dissenting.
In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that a proceeding initiated by the state of Montana to collect a tax on the Kurth family's marijuana crop was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the Kurths had already been convicted in criminal court for possession of those drugs. Today our court holds that the mere assessment of a similar tax by the Indiana Department of State Revenue prior to trial for .a related drug possession or dealing offense cuts off the ability of county prosecutors to obtain drug convictions and courts to impose sentences. I believe the majority today extends the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause further than the United States Supreme Court requires.26
I
While I do not agree in all the particulars, I do agree that the Indiana CSET bears enough resemblance to the Montana dangerous drug tax at issue in Kurth Ranch to implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. While the courts of several other states have found their drug tax statutes sufficiently distinct from the Montana tax to withstand scrutiny under Kurth Ranch, e.g., State v. Gulledge, 257 Kan. 915, 896 P.2d 378 (1995); State v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1995); Milner v. State, 658 So.2d 500 (Ala.Civ.App.1994); I find the majority's analysis persuasive that the CSET has punitive characteristies that subject it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1945. Accord, Stennett v. State, 905 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.Ct.App.1995).
II
Concluding that the Indiana CSET is sufficiently similar to the Montana dangerous drug tax to subject it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean, however, that this is the same case as Kurth Ranch. Indeed, this case is different from Kurth Ranch in at least one very important way-in Kurth Ranch, the taxpayer had first been convicted of the underlying drug offense and sought to avoid the subsequent imposition of the drug tax on double jeopardy grounds; here the taxpayer has first been assessed the drug tax and seeks to avoid punishment for the underlying drug offense on double jeopardy grounds.
The majority contends that the order in which the state seeks to impose the criminal and tax punishments makes no difference-that the tax can be either a first or a second punishment, but in either case it is considered punishment for double jeopardy pur*304poses. There is certainly authority for this position.27 But I think we should tread cautiously in this area. First, the Montana tax could be imposed only after a eriminal conviction and the Kurth Ranch majority expressly noted that it was not faced with "the question whether an ostensibly civil proceeding that is designed to inflict punishment may bar a subsequent proceeding that is admittedly criminal in character." Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1947 n. 21. Second, the Supreme Court seems to emphasize the sequence in Kurth Ranch, several times making explicit reference to the fact that the imposition of the tax followed the imposition of the criminal sanction.28 Third, as Justice DeBruler points out, the effect of holding that the tax can constitute a first punishment for double jeopardy purposes is to interdict a "power of the highest essential order," namely the power of the state to prosecute criminal behavior. In the absence of clear mandate from the Supreme Court, I think it highly inadvisable for us to hold that an administrative assessment of a tax can constitute a first punishment for double jeopardy purposes.29
TII
The majority takes the position that Kurth Ranch requires that when a civil or administrative proceeding or sanction has the punitive characteristics that subject it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the established principles of Double Jeopardy jurisprudence apply regardless of whether the criminal prosecution and sentencing or the civil or administrative proceeding and sanction come first. Even if I agreed with the majority that Kurth Ranch prevents the state from prosecuting drug offenders if CSET has already been imposed-and I do not; see part II, supra-I can not agree with the way the majority seeks to implement this principle. The majority says that jeopardy attaches when the revenue department issues its assessment notice and demand. This cannot be right-the mere issuance of an administrative order cannot be sufficient to shut down completely the state's ability to prosecute drug offenders.
A
The Double Jeopardy Clause is violated by (i) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction (which I will *305refer to as "prosecution jeopardy"), or (H) multiple punishments for the same offense (which I will refer to as "punishment jeopardy")30 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). And the factual patterns in this and the other cases before the court today generally involve three types of state actions: (1) a criminal prosecution for a drug possession or dealing offense; (i) a criminal prosecution for the failure to pay the CSET; and (i) an administrative (non-criminal) action to eollect CSET due. Prosecution jeopardy arises or attaches in the first two types of actions at the time the jury is sworn or, in an action tried to the bench, at the time the fact finder begins to take evidence. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2160-61, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (jury trial); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (bench trial); Maddox v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 92, 98, 102 N.E.2d 225, 228 (jury trial); State v. Proctor (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 707, 708 (bench trial). See generally Joseph G. Cook, 3 Constitutional Rights of the Accused 2d §§ 23:17-28:25 (1986 & Supp.1995). The cases are not so clear as to precisely when punishment jeopardy attaches but I have found no authority for holding that it attaches before an offender has commenced to serve a valid sentence. See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134, 101 S.Ct. 426, 435-36, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); Coleman v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 711, 715; Williams v. State (1986), Ind.App., 494 N.E.2d 1001, 1004, cert. denied 481 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 2191, 95 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987); Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing 2d §§ 8:14-8:17 (1991 & Supp.1994).
But because the concept of administrative or civil sanctions in general, and a tax in particular, constituting jeopardy is so new to the law,31 there is little guidance as to when prosecution jeopardy or punishment jeopardy attach in such context. Indeed, the majority's analysis on this point is quite abbreviated.32 Yet if we are to hold that at the moment of attachment, the state is interdict, ed from pursuing a criminal prosecution, ascertaining that moment of attachment becomes a vital inquiry.
I think we start with the basie principles that the mere filing of charges or conduct of pre-trial proceedings are not enough to implicate prosecution jeopardy and that the mere pronouncement of sentence is not enough to implicate punishment jeopardy. As noted above, prosecution jeopardy does not attach, in a jury trial, until the jury is sworn, and, in a bench trial, until the fact finder begins to take evidence. I would analogize the admin*306istrative procedure for enforcing the CSET to the criminal bench trial and would find the imposition of the CSET to constitute a prosecution jeopardy at the point, but not before, the taxpayer exercises his or her rights to appeal an assessment, a hearing has been convened, and the fact finder has begun to take testimony. Similarly, I would not find the imposition of the CSET to constitute a punishment jeopardy unless and until the taxpayer has begun to pay the assessment.33
B
Indiana Code § 6-7-3-18 (1998) provides that the Department of Revenue shall proceed to assess and collect CSET due under Ind.Code § 6-8.1-5-3 (1998). Under 45 Ind. Admin.Code § 15-5-8 (1992), the taxpayer may protest the assessment within a pre-seribed period of time and request a hearing. If a hearing is requested, the department is required to follow the hearing procedures specified in 45 Ind. Admin.Code § 15-5-38. In contrast to the majority which holds that prosecution jeopardy attaches at the time the department makes its initial assessment, I would hold that no attachment occurs until the hearing or alternative procedures contemplated by 45 Ind.Admin.Code § 15-5-8 are convened and the fact finder has begun to take evidence.
The recent Colorado case of People v. Litchfield, 902 P.2d 921 (Colo.Ct.App.1995), cert. granted (Colo. Sep. 11, 1995), takes a similar approach to what I propose. Subsequent to defendants' arrests but prior to trial, the Colorado revenue department assessed defendants with controlled substances taxes and penalties. Defendants objected to the assessment and requested an administrative hearing. At the time of trial, the department had taken no action on the objections. Defendants moved to dismiss the eriminal charges on grounds that the tax assessment was punishment and the double jeopardy clauses prevented their being subjected to criminal punishment for the same conduct. Id. at 924. Although the majority today would grant such motions, the trial court in Litchfield found that jeopardy had not yet attached to the assessment because there had been "no final administrative determination of defendants' obligation to pay the tax and penalty." Id. The Colorado appellate court agreed. Assuming that the tax was punishment under Kurth Ranch, the court pointed out that:
[There has been no hearing and thus no final determination of defendants' liability for the assessed tax. In addition, defendants have not paid any money to the state nor has the state taken any steps to collect the tax obligation allegedly owed.
Accordingly, jeopardy has not yet attached and there has been no punishment by imposition of liability for the state tax. See U.S. v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1991) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992) (no jeopardy attaches to preclude the government from prosecuting defendants for drug importation offenses until defendants actually pay civil fines assessed against them or until the government sues to collect on notes executed by defendants for payment of such fines).
Because defendants had not been subjected to punishment by imposition of a civil penalty for their alleged possession of marijuana, the trial court did not err when it found that the criminal prosecution did not subject them to multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clauses.
Id. at 925. Note that the Colorado court finds no jeopardy attaching at least until a final determination of liability is made,34 an even broader construction of attachment than I propose. I think attachment at the time the fact finder begins to receive evidence is a slightly better approach because it *307more closely tracks its criminal procedure analog.35
C
The assessment of CSET raises two additional issues. First, what are the double jeopardy implications, if any, if the CSET is not contested? And, second, what are the double jeopardy implications if the revenue department, proceeding as permitted under the statute and regulation, seizes, or levies on and sells, the taxpayer's property?
C-1
In cases where the taxpayer does not contest the assessment, I would find no prosecution jeopardy as nothing analogous to prosecution has occurred.36 However, under Kurth Ranch, I believe that CSET's punitive characteristics that implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause would cause punishment jeopardy to attach at the point the taxpayer began to pay the tax. Perhaps the case best illustrating this situation is United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992), cited by the Colorado court in People v. Litchfield, supra. In Sanchez-Escareno, three individuals had been arrested and assessed large civil fines by United States Customs officials for possession and attempted importation of marijuana. Criminal indictments based on the same conduct followed. The defendants did not protest the civil fines but instead acknowledged them by executing promissory notes. However, the notes had not been paid nor had the government attempted to collect the notes. The district court dismissed the indictments, concluding that punishment jeopardy attached at the point the defendants executed the promissory notes. Sanchez-Eseareno, 950 F.2d at 194-95.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as follows:
Here, the government has yet to subject the defendants to trial at all or to exact any form of punishment whatsoever. Defendants are presently in the same position as someone who has been charged in two criminal proceedings, but has not yet been tried or punished in either. If the defendants actually pay the civil fines, then any subsequent criminal prosecution would be double jeopardy. See Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall, 163, 85 U.S. 163, 21 Led. 872 (1873) (when defendant "fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone"). Likewise, if the government chooses to go forward with its prosecution of the defendants, jeopardy would attach when the jury is empaneled and sworn, as it would in any criminal case. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). Finally, if the government attempts to collect on the notes, jeopardy would attach when the court begins to hear evidence in that action. See id. But at this point, defendants' contentions *308under the Double Jeopardy Clause are misplaced.
Samnchez-Eseareno, 950 F.2d at 202-208.
C-2
Indiana statutes and regulations provide that if the CSET is not immediately paid, the department "may levy on and sell the person's property." Ind.Code § 6-8.1-5-3 (1993); 45 Ind.Admin.Code § 15-5-8. If the department exercises this option, does punishment jeopardy attach? In People v. Krizek, 271 Ill.App.83d 533, 207 Ill.Dec. 857, 648 N.E.2d 313 (1995), defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss drug charges on grounds that the prior seizure of his home to commence civil forfeiture proceedings constituted punishment jeopardy. The Illinois court analyzed federal court decisions from Oregon and Illinois that concluded that the seizure of a defendant's property does not, by itself, constitute punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clause:
[Although the seizure of real property under the Forfeiture Act marks the beginning of the civil forfeiture process, the actual seizure itself has limited legal significance. The act of seizure neither extinguishes the ownership rights of claimants to the property, nor does it vest title in the State. The respective ownership rights of the parties remain unaltered until such time as the trial court enters its final judgment. Until final judgment is entered, the claimant has the opportunity to retain his ownership rights in the property. Common sense dictates that it is the deprivation of ownership, not the deprivation of the unencumbered use of the property, that determines when punishment for double jeopardy purposes occurs. The State's seizure of defendant's property, therefore, does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes (see [United States v.] Stanwood, 872 F.SUPP. [791,] 799 [ (D.Or.1994) ]; [United States v.] Messino, 871 F.SUPP. [1027,] 1082 and the State's attempt to prosecute defendant under the Illinois Criminal Code does not contravene the double jeopardy clause.
Krizek, 271 Ill.App.3d at 538, 207 IIl.Dec. at 860, 648 N.E.2d at 316. I think this reasoning is sound and would find that the seizure of a taxpayer's property by the revenue department does not constitute punishment. However, the sale of that property is a more difficult question, one which should properly await a specific case in which the issue is argued.
C-8
Lest we become so consumed in thinking about drug taxes as punishment that we forget the general rule, it is worth recalling that the general rule is that a tax is not punishment and only becomes so when, "[tlaken as a whole," it is "too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment." Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. I mention this in the context of the two preceding sections because it is altogether plausible to me that a taxpayer may pay a portion of CSET assessed, or the revenue department may levy upon and sell an amount of property, which would merely reimburse the government for its actual costs arising from the taxpayer's criminal conduct. See id. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1945 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-450, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1902-03, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). Such a payment or levy and sale would not be sufficient in my view to constitute punishment jeopardy. Only to the extent that the amount paid or levied upon and sold in excess of that deemed reasonably remedial should be considered to be punishment. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105 (2d Cir.1995), cert denied -- U.S. --, 116 S.Ct. 171, 133 L.Ed.2d 112 (1995) (double jeopardy not implicated in Office of Thrift Supervision accompanying bank fraud prosecution where defendant did not make threshold showing that civil sanction was "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the government's damages and expenses"); Ragin v. United States, 893 F.Supp. 570 (double jeopardy not implicated in civil forfeiture proceeding accompanying drug prosecution where "the forfeiture was proportional to the damages caused by Ragin's conduct, and the forfeiture was essentially remedial").
*309D
If the majority is right that administrative imposition of a tax which is a punishment for double jeopardy purposes can cut off the state's ability to prosecute and sentence, then I think at a minimum the notion that jeopardy attaches at the time of assessment should be abandoned. Rather, I think analogies to the eriminal procedure and the newly emerging precedents in the area of civil fines, forfeitures, and taxes indicate the following: First, a first prosecution should not attach until the accused contests the assessment and evidence is taken at an administrative hearing. At this point, the ability of the state to prosecute for the underlying criminal offense would be cut off, Second, if the accused does not contest the assessment such that no adjudicatory proceedings are commenced, there is no prosecution jeopardy and the state is free to proceed with criminal prosecution. Third, if the accused pays a portion of the assessment in a sufficient amount to constitute punishment,37 punishment jeopardy attaches and the ability of the state to sentence for the underlying criminal offense would be cut off.
Conclusion
I agree with the majority that the Indiana CSET has punitive characteristics that sub-jeet it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See part I, infro But I find nothing in Kurth Ranch that compels us to prohibit the prosecution of alleged drug offenders merely because the revenue department asserts a CSET obligation on the part of the alleged offender first. See part II, infra.
Assuming the established principles of Double Jeopardy jurisprudence apply regardless of whether the criminal prosecution and sentencing or the imposition of CSET comes first, I would hold that (i) there is no prosecution jeopardy unless the taxpayer contests the assessment and a hearing is convened to adjudicate the protest, Litch-field, 902 P.2d at 925; prosecution jeopardy attaches when evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, Torres, 28 F.8d at 1465; and (8) there is no punishment jeopardy unless the taxpayer pays at least a portion of the tax, Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d at 202. See part III, infra. Certainly, there is nothing in Kurth Ranch that is inconsistent with this approach. In that case, Montana's tax authorities assessed the dangerous drug tax and the taxpayers contested the assessments in administrative proceedings. Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. at -----, 114 8.0t. at 1942-43. Thus more happened in Kurth Ranch than the mere initiation of a drug tax assessment proceedings the taxpayers actually contested the assessment in administrative proceedings.
Based on the foregoing analysis, I would affirm Bryant's convictions. No claim is made that Bryant contested the assessment such that an adjudication of liability was conducted. As such, no prosecution jeopardy attached and the state was free to prosecute him on the eriminal charges. Nor is any claim made that Bryant voluntarily paid a sufficient amount of the tax to constitute punishment.38 As such, no punishment jeopardy attached and the state was free to punish him on the criminal charges. I agree with the majority's analysis of the non-CSET issues in Bryant's appeal.
. "[Aln increasingly popular tactic of those criminally charged with violating state and federal drug laws and correlatively subjected to forfeiture proceedings is to concede in the forfeiture proceedings at the earliest opportunity and, thereafter, seek to avoid criminal sanctions by moving to dismiss pending criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds." People v. Hellis, 211 Mich.App. 634, 536 N.W.2d 587, 592 (1995). The majority opinion goes further by proscribing criminal sanctions once drug tax administrative proceedings are initiated; the accused need not concede anything to avoid prosecution.
. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994), amended by order, 56 F.3d 41 (1995); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 203 (5th Cir.1991); F. Anthony Paganelli, "Constitutional Analysis of Indiana's Controlled Substance Excise Tax," 70 Imnd.LJ. 1301, 1330 & n. 217 (1995). But see United States v. $405,089.23, 56 F.3d at 41 (opinion of Ryner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane, joined by six other judges); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3d Cir.1993).
. The Supreme Court's emphasis on the tax punishment constituting the second punishment is seen in the following passages:
This case presents the question whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for the same offense.
Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1941 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The third proceeding involved the assessment of the new tax on dangerous drugs.
Id. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1942 (emphasis supplied) (the first proceeding was the criminal prosecution and the second was a civil forfeiture action).
This drug tax is not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead it is a second punishment within the contemplation of [the Double Jeopardy Clause] and therefore must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all.
Id. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1948 (emphasis supplied). While I acknowledge that this last sentence lends support to the majority's view that the drug tax can constitute a first punishment, it did not in Kurth Ranch and, for the reasons discussed in the text of my dissent, I do not think it prudent to extend this principle in the absence of the Supreme Court explicitly so holding.
. Several alternatives are available. First, we could hold that the tax becomes a first punishment only when ordered by a court, i.e., only when the taxpayer has exercised his or her right to protest the assessment in court or the department of revenue has obtained judicial assistance in enforcing it. Second, we could hold that sentencing on the underlying criminal offense extinguishes any previously established CSET liability. Either of these approaches would be consistent with the outcome of Kurth Rench and would not interfere with the power of our prosecutors to seek to bring drug possessors and dealers to justice.
. In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), Justice Sca-lia, writing for the majority, takes issue with Justice Souter who, in dissent, distinguishes between what I refer to as prosecution jeopardy and punishment jeopardy. Justice Scalia writes that "there is no authority, except Grady [v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)], for the proposition that [double jeopardy] has different meanings in the two contexts." Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S.Ct. at 2860. Dixon overruled Grady. However, the Scalia-Souter debate addressed substantive principles of double jeopardy law. I distinguish between prosecution jeopardy and punishment jeopardy only for what I think are obvious procedural differences in when jeopardy in respect of a prosecution attaches and when jeopardy in respect of punishment attaches.
. The United States Supreme Court held for the first time that civil fines, forfeiture, and financial exactions styled as a tax can be penalties for crime in 1989, 1993, and 1994, respectively. Montana Dep't of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (tax); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) (forfeiture); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (civil fines).
. The majority's only analysis on this point is that, at the point the department of revenue served the taxpayer with an assessment notice and demand, "Bryant faced more than a risk of being found guilty; he had actually been found guilty." The majority offers no authority for this proposition and I reject it. It seems to me tantamount to saying that when a prosecutor files criminal charges, a criminal defendant has actually been found guilty. In both instances, the assessment and filing of charges merely represents the first step in a statutorily-prescribed regime. That the department is authorized to seize the taxpayer's property immediately does not change the analysis for me. I discuss this issue in greater detail in part IIL-C-2, infra. And to continue my analogy to criminal procedure, the state is also entitled to impose substantial infringements on the criminally accused's liberty and property following the filing of criminal charges.
. I make this point because there will be cases where the taxpayer will not contest the assessment. See part III-C-1, infra.
. In fact, the Colorado court suggests that jeopardy might not attach until the defendants actually paid money to the state or the state had taken steps to collect the tax obligation. Litchfield, 902 P.2d at 924. Cf. Ragin v. United States, 893 F.Supp. 570, 574 (W.D.N.C.1995) (holding in forfeiture proceeding accompanying drug prosecution that "jeopardy attaches when the final judgment of forfeiture is entered, and not when the claim or answer is filed or the property seized.")
. Additional support for this approach is found in the following hypothetical offered by Judge Easterbrook in an influential administrative forfeiture case:
Suppose the civil forfeiture gets to trial first. The United States will try to show that the money was used in an illegal drug transaction. At the beginning of the hearing, when evidence is first presented to the trier of fact in a proceeding seeking to impose a penalty for crime, jeopardy attaches.
United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
. See United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995), where defendant Baird contended that a drug prosecution subsequent to an uncontested administrative forfeiture proceeding arising from the same incident subjected him to double jeopardy, the court observed that "[wJithout risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach.... Because Baird failed to contest the forfeiture, ... Baird was not, and could not have been, placed at risk by that process." See also United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105 (2d Cir.1995), where defendant Morgan contended that a bank fraud prosecution subsequent to his settlement of civil proceedings brought by the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Thrift Supervision subjected him to double jeopardy, the court noted that "Morgan cannot claim prosecution for the same offense arising after an acquittal or conviction because the initial civil proceeding did not result in either." Contra, United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir.1995).
. Or, arguably, such an amount of property is levied upon and sold, depriving the accused of his or her ownership thereof. See part II-C-2, supra.
. Bryant may be able to establish that the seizure of his property following assessment constituted a change in ownership such that he could argue punishment. That issue, left open in part IIIL-C-2, supra, is not before us.