concurring.
I respectfully concur in the principal opinion as to Points I, II, IV, and V. However, I cannot join the rationale expressed by the principal opinion supporting reversal of Point III.
The principal opinion is positing that the State could not prove Defendant had the apparent possibility to commit the crime, see State v. Mulder, 916 S.W.2d 346 (Mo.App. E.D.1996), because the intended victim left, and there was no contact with the victim. This “no contact” analysis is extracted from State v. Ballenger, 72 S.W.3d 154 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). The Ballenger *99court analyzed a defendant’s relationship to an anhydrous ammonia tank, found no contact, and simply stated physical contact with the tank would have been that “something more than mere preparation” to demonstrate the defendant was attempting to steal the contents under those facts. Id. at 158.
O’Brien and Ballenger specifically involved the attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and depended upon an analysis of the facts, including the defendant’s relationship to otherwise legal items or products. Analysis in this case, however, depends not only upon an examination of Defendant’s relationship to otherwise legal items, i.e., cell phone and binoculars, but also as to Defendant’s connection with the illegal actions of his cohort, who concealed his possession of a BB gun while approaching a person using an ATM machine. Therefore, the dissent would hold a jury could reasonably, and without speculation, conclude Defendant was acting as a lookout for his cohort who was attempting to commit a robbery. Neither analysis sufficiently examines the distinction between attempts to steal property in general and attempts to steal property from the intended victim’s person.
An attempted robbery can occur without a defendant having actual “contact” with the intended victim. See State v. Stewart, 537 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.App.St.L.Dist.1976). Further, we are instructed by Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law Section 11.4 (2d Ed.2003) that in various states where the “substantial step” analysis is employed, there are several instances where the corpus delecti has been established for an attempted robbery and the intended victim is unaware of the pending attempt. For example, when a defendant is lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime, or when a defendant is in possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the cidme “which are specifically designed for such unlawful use or which serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances,” courts have found a defendant to be guilty of attempted robbery. Id. at 227-28.
Relying on the above rationale in this case, I agree there would be sufficient evidence upon which to convict Defendant’s cohort of attempted robbery, and so too Defendant of aiding and abetting, if there was “something more” present, not merely contact with a victim. Yet, even in Stewart the victim was identifiable, and it was not clear from the opinion whether someone from the victim Bank or Courier Service did or did not testify to the unwanted action of that defendant. Stewart, 537 S.W.2d at 581. Here, the complete absence of the victim necessitates “something more” to fill the void.
Although it need not be established that the intended victim was aware of the conduct towards him or her, a victim called to testify would establish whether he or she was in fact within the vicinity of the crime scene, and any such conduct or contact by a defendant or cohort would have been unwanted. Furthermore, some evidence of a pattern of conduct, common scheme or plan by a defendant may obviate the need that a specific victim be produced to establish an attempt. There could even be testimony about an unidentifiable victim, seen screaming and fleeing the scene, which indicates a lack of consent to the actions of Defendant and his cohort. Indeed, I can find no Missouri case wherein the victim was completely unidentifiable.
In short, the “something more” can be something other than “contact” with a victim. What constitutes “something more” will vary based upon the circumstances of each case. This “something more” also differs from what would be required to *100establish intended asportation of an inanimate object as opposed to taking property directly from an individual. In my opinion, the “something more” is missing here. Therefore, I concur in result only.