(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority decides that the police' reports made by certain of the individual defendants, which essentially corroborate their versions of the *29facts, were admissible under MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The majority rules that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion in admitting the reports.”
MRE 802 prohibits hearsay except as provided under the evidentiary rules. MCR 2.613(A) provides "an error in the admission ... of evidence ... is not grounds for . . . disturbing a judgment or order unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” This is in accord with the general rule. 5A CJS, Appeal & Error, § 1727, p 999 (error committed in admitting hearsay evidence may or may not be grounds for reversal, depending upon whether such error is prejudicial).
MRE 803(6) provides:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, transactions, occurrences, or events, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown hy the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. [Emphasis added.]
Police reports have been rejected under the hearsay exception for several reasons, including: (1) inclusion of police officer’s factual conclusions although he was not an eye witness, Derrick v Blazers, 355 Mich 176, 180-181; 93 NW2d 909 *30(1959); (2) declarants were not acting in the regular course of their business when making the statement, Hewitt v Grand Trunk W R Co, 123 Mich App 309, 322-325; 333 NW2d 264 (1983); and (3) untrustworthiness, specifically, the motive of the declarant, Central Fabricators, Inc v Big Dutchman Div of US Industries, Inc, 398 Mich 352, 354-355; 247 NW2d 804 (1976). The federal advisory committee note on this exception under the federal rules of evidence, FRE 803(a) states:
Problems of the motivation of the informant have been a source of difficulty and disagreement. In Palmer v Hoffman, 318 US 109, 63 S Ct 477, 87 L Ed 645 (1943), exclusion of an accident report made by the since deceased engineer, offered by defendant railroad trustees in a grade crossing collision case, was upheld. The report was not "in the regular course of business,” not a record of the systematic conduct of the business as a business, said the Court. The report was prepared for use in litigating, not railroading. While the opinion mentions the motivation of the engineer only obliquely, the emphasis on records of routine operations is significant only by virtue of impact on motivation to be accurate. Absence of routineness raises lack of motivation to be accurate. The opinion of the Court of Appeals had gone beyond mere lack of motive to be accurate: the engineer’s statement was "dripping with motivations to misrepresent.” Hoffman v Palmer, 129 F 2d 976, 991 (CA 2, 1942).
Our Supreme Court has said:
The police report is a writing. It could be admitted into evidence as an exhibit if the proponent can show that it meets the requirements of the business records exception. However, because of the "nature” of police business and the circumstances under which such reports are usually *31made, the possibility of police reports so qualifying is unlikely. [Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181, 189; 247 NW2d 783 (1976) (citing Palmer).]
In the instant case, the motivation to misrepresent is obvious. Faced with possible internal police department sanctions and facing probable litigation even the most honest and self-effacing officer might be inclined to place his actions in the best possible light. The reports, given their imprimatur as official police documents, might be viewed as more credible than the testimony of live witnesses. It is impossible to conclude that the jury, faced with a quasi-official document which purports to offer an objective recitation of the "facts,” would not place heavy reliance on its accuracy. I would conclude the reports fail a reasonable MRE 803(6) analysis and therefore should have been excluded because of the serious problem of trustworthiness. MRE 802. Nor do I believe the error harmless. MCR 2.613(A).
By comparison, I note a federal case, Wilson v Beebe, 743 F2d 342 (CA 6, 1984), aff'd on reh en banc 770 F2d 578 (CA 6, 1985), on FRE 803(8), the federal business records hearsay exception. In that case, the defendant, a state trooper, shot the plaintiff while attempting to handcuff him during an arrest. Plaintiff brought a negligence and civil rights action. At trial, plaintiff sought to admit a memorandum written by the defendant’s superior in which the superior concluded that defendant had acted contrary to department training in weapons use and handling. The district court admitted the memorandum. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit concluded that all the relevant factors indicated that the memorandum was accurate. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the memorandum was free from motivational problems which might de*32tract from its trustworthiness. I note in the Wilson case that the police memorandum is against the interest of the police officer.
The reports in the instant case present serious motivational problems. Because they are official police documents I believe the reports have inherent and excessive credibility in the jurors’ eyes. Therefore, I believe the admission of these reports was error and was not harmless. I would remand the case for a new trial.