I concur in the result. I write separately to note that the Miller ordinance was never put in evidence; consequently, it was not something that Miller or Modern Day could have properly included in the legal file or otherwise put before this court.
If Miller had claimed its ordinance was designed to limit the number of liquor-by-the-drink licenses for tax-exempt organizations, then the exact language of the ordinance would have been relevant in deciding if the ordinance was unreasonable, unjust, or unduly oppressive. See Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214 (Mo.App.2003). However, that is not what the record shows.
Here, Miller simply refused to issue a license to Modern Day because its qualified voters had not, by vote, authorized the issuance of such a license. Thus, the issue *180in this case is whether Miller could absolutely prohibit a liquor-by-the-drink license for tax-exempt organizations unless the license was authorized by a vote of the people, not whether Miller could limit the number of licenses by requiring voter approval for additional licenses of this type.
Under the circumstances, the presence or absence of Miller’s ordinance, or the presence or absence of its specific language, is of no consequence. Whatever the language of the Miller ordinance, Miller used it to refuse a license to Modern Day unless Miller’s voters approved the license. Based on Miller’s interpretation of its ordinance, it is “inconsistent” with section 311.090.1 as it prohibits what section 311.090.1 allows. That is to say, Miller interprets the ordinance as prohibiting a liquor-by-the-drink license for Modern Day unless there is voter approval, whereas section 311.090.1 allows Modern Day such a license regardless of voter approval. Miller had no authority to adopt such an ordinance, whatever its language. See 311.220.2, RSMo 2000. Consequently, the trial court did not err in issuing the writ of mandamus.