(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part) — I. I concur in that part of the majority opinion holding the bonds in question are general obligation bonds payable out of the debt service fund (section 13, chapter 159, Acts of the Fifty-fourth General Assembly) by an unlimited tax levy.
I agree with the majority opinion that sections 37.6 and 37.7, Code, 1950, which authorized the issuance and sale of these memorial bonds and the tax to pay them, were not repealed or modified by chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A. As the majority opinion points out, the bonds are “to be issued and sold as provided by law relative to general county and city bonds.” (Section 37.6, Code, 1950.) In other words they were general city bonds payable out of an unlimited tax levy on city property. Sections 76.1 and 76.2, Code, 1950, made it the mandatory duty of the city officials to levy a tax to pay these bonds within a twenty-year period. Section 37.7, Code, 1950, did not limit the tax to pay the bonds to four mills during the period they were outstanding. It limited the number and amount of bonds which the city could issue under section 37.6, Code, 1950, to that amount which four mills would retire at the equalized, assessed *1002valuations then existing. This is provided for in section 76.3, Code, 1950, as follows:
“Tax limitations in any law for the issuance of bonds shall be based on the latest equalized actual valuation then existing and shall only restrict the amount of bonds which may be issued.”
The above section was not repealed expressly or by implication or otherwise modified by chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A. I think there is no question presented as to whether sections 76.1 and 76.2 were repealed or modified. These sections placed the mandatory duty on the city to provide for. an annual levy of sufficient tax to retire all bonds “of every kind and character” within twenty years. The debt service fund, or section 13, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., places the duty on the city to levy such tax “as is necessary” to retire “outstanding” bonds. There is a slight difference in the latter section in that the period limitation for retirement permits a quarterly percentage basis but the point is not argued. One of the specific recommendations of the committee that recommended this bill was: “That no arbitrary limitations should be imposed on the tax levies required * * * for servicing municipal indebtedness.” See quotation from the committee report in Alexander v. Town of Montezuma, 243 Iowa 251, 254, 255, 51 N.W.2d 456 at 459. I think it is perfectly clear that chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., provides for an unlimited levy to pay all outstanding bonds. It is firmly established in chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., that section 13 is the paramount fund and it must always raise enough money by a sufficient millage levy to pay interest and principal on all outstanding municipal bonds. One of the early sections of the Act (section 4) makes it the mandatory duty of the municipal authorities after estimating revenues to “allocate sufficient revenue to the debt service fund from other funds or sources to pay all bonds and interest thereon as they become due.”
The majority reaches the conclusion that the bonds are general obligation bonds by first concluding that section 76.2, Code, 1950, providing for mandatory levies sufficient to pay all bonds of counties, cities, towns and school districts, has not been repealed or modified insofar as it applies to the cities and towns. It seems to me perfectly apparent that such mandatory pro*1003visions in 76.2 have been repeated. The legislature, in chapter 159, was drawing a comprehensive law to codify and simplify all of the laws with respect to municipal financing. Necessarily this involved a new law where, under the old, some financing duties bracketed the municipalities with other political subdivisions. But this does not mean the old law is to be resorted to when the new makes provision for the same duties. Some sections of chapter 159 are exact copies of the laws they supersede. I think it idle to talk of whether section 76.2, Code, 1950, has been amended or modified by chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., insofar as it applies to city and town bonds. The mandatory levy requirements of the former statute insofar as city and town bonds are concerned have been carried over into the comprehensive municipal financing statute that is now chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A. All the legislature did by section 13, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., is make one fund — debt service fund — out of what was before Judgment bond fund, Sewer bond fund, Paving bond fund, Memorial bond fund, Airport bond fund, and perhaps many more.
II. I think the next question in the case is whether the levy to pay the bonds is to be included in the ten-mill maximum provided for in section 10, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A. I think the majority feel that if the levy to pay these bonds is included in the levy for the Municipal Enterprises fund it will result in a limited levy for that fund is limited to ten mills for all municipal enterprises. I do not think it would have that result at all.
Section 10, chapter 159, Acts of the Fifty-fourth General Assembly provides for “an annual tax not to exceed ten (10) mills” for many purposes and “in lieu” of taxes provided in seven Code sections — one.of them being section 37.7, which is admittedly the section providing for a tax to pay memorial bonds. As pointed out in Alexander v. Town of Montezuma, 243 Iowa 251, 51 N.W.2d 456, the design of the law (chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A.) was to reduce the number of funds by grouping related municipal functions into one fund. Part of the committee report stated: “In lien of the 164 municipal funds now provided by statute, Bill No. 13 makes provision for nine funds * * (Italics supplied.) And, to carry out the committee *1004thought, each functional fund is to stand in lieu of the many specific tax statutes authorizing special taxes and expenditures for the same or similar functions. The bill followed the recommendations of the committee, including the recommendation to remove limitations on tax levies for specific purposes, and substituting over-all limitations on total millage levies. These overall limitations for all of the funds are quite high. Added together they would permit levies of fifty-three mills, but section 2 of the Act provides the aggregate levy shall not exceed thirty mills. See Alexander v. Town of Montezuma, supra'. Other provisions provide for flexibility and transfers from one fund to another so that “Municipal corporations may fit their income to their needs.” See section 5.
The reference in subsection 12 of section 10, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., to the tax provided in section 37.7 to pay these bonds is not to limit the tax to pay the bonds but to diminish the permissible levy for municipal enterprises by the amount of the tax required to pay the bonds. In other words, the millage required to pay these bonds is to stand as a part of the permissible millage for municipal enterprises. This is the obvious legislative intent. Further indication of this intent is shown in section 18 where provision is made that the millage required to pay bonds enumerated therein shall reduce the maximum millage (thirty mills) allowed by section 2 of the Act.
The record shows that the 1951 tax levy for municipal enterprises for the City of Des Moines was 2.389 mills; that a one mill levy will produce $183,956 upon the basis of the last assessed valuation of city property. Less than a two mill levy each year would, on present valuations, satisfy the levy provisions of the ordinance. I think the clear mandate of the statute is for the City of Des Moines to place the levy (unlimited by any statute) to pay these bonds on its books as a part of the levy to pay for municipal enterprises. And I think that is the only effect of the reference in section 10, subsection 12. It has a diminishing effect on the levy which is to be made each year to pay for municipal enterprises while these bonds are outstanding and unpaid.
The trial court and the majority hold that section 10, subsection 12, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., provides for an addi*1005tional power or method for paying for a municipal building in lieu of that provided in section 37.7, Code, 1950. I cannot follow the reasoning. Before the passage of chapter 159 the bonds were payable by an unlimited tax levy. This is what the majority holds. How could section 10, subsection 12 of chapter 159 give any additional power or method? The right answer, as I see it, is the hew Act gave the municipality an account— municipal enterprises — wherein. it could carry this levy and once there it reduced, by the amount of the annual levy to pay the bonds, the total amount the city could spend for municipal enterprises each year.
The guiding consideration for interpretation of the words “in lieu of” is revealed by the statement of the problem and the recommendations of the committee, stated in the committee report. These are all set forth in Alexander v. Town of Montezuma, supra. It is apparent that chapter 159 is a municipal bookkeeping statute. It is mandatory in the sense that cities and towns must now make their levies and allocations under the functional fund and other fund provisiqns provided in chapter 159. The object was to have these funds stand “in lieu” of the one hundred sixty-four funds that were, previously carried on the municipal books. A study of chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., reveals that in sections 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 the single municipal funds therein named are to stand “in lieu” of many tax levies authorized in specifically referred to statutes contained in the Code of 19.50. The wording in these other sections is identical with the wording of subsection 12 of section 10. The majority interpretation, holding the levy under the referred to statute is “additional” and not to be considered as a levy for the named fund, will of course rule the interpretation to be placed on the same wording in other sections. It will mean all of these specific funds are restored, and moreover, the levies made under them will not be considered as levies for’ the named funds.
Section 25, subsection 5, chapter 159, Acts of the Fifty-fourth General Assembly provides:
“No other statute whether heretofore or hereafter enacted relating to the taxing power of municipal corporations, shall be construed to increase, the limits on millage levies established *1006in # * * sections six (6) through twelve (12) of this Act, unless this Act is amended.”
The majority holding seems to me a clear increase of the maximum millage levy for the enterprises fund in section 10 by the amount of the levy to pay these memorial bonds. It may not be very important in this case for with the levy included the city would not use half of the permissible levy for municipal entérprises. But it is very important as a guide to an interpretation of the whole Act. When,- as in the majority opinion, a particular result is reached by interpreting a clause that is repeated often in the'statute, it illuminates the shortcomings of that result to show the same interpretation, applied to the same language, throughout the Act will be absolutely destructive of the manifest legislative intent. The full sweep of the majority opinion, as I understand it, is: when the Fifty-fourth General Assembly said in chapter 159 that a single functional' levy was to be made “in lieu” of many specifically referred to levies under named statutes, it meant to provide for additional levies. This is contrary to the ordinary meaning Of “in lieu” as something that is “instead of” or something that is to stand “in place of.” I feel it is contrary to the apparent legislative intent.
I would hold this levy general and unlimited but I would not hold it is an additional levy to or something outside of the general municipal enterprises levy. I think the language of section 10 providing for a single levy “for a fund to be known as the municipal enterprises fund” in lieu of special taxes provided in many Code sections including: “in lieu of the taxes provided b.y section * * * 37.7 [memorial bond tax]”, when properly construed, means the one general levy is to stand in lieu of and include the special levies. Such a construction would save the Act and in no wise destroy the general and unlimited character of the bond obligations.
Oliver, J., joins.