concurring:
I concur in the majority’s disposition of this matter. I write separately because I feel compelled to expand upon the rationale underlying our decision, and to state my distaste for the tactic employed by defense counsel in this case.
It is beyond question that “there is no constitutional prohibition to a court’s denial in appropriate circumstances, of a defendant’s request to be tried by a judge sitting without a jury.” Commonwealth v. Garrison, 242 Pa.Super. 509, 514-15, 363 A.2d 388, 390 (1976) (allocatur denied). See also Commonwealth v. Hailey, 332 Pa.Super. 167, 480 A.2d 1240 (1984) (no absolute right to a bench trial); Commonwealth v. Edney, 318 Pa.Super. 362, 464 A.2d 1386 (1983) (same); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 312 Pa.Super. 557, 459 A.2d 362 (1983) (court not constitutionally prohibited from denying request to waive jury trial); Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 311 Pa.Super. 259, 457 A.2d 875 (1983) (no absolute right to non-jury trial); Commonwealth v. Forrest, 305 Pa.Super. 297, 451 A.2d 540 (1982) (no constitutional reason why a court cannot refuse waiver). The decision to grant a waiver of a jury trial is one committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 500 Pa. 355, 456 A.2d 1326 (1982); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, supra; Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra; Commonwealth v. Forrest, supra; Commonwealth v. Lee, 262 Pa.Super. 280, 396 A.2d 755 (1978).
The fact that a waiver is found to be “knowing and intelligent” does not mandate the court’s approval of a defense request to be tried without a jury; “[ijnstead, ... even if satisfied that the defendant’s waiver is ‘knowing and intelligent,’ ... the judge has discretion to decide whether to approve the waiver.” Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra, 311 Pa.Superior Ct. at 262, 457 A.2d at 876. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 500 Pa. 355, 456 A.2d 1326 (1982) (court may properly deny waiver where judge was exposed to accused’s criminal record during pre-trial proceeding); Commonwealth v. Garrison, 242 Pa.Super. 509, 364 A.2d 388 (1976) (court may properly deny waiver *523when accused’s only purpose was to maneuver for a more desirable judge).
In the case at bar, appellant’s action was nothing more than a blatant attempt to judge-shop. Even had the learned trial judge held a waiver colloquy, I have no doubt that he would have denied appellant’s request. Where the motivations for an accused’s waiver request are as clear as appellant’s, a colloquy is not necessary.
I must also note my distaste for defense counsel’s tactics regarding appellant’s placement in the Career Criminal Program. Appellant’s extensive prior record certainly warranted his inclusion in the Program. Counsel’s attempt to sidestep the inevitable was at most a waste of valuable judicial assets.