(dissenting). The issue here is whether an accountant may assert the malpractice *334period of limitation as an affirmative defense to liability. The majority holds that if someone, somehow, sometime, somewhere, and in some source, labeled an action against a member of the same occupation as defendant a "malpractice” claim, then the two-year malpractice period of limitation will apply. Statutes of limitation are premised on the idea that there should be a bright-line cut-off date to potential litigation. I dissent because I believe that the majority’s holding unnecessarily confuses and obscures the rules of litigation in the State of Michigan.
At issue here is the meaning of MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), which provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” This provision was one small section in the Revised Judicature Act of 1961.1 The Judicature Act of 1915 provided a two-year malpractice period of limitation for physicians, surgeons, and dentists. 1915 CL 12323(3). Because the 1961 provision deleted the physician, surgeon, and dentist language, Michigan courts have struggled with whether the malpractice period of limitation applies to other professions.
In Kambas v St Joseph’s Mercy Hosp of Detroit, 389 Mich 249, 253; 205 NW2d 431 (1973), the defendant hospital, relying on MCL 600.2912; MSA 27A.2912, another provision of thé Revised Judicature Act of 1961, asserted that nursing was a licensed profession that was protected by the malpractice period of limitation. Section 2912(1) provides:
A civil action for malpractice may be main*335tained against any person professing or holding himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession. The rules of the common law applicable to actions against members of a state licensed profession, for malpractice, are applicable against any person who holds himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession.
Kambas specifically rejected the argument that § 2912 created any new cause of action. Id. at 253. The Court relied on the explicit Committee Comment from the drafters of the statute:
"The source section pertained only to physicians and surgeons. Note that the broadening of this section does not create a new cause of action. Members of state licensed professions are liable for malpractice at common law, as are unlicensed persons. What this section does is hold the unlicensed person to the standard of care to which a member of the state licensed profession would be held, instead of to the standard of care of a layman, to which unlicensed persons are held at present.” [Id., quoting Committee Comment accompanying § 2912 (emphasis added in Kambas).]
The Court held that § 2912 merely extended the malpractice cause of action to pseudoprofessionals serving in professions that were already subject to malpractice actions. Id. Kambas concluded that because nurses were not subject to malpractice actions under the Judicature Act of 1915, the Legislature did not intend that nurses could fall within the malpractice period of limitation. We should recognize that the Legislature subsequently amended related statutes and current legislation provides that medical malpractice actions extend to licensed health care professionals who are licensed or registered under article 15 of the Public *336Health Code,2 and licensed health care facilities or agencies who are licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code. MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838a. The statute expressly excludes sanitarians and veterinarians. § 5838a(l)(b).
Another factor, for consideration has been a Committee Comment that the drafters of the 1961 statute submitted with § 5805: "Section [5805] is a compilation of the limitations on the general tort remedies. Existing time periods have been used.”31 relied on this comment in my dissenting opinion in Sam v Balardo, 85 Mich App 20, 29-30; 270 NW2d 522 (1978), a legal malpractice case, in which I concluded that the Legislature intended to limit the malpractice period of limitation to physicians, surgeons, and dentists. However, on appeal, the majority of this Court held that the analysis should focus on the definition of malpractice by resort to the common law. Sam v Balardo, 411 Mich 405, 424; 308 NW2d 142 (1981).
Dissenting, Justice Levin astutely predicted that this holding would leave litigation rules uncertain:
The majority’s construction has the effect of rendering uncertain the period of limitation applicable to any given profession. After today, only members of the legal and medical professions (including nurses) can know with confidence which period applies until a court, and probably not until this Court, has searched reported decisions, treatises and statutes relating to actions for the negligent practice of that profession to ascertain whether the word "malpractice” has been used with regard to it with sufficient frequency for the Court to conclude that such an action was consid*337ered a "malpractice” action at common law. [Id. at 440.][4]
The majority states that it is necessary to research all available sources in order "to discern the scope of common-law malpractice.” Brickley, C.J., ante at 332. The majority reasons that "[t]o hold otherwise would impose an arbitrary limit on” the malpractice period of limitation. Id.5 This analysis is in conflict with this Court’s most recent approach in Dennis v Robbins Funeral Home, 428 Mich 698; 411 NW2d 156 (1987), in which we held that funeral homes and their directors could not use the shorter malpractice period of limitation. Dennis specifically looked only to Michigan cases. Id. at 702, n 1. We stated:_
*338Since a malpractice action against a funeral home or funeral director was not recognized at the time the Legislature enacted the Judicature Act of 1915 and the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, as amended, we find no indication that the Legislature intended to include this cause of action within the1 meaning of the malpractice statute of limitations. [Id. at 703.]
Now, in contrast to the majority’s approach in Sam, and in contrast to the unanimous opinion in Dennis, this Court will apparently consider sources after 1961, the date that the revised Michigan statute of limitations was . enacted. Brickley, C.J., ante at 332-333. I believe that post-1961 sources are entirely irrelevant in determining tbe Legislature’s intent when it enacted this statute.
Statutes of limitation are rules that govern litigation and are intended to establish predictability and certainty for lawyers, judges, and clients. In contrast, the majority’s approach seems to leave no limit with regard to who can fit into the shorter malpractice statute, and, therefore, the majority has shaken predictable rules and left them totally. uncertain. After today, no lawyer can safely advise a client that a claim is actionable, or that it is barred, unless the defendant is a health care professional, lawyer, architect, engineer, land surveyor, contractor, or accountant. No judge can confidently rule on a statute of limitations motion involving another profession without researching every printed source available from any and all jurisdictions. This goes far beyond Kambas, Sam, and Dennis. Even if we accept the Sam majority’s approach, the scope of our inquiry is limited to what the Michigan Legislature intended in 1961, as evidenced by Michigan law under the Judicature Act of 1915.
I believe the correct approach to a statute of *339limitations issue has been demonstrated by 1988 PA 115. In Marysville v Pate, Hirn & Bogue, Inc, 154 Mich App 655, 661; 397 NW2d 859 (1986), the panel affirmed the application of the malpractice period of limitation to a claim against a professional engineering firm. The Legislature responded by enacting § 5805(10), which provides: "The period of limitations for an action against a state licensed architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, or contractor based on an improvement to real property shall be as provided in section 5839.”6 See Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 478 (Second Analysis), June 22, 1988. The Legislature expressed its intent that the malpractice period of limitation does not apply to these particular licensed professionals.7
I would maintain that the Legislature can readily extend the malpractice period of limitation to professions that were not recognized as being subject to malpractice actions by Michigan law in 1961, as it has done with respect to health care professionals and as it expressly has not done with respect to architects, engineers, land surveyors, and contractors. Therefore, we should end our consideration of this issue here. We would then have bright-line rules that all litigants and courts can follow. Otherwise, we will continuously face this issue each time a different profession asserts the malpractice period of limitation as a defense, as foretold by Justice Levin. Sam, supra at 441. Such uncertainty belies the purpose of the statute of limitations.
Therefore, I would hold that § 5805(4) applies *340only to medical and legal malpractice. If other professional groups want the protection of a shorter period of limitation they should contact members of the Legislature. It is not our place to create new malpractice causes of action when the Legislature has expressly stated that it has not. Barring such an approach, I believe that our inquiry must remain whether Michigan recognized a malpractice action against this profession in 1961. Because there is no Michigan source recognizing an accountant malpractice action before 1961, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.8
Levin and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J._For a more thorough discussion of the legislative history, see my dissenting opinion in Sam v Balardo, 85 Mich App 20, 25-27; 270 NW2d 522 (1978).
Article 15 applies to chiropractic, dentistry, medicine, nursing, optometry, osteopathic medicine and surgery, pharmacy practice, physical therapy, podiatric medicine and surgery, counseling, psychology, occupational therapy, sanitarians, and veterinary occupations.
Reprinted as an annotation to § 5805.
Justice Levin argued:
If there is a difference between malpractice actions and ordinary negligence actions it is that, since the former involves negligence in the practice of a profession, the applicable standard of care is that of a reasonable member of the profession rather than of a reasonable layman. If the Court’s construction has the effect of extending the malpractice limitation period to all professionals of whom a higher standard of care is required, then it will be difficult to explain why the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 did not extend the malpractice limitation period to all state-licensed professionals.
If the shorter malpractice limitation period applies to all state-licensed professions, then it applies not only to physicians and lawyers but also, for example, to taxidermists, foresters, surveyors, contractors, landscape architects and community planners. If that is to be the course of adjudication of § 5805(3) [now 5805(4)], Kambas should be openly overruled. Otherwise, nothing will be left of the Kambas decision save that nurses, alone among state-licensed professionals, will be denied the benefit of the shorter malpractice limitation period. [411 Mich 442.].
I would counter that statutes of limitation are, by their very nature and purpose, arbitrary. For example, the Legislature has decided that a normal breach of contract action must be commenced within six years. MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8). Therefore, six years and two weeks is too late. The Legislature draws the lines, it is not our place to alter them.
Section 5839 generally provides a six-year limitation, a one-year discovery rule exception, and a ten-year ultimate limitation for all actions.
Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the Legislature has acquiesced to having the courts pick and choose which professions are covered and which are not.
The panel held that the two-year malpractice period of limitation did not apply. It further found it unnecessary to determine which period did apply because the complaint was filed within the shortest of the alternative periods. 204 Mich App 451-452.