(dissenting). The circuit court did not err in affirming the decisions of the board of review' that the claimants were requalified to receive unemployment benefits because their labor dispute disqualifications were terminated under §29(8) of the Michigan Employment Security Act (mesa), MCL 421.29(8); MSA 17.531(8). I would affirm.
These cases involve the so-called "make work” circumstances of thirteen claimants who worked for individual employers for at least two weeks at wages at least as high as their weekly benefit rates for the employment involved in the labor dispute.1 The majority opinion engages in unnecessary statutory construction to reach the conclusion that these jobs did not satisfy the requirements for requalification. No statutory construction is necessary because the statute is, on its face, clear and unambiguous and fully supports the decisions of the board of review and the circuit court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority, which reverses with respect to these claimants, and would affirm the requalification to receive benefits.
A
The mesa is a remedial act and its scheme is *127intended to safeguard the general welfare. Tomei v General Motors Corp, 194 Mich App 180, 184; 486 NW2d 100 (1992). It is entitled to liberal interpretation to give effect to its remedial policy. Wohlert Special Products, Inc v MESC, 202 Mich App 419, 424; 509 NW2d 825 (1993); Tomei, supra. Disqualifications are to be narrowly construed and, in the absence of provisions requiring disqualification, we will not judicially impose such requirements. Johnides v St Lawrence Hosp, 184 Mich App 172, 177-178; 457 NW2d 123 (1990); Wilkerson v Jackson Public Schools, 170 Mich App 133, 136; 427 NW2d 570 (1988). In my view, the majority imposes requirements not found in the statute.
In Dow Chemical Co v Curtis, 431 Mich 471, 480; 430 NW2d 645 (1988), our Supreme Court pointed out that 1974 PA 104 amended § 29(8) of the mesa to "restore the viability” of the labor dispute disqualification in light of the interpretation of that section in Great Lakes Steel Corp v MESC, 381 Mich 249; 161 NW2d 14 (1968). The amendment of § 29(8) was accomplished with an eye toward establishing objective criteria' to evaluate interim employment. The amendment thereby supplied a means to determine whether employers are entitled to claim the bar of the disqualification.
B
The Legislature achieved its purpose by amending § 29(8) to require that two objective criteria be met in order to terminate the labor dispute disqualification for receipt of benefits: (1) the claimant must have employment for at least two consecutive weeks, and (2) have earned at least as much as the weekly benefit rate for the employment involved in the labor dispute. These two relatively *128minimal requirements are clearly and succinctly established in the statute and nothing more is required. Statutory construction is unnecessary because the language is unequivocal and unambiguous. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). We cannot and should not add requirements to the statute that are not found there.
The majority holding adds a subjective requirement to the objective requirements of the statute. The majority would require an inquiry into the motives and intentions of workers and their subsequent employers and only after such inquiry could the subsequent employment be judged to be bona fide employment. I disagree.
c
We need not go outside the statute to determine whether employment is bona fide because the statute defines both the term "employment,” MCL 421.42(1); MSA 17.545(1), and the term "unemployed,” MCL 421.48; MSA 17.552. The mesa serves as the basis for the definitions to be applied to determine statutory compliance. Great Lakes, supra; Nordman v Calhoun, 332 Mich 460; 51 NW2d 906 (1952). The claimants have met all of the statutory requirements of bona fide employment and any inquiry into the subjective elements of that employment is clearly outside the bounds of the statute and amounts to judicial legislation.
In amending § 29(8), the Legislature chose to adopt objective criteria for overcoming the labor dispute disqualification and to address the perceived potential for abuse pointed out in the Great Lakes decision2 without reference to "good faith”. *129It just as easily could have adopted the subjective approach adopted here by the majority of this panel, but chose instead to limit the reach of the disqualification. As pointed out in the opinion of the circuit court, the establishment of strictly objective criteria serves the perfectly reasonable purpose and good public policy of avoiding litigating large numbers of unemployment compensation claims to resolve difficult and disputed questions of subjective intent. Given the remedial purpose of the statute and the potential to overload the system if subjective criteria are adopted, I believe that the majority errs in going where the Legislature has refused to tread. The circuit court judgment should be affirmed.
This case is still good law.