dissenting.
In my opinion, the advisory form which the law enforcement officer read to Smith was adequate under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197(10) (Reissue 1993) to advise Smith of the consequences of taking and failing a chemical test.
The majority opinion holds that the advisory form only partially complied with the requirements of § 60-6,197(10). As examples of what was missing from the form, the majority opinion notes that Smith was not informed that (1) in order to reinstate his license after the expiration of the revocation period, Smith would have to pay a reinstatement fee; (2) the results of the chemical test could be competent evidence in any prosecution for driving under the influence; (3) failing the breath test would be probative of a driving under the influence offense; and (4) there were more serious penalties, including felonies, which could result from a test which disclosed an illegal concentration of drugs or alcohol.
The majority opinion ignores the Legislature’s intent behind § 60-6,197(10). In construing a statute, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail *370over that of a particular part considered separately. State v. Joubert, 246 Neb. 287, 518 N.W.2d 887 (1994). An appellate court must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, problem to be remedied, or purpose to be served, and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves its purpose, rather than a construction which will defeat the purpose. Id.
The Legislature enacted 1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 291, to provide
a swift and sure method for administratively revoking a person’s driver’s license if he or she either refuses to submit to a test of his or her alcohol concentration under the state implied consent law or if such test of alcohol concentration indicates that he or she is under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of [§ 60-6,196].
Statement of Purpose, L.B. 291, Committee on Transportation, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 11, 1991). In passing L.B. 291, the Legislature intended to “provide a deterrent to persons who might be tempted to drink and drive.” Statement of Purpose, supra.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. McGuire, 493 So. 2d 559 (La. 1986) is directly on point. The statute in effect at the time of the McGuire decision required a law enforcement officer who requested a driver to submit to a chemical test to “ ‘first inform the person of the consequences of a refusal and the consequences if the test is conducted and the results indicate a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or above ....’” Id. at 561. The warning administered by the officer in McGuire contained only the following language with regard to the consequences of submitting to and failing the chemical test: “ ‘[T]est results of .10 percent or above will be used against you in court.’ ... ‘If you submit to the test, and the test results show a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or above, your driver’s license shall be suspended for a minimum period of three (3) months.’ ” Id. at 562.
The court in McGuire held that the warning administered by the officer constituted satisfactory compliance with the statute requiring the officer to inform the driver of the consequences of failing the test. The McGuire court specifically held that the *371statute did not require a law enforcement officer to embark upon a discussion of the legal consequences of submitting to .and failing the chemical test.
I would reach the same decision in the case at bar that the Louisiana Supreme Court reached in McGuire. Of the four deficiencies cited by the majority opinion in the advisory form, three dealt with the use of the chemical test results in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Those legal consequences existed prior to the passage of L.B. 291, and the Legislature never saw fit to require a law enforcement officer to inform the driver of those consequences. See State v. Deets, 234 Neb. 307, 450 N.W.2d 696 (1990). The passage of L.B. 291 enabled law enforcement officers to immediately revoke and impound a driver’s license for submitting to and failing a chemical test. The purpose of L.B. 291 was to combat the drunk driving problem with a swift and efficient administrative procedure, not to require police officers to provide drivers with a litany of their rights and the consequences of their actions. The only information the Legislature intended for law enforcement officers to have to impart to drivers pursuánt to § 60-6,197(10) was with regard to the new administrative consequence — if the driver submitted to and failed a chemical test, his or her license would be revoked.
The majority also cited the lack of information regarding a reinstatement fee as one of the consequences about which Smith should have been informed. Pursuant to State v. Deets, supra, the purpose of the statute requiring the advising of consequences is to provide the driver with relevant information ensuring that “the driver knows and is in a position to make a rational and voluntary decision as to whether he will comply with the law.” 234 Neb. at 308, 450 N.W.2d at 697. If a law enforcement officer is required to inform the driver of the potential monetary consequences of failing a chemical test, such as the payment of a reinstatement fee, why not require the arresting officer to inform drivers that they could lose their jobs, that their insurance premiums might be increased, and that they might incur attorney fees if charges are filed?
Clearly, the only relevant consequence of failing a chemical test contemplated by § 60-6,197(10) is the administrative *372revocation of the license. Smith was sufficiently informed of that consequence.
Wright, J., joins in this dissent.