dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This court does not possess jurisdiction to review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a joinder appeal brought under former civil practice and remedies code section 15.003. See Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 978, 979, amended, by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 3.03, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 853 (current version at Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.003 (Vernon Supp.2004)).1 The legislature has narrowly defined our appellate jurisdiction in join-der appeals. Id. In a joinder appeal, we “shall ... determine whether the joinder or intervention is proper based on an independent determination from the record and not under either an abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standard.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that this statute allows an interlocutory appeal for one specific purpose: to contest the trial court’s decision allowing or denying intervention or joinder. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex.2000). In fact, the Texas Supreme Court has held: “The language the Legislature used clearly indicates its intent to limit interlocutory appellate review of a trial court’s decision to whether certain plaintiffs may intervene or join in the suit.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 87(6) (providing that “[tjhere shall be no interlocutory appeals from such [a venue] determination”).
An appellate court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders and judgments only when specifically authorized by statute. Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex.2000); Fort Worth Star-Telegram v. Street, 61 S.W.3d 704, 707-08 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). A statute such as civil practice and remedies code section 15.003(c)(1) authorizing interlocutory appeals is strictly construed because it, is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment is appealable. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 8 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). Strictly construing section 15.003(c)(1), the provision authorizing the interlocutory joinder appeal here, the provision grants us jurisdiction to decide a single issue: “whether the joinder or intervention is proper based on an independent determination from the record.” Former Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.003(c)(1); see Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 96.
The majority, citing our opinion in the Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores class certification appeal, holds that we possess jurisdiction in this interlocutory joinder appeal to review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in plaintiffs’ live pleadings. Maj. Op. at 722 (citing Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, 127 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tex.App.-*727Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.)). But the subject matter jurisdiction analysis we applied there is not applicable to this joinder appeal. The Shell Cortez Pipeline interlocutory class certification appeal was filed pursuant to civil practice and remedies code section 51.014(a)(3). Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon Supp.2004). The legislature in section 51.014 granted us general appellate jurisdiction over any appeal “from an interlocutory order” set forth in section 51.014. Id. § 51.014(a), (f). We held in the Shell.Cortez Pipeline class certification appeal that civil practice and remedies code section 54.014’s general statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction implicitly conferred upon us the power to review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enter the class certification order being appealed. See Shell Cortez Pipeline Co., 127 S.W.3d at 290 (citing numerous cases); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a), (f). Specifically, we held that “when an appellate court is granted jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order or judgment, that jurisdiction encompasses a review of the validity of the ... trial court’s authority or jurisdiction to enter the appealable interlocutory order.” Shell Cortez Pipeline Co., 127 S.W.3d at 290.
Unlike the general statutory appellate jurisdiction granted to us by section 51.014, however, the legislature chose to, and expressly did, limit our appellate jurisdiction in joinder appeals to the determination of the issue of whether the joinder or intervention is proper based on an independent determination from the record. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.003(c)(1); Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 96. In section 15.003(c)(1), unlike in section 51.014, the legislature did not grant us general appellate jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order or judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 15.003(c)(1), 51.014(a)(8). Only the issue of joinder is appealable. See id. § 15.003(c)(1); Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 96. The majority’s interlocutory review of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pleaded in plaintiffs’ live pleadings is not supported by our holding in Shell Cortez Pipeline and, moreover, is beyond the issue we are statutorily authorized to review under section 15.003(c)(1).
Aso, in my view, the majority’s review of Appellants’ subject matter jurisdiction complaints is tantamount to a review of the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction. The trial court held a hearing on Appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction and denied them. Appellants make the very same subject matter jurisdiction arguments in this joinder appeal that they made in their pleas to the jurisdiction.2 We are not authorized to conduct an interlocutory review of a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction not involving a governmental unit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). To hold as the majority does, that in every joinder appeal an appellant may also obtain appellate review of any challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is contrary to the plain language of sections 15.003(c)(1) and 51.014(a)(8). See id. §§ 15.003(c)(1), 51.014(a)(8). I fear that the effect of the majority’s ruling will be the exact quagmire it has presented in this case: a bogging down of accelerated interlocutory joinder appeals to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in violation of the legislature’s express wishes that the single issue of proper joinder be expeditiously decided within 120 days of *728the perfection of an appeal. See id. § 15.003(c)(2).
For these reasons, I dissent.
. The 2003 amendments are not applicable to this case; they apply only to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003. See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 23.02(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 899. Consequently, all citations herein to section 15.003 of the civil practice and remedies code are to the 1995 version of that section in effect until the 2003 amendments.
. Although no party has requested on rehearing that we reconsider our original holding that we would not review subject matter jurisdiction in a joinder appeal, the majority nonetheless on its own motion disposes of this joinder appeal on this basis.