concurring and dissenting.
As explained in part II of my dissent today in State v. Bryant (1995), Ind., 660 N.E.2d 290 (Sullivan, J., dissenting), I believe the majority errs in holding that an administrative assessment of a tax can constitute a first punishment for double jeopardy purposes3 As such, I believe that Charles Hayse's erim-inal conviction is not contrary to the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, payment of the CSET assessed would constitute a second punishment of Hayse- and would therefore be barred by Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (tax on *327the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the state has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct violated Double Jeopardy Clause).
I agree with the majority that the CSET violates neither Hayse's privilege. against self-incrimination nor his due process rights.
. If we were to proceed under the alternative approach I describe in part III of my Bryant dissent, we would reach the same result as the majority here. This is because a first prosecution occurred at the time of the hearing on Hayse's contest of the CSET assessment, prior to jeopardy attaching in the criminal proceeding.