dissenting:
A principal issue before this court is whether the Public Service Commission (PSC or Commission) properly determined the scope of its authority under D.C.Code § 43-503 (1990).1 Remand is not required *1114to resolve the question. The Commission dismissed petitioner’s complaint as moot, having decided that its authority under § 43-503 to compel a public utility to comply with the federal law involved was at an end once the federal agency responsible for enforcing that law, the General Services Administration (GSA), determined that Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) was in compliance with it. In my view, the Commission’s determination of the scope of its authority under § 43-503 is a reasonable construction of its regulatory statute, and we should give it considerable weight. See Winchester Van Buren Tenants Ass’n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 550 A.2d 51, 55 (D.C.1988) (“Courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by an agency charged with its enforcement.”)
It was entirely reasonable for the Commission to conclude that any action under § 503 to compel PEPCO to negotiate and include in its contract with GSA provisions conforming to federal procurement requirements was moot once GSA executed a contract with PEPCO which, pursuant to its authority under law, GSA determined met the requirements of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4) and (5) (the Act).2 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(C) and (D).3 As the Commission points out on appeal, if it had not dismissed the complaint, it would have been obliged to accept GSA’s conclusion that the contract conformed to federal requirements, making further action on that issue a useless pursuit. Alternatively, the Commission would have had to resolve the issue anew, perhaps reaching a decision inconsistent with that of the responsible federal agency, a potential fraught with mischievous consequences. Under the circumstances, the Commission properly declined to proceed where the overriding federal interest in overseeing the manner in which it achieves the goals for which the Small Business Act was designed is not the proper subject of local control.4 Nothing in *1115the Commission’s charter authorizes it to intrude into these aspects of the federal procurement process after that process has been completed by execution of a contract by the federal government with its supplier (PEPCO).
In its ruling, the Commission recognized not only the limits of its own power under § 503, but also the principles of federal preemption, although the Commission did not so label its restraint.5 Preemption invalidates or precludes state action which interferes with or is contrary to federal law. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)). Federal preemption can be express or implied. Id.; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 567, 569 (6th Cir.1991). Preemption may be presumed where the statutory and regulatory scheme in the area is so comprehensive that it is reasonable to infer that there is no room for supplementary state regulation. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491, 107 S.Ct. 805, 811, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987); Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. at 2375; Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). Local involvement is deemed preempted when it interferes with the methods by which the federal enactment was designed to reach its goal. International Paper, 479 U.S. at 494, 107 S.Ct. at 813.
We deal here with such an area of federal interest where intrusions of local authority over the terms of federal contracts specified by statute cannot be countenanced and where the involvement by the individual states or other local governments would be disruptive to the federal scheme. The very nature of the interest involved here raises an inference of local exclusion. That interest is participation of small business concerns and the socially disadvantaged in the federal procurement system through federally mandated and enforced contract provisions. Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that the Commission erred in dismissing that aspect of the petitioner’s complaint which sought to compel PEPCO to negotiate a contracting plan with GSA after GSA had already approved PEPCO’s plan and executed a contract.
Similar considerations lead me to conclude that the Commission properly dismissed petitioner’s related requests for certain remedial relief for claimed past transgressions by PEPCO. As the Commission concluded, the remedies sought by petitioner are not within its statutory powers. See D.C.Code §§ 43-102, -503;6 see also Ches*1116apeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 378 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C.1977) (a creature of statute, the Commission may' exercise only those powers granted by it). Moreover, as the Commission recognized, issues related to the adequacy of PEPCO’s compliance and the diligence with which PEPCO complied with the federal statute “are questions best directed elsewhere.” Remedies available to parties actually aggrieved 7 by any past noncompliance of the utility with federal law must derive from the federal laws allegedly violated.
The statute provides for inclusion of a liquidated damages provision in federal contracts payable, “upon a finding that a prime contractor has failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements imposed [by § 637(d)].” 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(F)(i). The Act further provides:
The contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate a good faith effort regarding compliance prior to the contracting officer’s final decision regarding the imposition of damages and the amount thereof. The final decision of a contracting officer regarding the contractor’s obligation to pay such damages, or the amounts thereof, shall be subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 601-603).
15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(F)(ii). The statute makes clear that only GSA, the procuring agency, can pursue the remedy in the manner specified. Individuals cannot circumvent the procedural provisions of the statute and regulations upon which they rely in seeking redress. Although a private right of action in favor of a protected class has been implied in some circumstances from a statute, see Organization of Minority Vendors v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 579 F.Supp. 574, 592 (N.D.Ill.1983), we need not decide whether the Act involved here does so. Whatever private rights of action may be implicit in the Act for any person or class of persons actually aggrieved, as the Commission determined, it is not the appropriate forum for redress for alleged federal rights derived by implication from the federal statute under which petitioner filed his complaint. Therefore, in my opinion, the Commission appropriately determined that its authority under the charter creating it does not allow it to adjudicate such federal rights, if any, and properly deferred to other forums. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 43-503, the Public Service Commission has the power, after notice and hearing, to compel a public utility to comply, inter alia, with any “laws of the United States applicable.” Section 43-503 reads in its entirety as follows:
*1114Commission to compel compliance with laws and ordinances.
The Commission shall have power, after hearing and notice by order in writing, to require and compel every public utility to comply with the provisions of Chapters 1-10 of this title, and with all other laws of the United States applicable, and any municipal ordinance or regulation relating to said public utility, and to conform to the duties upon it thereby imposed or by the provisions of its own charter, if any charter has or shall be granted it: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be held to relieve any public utility, its officers, agents, or servants, from any punishment, fine, forfeiture, or penalty for violation of any such law, ordinance, regulation, or duty imposed by its charter, nor to limit, take away, or restrict the jurisdiction of any court or other authority which on March 4, 1913, had or which may thereafter have power to impose any such punishment, fine, forfeiture, or penalty.
. The Act requires GSA and the Small Business Administration to develop a subcontracting program designed to assure that small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals have "the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency.” See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1).
. The federal procurement authority (here GSA) is responsible for determining whether the plan of the offeror (here PEPCO) meets the require-merits of law and to withhold the award of a contract if it does not. Pertinent statutory provisions read as follows:
(C) If, within the time limit prescribed in regulations of the Federal agency concerned, the apparent successful offeror fails to negotiate the subcontracting plan required by this paragraph, such offeror shall become ineligible to be awarded the contract. Prior compliance of the offeror with other such subcontracting plans shall be considered by the Federal agency in determining the responsibility of that offeror for the award of the contract.
(D) No contract shall be awarded to any of-feror unless the procurement authority determines that the plan to be negotiated by the offeror pursuant to this paragraph provides the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to participate in the performance of the contract.
15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(C) and (D).
.In dismissing the complaint, the Commission determined, inter alia, that the federal statute and regulations implementing it "do[ ] not contemplate state Commission action.” See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(8); Federal Actions Acquisitions Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 19.702(c) (1992). The Commission also stated that "[t]he Commission’s statutory power only extends to determining whether its statute, rules or regulations have been violated and enforcing certain remedies contained in the D.C.Code.”
. I cannot agree with the majority that the Commission's failure to characterize one of its legal positions in "recognizable preemption terms” either precluded the parties from addressing the point or forecloses this court from considering the legal correctness of its ruling. See Common-Cause v. Federal Election Comm’n, 285 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 12, 906 F.2d 705, 706 (1990) (agency decision of less than ideal clarity will be upheld if its path can be reasonably discerned) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). Here, it is clear from PSC’s two orders that it relied, in part, on preemption principles in dismissing petitioner’s complaint. See supra note 4. The PSC’s position that its action is precluded by the governing federal statute and regulations and that the appropriate forum "as Congress intended [is] GSA, SBA or the federal courts" also permeates its brief in this court. In summarizing its arguments on review, the Commission stated the following which exemplifies its legal position:
The Commission’s decision to dismiss the action must be upheld because: 1) only GSA, not the Commission, has statutory authority to determine whether the Small Business Act has been violated and no such determination was ever made, 2) GSA, not the Commission, has the authority over the federal procurement process, and 3) a remand of this matter would lead us to the same result because the Commission lacks authority in this aréa.
Such reasons for sustaining the validity of the PSC's order fall within the preemption principles discussed in this dissenting opinion. Therefore, in my view, the PSC’s preemption determination is sufficiently articulated in such language in its orders and brief to allow this court to review whether the PSC erred in concluding as a matter of law that federal law precludes it from intruding into an area which by statute is vested in certain federal agencies or in the federal courts.
. D.C.Code § 43-102 outlines generally the Commission’s authority to enforce certain laws affecting public utilities. See also D.C.Code § 43-503, supra note 1.
. Appellant is a shareholder and ratepayer as opposed to a potential subcontractor of PEPCO who might be in a position to claim adverse consequences as a result of PEPCO’s prior noncompliance.