dissenting in part and concurring in part:
In my opinion the School District is immune from liability pursuant to sections 3 — 106 and 2 — 201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 — 106, 2 — 201 (West 1998)).
In regard to section 3 — 106, I believe the accessibility ramp increased the usefulness of, and was an integral part of, the school gymnasium. In Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 508-09 (1997), our supreme court set forth the “increased usefulness” test under section 3 — 106 for adjoining nonrecreational structures to recreational public property. In that case, the court held that section 3 — 106 immunity applied to a walkway adjacent to a Soldier Field parking lot, because it increased the usefulness of, and was an integral part of, the Soldier Field recreational facility. Thus, Sylvester directs me to conclude that immunity should apply going in and going out.
In the instant appeal, the accessibility ramp led to the gymnasium and provided the primary, if not the sole, means of ingress and egress to the gymnasium for those with mobility impairments. In other words, the ramp welcomed all gymnasium users. Thus, it was an integral part of — and much more than merely incidental to — the recreational character of the property as a whole. See Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 509, citing Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 379-81 (1995). Thus, section 3 — 106 immunity should apply. See 745 ILCS 10/3 — 106 (West 1998).
Under section 2 — 201, immunity is not possessed unless the plaintiff’s injury resulted from an act or omission by a public employee, in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion, who was exercising discretion and determining policy. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342 (1998) (interpreting section 2 — 201). In 1980, when the ramp was constructed, the architect and the business manager for the School District exercised discretion when deciding how to design the ramp and determined policy in deciding to build the ramp to increase access for the disabled. Thus, section 2 — 201 immunity should apply because plaintiff’s injury complained of here resulted from alleged deficiencies — namely, the lack of a railing — in the design and in the building of the ramp.
Therefore, I believe that certified question one (whether an accessibility ramp leading into a school recreational facility is an integral part of said facility thereby affording the School District the immunity of section 3 — 106) and question three (whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 2 — 201 where plaintiff allegedly stepped off the side of an accessibility ramp while exiting a school gymnasium) should be answered with a resounding “Yes.”
I concur with the majority, answering “No,” in response to question two (whether the School District’s conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton as a matter of law). I also concur with the majority in regard to question four (whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 3 — 108(a) (745 ILCS 10/3 — 108(a) (West 1996)) for failure to supervise). However, I would conclude that the School District is immune for failure to place a rail, for failure to warn, and for failure to illuminate under section 3 — 106 or under section 2 — 201 of the Tort Immunity Act.