworking spouse is not required to reimburse a working spouse for contributions previously made by the working spouse to support the nonworking spouse and children born of the marriage. This is true whether the idleness of the nonworking spouse was caused by illness, by physical or mental disability, because of the need to care for children, or because, for reasons of sloth, the spouse was unwilling to work. Why, then, should there by a different rule where the inability of a spouse to work is brought about by the need to attend classes? Or, to state it differently, if a working spouse can recover contributions made to the family while the nonworking spouse is pursuing an academic degree, why shouldn’t a working spouse be entitled to recover such contributions upon divorce whenever the other spouse, for whatever reason, failed or was unable to work? Logic suggests that the duty of spousal support should not be treated differently merely because contributions of support are unequal while one spouse seeks an advanced degree or undergoes training intended to increase his or her earning power.

The duty of support is imposed by rule of law on both spouses. Compliance with this legal duty does not result in *574unjust enrichment to the other. Marriage is for better or worse. It is not entered with a conscious intent that at some future time there will be an accounting of and reimbursement for moneys contributed to the support of the family. To inject such a concept would, in my judgment, have far-reaching and unfortunate consequences. If I am correct in my view regarding the duty of spousal support, then it is difficult to perceive good reason for creating an exception which would reimburse a spouse for support contributed while the other is attending an institution of higher learning or otherwise obtaining advanced training.

The imposition of an equal duty on both spouses to pay nonrecoverable support to the other does not deny the financial sacrifices made by a working spouse while the other spouse acquires an education. Those sacrifices are real and, at times, burdensome. The working spouse may have foregone his or her own educational goals; both spouses may have reduced their standard of living for a time; and the experience may have been financially and emotionally draining. The decision to take that route in preference to another, however, is a decision born of the marriage. That the marriage subsequently proved unsuccessful does not permit a court to turn back the clock and return the parties to the same positions in all respects which they occupied before they assumed the mutual obligations of marriage. Return to the status quo which existed prior to marriage is not one of the goals of the Divorce Code.

I would hold that a nonworking spouse is liable to reimburse a working spouse only for sums advanced in excess of the legal duty of support imposed by law upon the working spouse. In most cases where the nonworking spouse is engaged in obtaining an education, this will, be the amount contributed by the working spouse to the cost of educating the other spouse. Such a limit on the right to obtain restitution on equitable grounds is consistent with the contract of marriage, the legal duty of spousal support, *575and the purpose of the Divorce Code to effectuate economic justice between the parties upon divorce.

In the instant case, the evidence established that Mrs. Lehmicke’s contributions while her husband was attending medical school were limited to spousal and child support. She worked as a waitress five or six nights a week and earned between thirty and forty dollars per night. She also worked summers as a recreation assistant. Her earnings were used to pay rent and to purchase food and clothing for the family. Although some tips were kept in a jar and may have been used on occasion to purchase books for her husband, it seems clear that Dr. Lehmicke’s financial resources were in excess of the cost of his medical education. His education cost $1,877.00 per year for three years or a total of $5,631.00. During this three year period he earned $1,000.00 by doing research work, received $1,000.00 in scholarships, and borrowed $8,600.00. He also received $240.00 per month in veteran’s benefits, which were used to make monthly payments on a car. Moneys received in excess of the annual cost of his education were used to pay household expenses.

This evidence does not establish that Mrs. Lehmicke paid for Dr. Lehmicke’s medical education. It does show that she contributed to the support of the family, including her son, while Dr. Lehmicke was unable to work full time because he was attending medical school. These were support contributions which she was legally obligated to make. She was obligated to support her husband, as well as her son, while her husband was unemployed for any reason provided, only, that he had not forfeited the right of support by his conduct. Because appellee was obligated by law to provide spousal support she is not entitled to reimbursement therefor upon dissolution of the marriage. She was no more entitled to restitution for supporting her husband than he would have been if he had been the working spouse and had supported her while she stayed at home to care for their son. In either case, the spouses would have been building and investing for the future of *576their family. In either case, there would have been no unjust enrichment because of support payments made to benefit the family.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and set aside the order of the trial court which awarded appellee the sum of $64,790.00 as compensation for her interest in appellant’s medical degree.

. Dr. Lehmicke’s medical degree was given an estimated present value of $388,740.00 based on his earning capacity. Mrs. Lehmicke was awarded a one-sixth interest, or $64,790.00, payable in six yearly installments.

. 23 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq.