¶ 115. (dissenting). In this case, the court decides much more than whether Miguel Olivas owes additional premiums on worker's compensation and business liability policies issued to him by Acuity. The majority makes law by opining about who qualifies as an employer and who qualifies as an employee under the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act in circumstances where the purported employees are undocumented workers. Because the precedent established by this decision creates uncertainty for employers, insurers, and workers, I respectfully dissent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 116. Unless noted otherwise, the following facts are based on the record made at a September 27, 2004, trial to the Sheboygan County Circuit Court, James J. Bolgert, Judge.
¶ 117. In making its case for additional premiums, Acuity presented two witnesses: Deb Seidel, a premium auditor who had worked for Acuity for 16 years, and Steven Tenpas, a Sheboygan County drywsdl contractor.
*684¶ 118. Tenpas owns Steve Tenpas Drywall, Inc. At the time of trial, he had operated his business for 23 years, and his son had become part of the business. The record does not indicate the number of payroll employees in the business, but Tenpas stated that when his company hires an employee for the payroll, the employee's history is investigated.
¶ 119. Tenpas testified he had known Miguel Oli-vas for about five years. "He came to me looking for work as a subcontractor." For many years Tenpas had asked all his subcontractors to obtain and show proof of "workmen's comp and liability" policies, and he asked Olivas to comply with this requirement. The requirement resulted from an early experience Tenpas had with his business. The business grew rapidly, hired outside subcontractors, and then was audited by its worker's compensation carrier. The implication of the testimony is that Tenpas was required to pay additional worker's compensation premiums for non-payroll "employees."
¶ 120. Against this background, Tenpas bluntly explained his motivation. He said he required his subcontractors to obtain worker's compensation coverage for their employees "so that I don't have to pay [for worker's compensation]." "[H]e [Olivas] is in charge of whoever he hires, and they are covered." He added:
I don't know the people personally who he hires, so I don't have to be responsible for his men. If I hire somebody in a payroll, we kind of — we investigate their history and stuff like that. And if you hire a sub, you don't know exactly the history of all of his employees, so I require workmen's comp and liability from them so they are responsible for their workers.
¶ 121. Tenpas testified that he paid Olivas each week by check, whereas he paid his own employees every two weeks. Tenpas gave Olivas a Form 1099 at the *685end of each year. The Form 1099 for 2002 showed payments to Olivas of $193,644.17. The Form 1099 for 2003 showed payments of $191,370.27.
¶ 122. Tenpas testified that Olivas was never on his payroll as an employee and that Olivas's workers were never on his payroll as employees. He said he gave jobs to Olivas and that he and Olivas determined the price to be paid for the jobs based on the number of sheets of drywall to be installed, which reflected the number of square feet of wall space to be covered. The price could go up based on the difficulty of a job.
¶ 123. Tenpas stated that he did not determine the number of people who worked on a subcontracted job, or the identity of the people working, or how long they worked, or how much money they were paid. He did not hire or fire any of the subject workers. He did not know whether Olivas or his workers worked exclusively on Tenpas projects because that was up to Olivas. He said he knew Olivas had "done a few small jobs" for others; that "he did work for another drywall company the beginning of last year [2003] ... I believe for a while." The implication of the testimony is that Olivas was not required to work exclusively for Tenpas.
¶ 124. Tenpas acknowledged that he knew Olivas did not work alone, that he had a crew of workers. He had seen these workers at work sites, had said hello to them, and knew some of their first names. However, there was a language barrier between him and these workers, he said, so that virtually all substantive communication was with Olivas.
¶ 125. In his defense, Miguel Olivas testified that he was not an employer. He said he was simply one of a group of six people who did drywall work for Steve Tenpas. Of this group, Olivas was the only one who spoke English and the only one with "papers." That is *686why Olivas was the one who approached Tenpas for work and the only one who spoke to Tenpas about job assignments and compensation. Olivas said that Tenpas supplied the drywall and other materials for jobs hut not the tools used by the workers.
¶ 126. When Olivas first came to Tenpas, Tenpas told Olivas that he required proof of a worker's compensation policy before permitting Olivas and his crew to work. Olivas secured a policy and showed Tenpas the required proof. He said Tenpas did not require the other workers to "provide proof of work comp insurance."
¶ 127. Tenpas paid Olivas weekly by a check made out to Olivas. Olivas, in turn, gave money to the other workers. He testified that he "did not have any gains" (e.g., profits) and that the group collectively made the decision how to divide up the money. "I did not make that decision," he said. The six "would come to an agreement on who was going to get what, because we had different skill levels." In making payments to others, Olivas did not withhold any money for social security or income taxes. At the end of the year, Olivas received a single Form 1099 from Tenpas, and he then gave a Form 1099 to each of the other workers.
¶ 128. Olivas acknowledged that he taught some of the other workers about dry walling and participated in group decisions to replace workers who left the group or add a new worker for a particular job. He said, however, that he had no power to fire anybody.
¶ 129. Olivas was asked whom he worked for "from December 7th of 2001 to December 7th of 2002." He replied: "For Steve only. Only Steve." He was then asked, "[D]id you do any work for anybody else?" He replied, "No, only him."1
*687¶ 130. Olivas said:
I don't have any workers. We are just a group of workers.
. . . [T]hey are not my employees, because we are just a group of workers.
I was never a supervisor, because we were all — the group of us, we were just independent workers.
No one explained anything to me.
None of us were responsible. It was just an innocent group that we didn't know any of the laws from here.
¶ 131. As part of his defense, Olivas called Jose Mireles, one of the workers. Mireles testified that he worked for Steve Tenpas. "Miguel pays me, but Steve pays him." He testified that Olivas did not make a profit from the work Mireles did, but he also stated that some members of the group were paid more than others "because some of us have more experience than others." He stated that Olivas gave him a Form 1099 at the end of the year. He testified that he never dealt directly with Steve Tenpas.
DISCUSSION
¶ 132. On the surface, this case involves nothing more than an insurance company's demand for addi*688tional premiums from an insured who purchased worker's compensation and business liability insurance policies. To resolve this dispute, however, the court addresses relationships and responsibilities in the workplace as they are affected by the terms of insurance policies and the Wisconsin worker's compensation law.
¶ 133. Miguel Olivas wanted to obtain work for himself and his friends from Steve Tenpas. Tenpas was willing to provide work to Olivas and his friends but not as payroll employees. Payroll employees necessitate regular compensation, fringe benefits, withholding for social security and income taxes, worker's compensation coverage, unemployment compensation coverage, and liability coverage. Payroll employees are the people an employer normally wants to keep working if and when the economy slows down.
¶ 134. Tenpas is an "employer" with "payroll" employees. However, under the law, people who do any substantial amount of work for an "employer" also become "employees" for worker's compensation purposes, irrespective of whether they are formally on the employer's payroll, unless they fit into some other statutory category. See Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(b)l., 102.07(4).
¶ 135. Building contractors like Tenpas often engage subcontractors. These subcontractors may be "employers" and/or independent contractors — not "employees" — if certain criteria are met.
¶ 136. A contractor may become responsible for work-related injury to a subcontractor and his employees if the subcontractor fails to provide for his own worker's compensation coverage. See Wis. Stat. § 102.06. But contractors are not liable for injuries to a subcontractor and his employees when the subcontrac*689tor has elected to become an employer by purchasing an employer's worker's compensation policy. Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(e), 102.05(2).
¶ 137. The circuit court ruled that Olivas's workers were independent contractors under Wis. Stat. § 102.07(8) (b). This ruling excused Olivas from liability for additional premiums under his worker's compensation policy — at least in the absence of worker's compensation claims. But this court rejects the circuit court's ruling. It concludes that the workers were "employees." This conclusion makes Olivas responsible for additional premiums under his worker's compensation policy except for the court's additional determination that the workers were not employees of Olivas.
¶ 138. Although the court does not say so explicitly, the court implies that the Olivas workers were "employees," for worker's compensation purposes, of the only other suspect in this tale, Steve Tenpas. Without saying so, the court assigns legal responsibility for any worker's compensation claims from the five undocumented workers to Tenpas Drywall. This approach may or may not constitute good immigration policy, but it is bad worker's compensation law. It is bad worker's compensation law because it impairs a contractor's statutory defense to imputed liability, and it encourages subcontractor irresponsibility and fraud.
¶ 139. The term "employer" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 102.04. Tenpas Drywall is an "employer" under § 102.04(l)(b)l.: "Every person who usually employs 3 or more employees, whether in one or more trades, businesses, professions or occupations, and whether in one or more locations."
¶ 140. Miguel Olivas may be an "employer" under this same paragraph, but if he is not, then he is an *690"employer" under Wis. Stat. § 102.04(l)(e). This paragraph provides that an employer includes:
(e) Every person to whom pars, (a) to (d) are not applicable, who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who, at or prior to the time of the injury to the employee for which compensation may be claimed, shall, as provided in s. 102.05, have elected to become subject to the provisions of this chapter, and who shall not, prior to such accident, have effected a withdrawal of such election.
Wis. Stat. § 102.04(l)(e) (emphasis added).
¶ 141. The above quoted paragraph references Wis. Stat. § 102.05. Section 102.05(2) provides:
(2) Any employer who shall enter into a contract for the insurance of compensation, or against liability therefor, shall be deemed thereby to have elected to accept the provisions of this chapter, and such election shall include ... employees not in the course of a trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer if such intent is shown by the terms of the policy. Such election shall remain in force until withdrawn in the manner provided in sub. (1).
¶ 142. Subsection (1) of § 102.05 provides in part:
If an employer who is subject to this chapter only because the employer elected to become subject to this chapter under sub. (2) cancels or terminates his or her contract for the insurance of compensation under this chapter, that employer is deemed to have effected withdrawal, which shall be effective on the day after the contract is canceled or terminated.
Wis. Stat. § 102.05(1).
*691¶ 143. These provisions must be read in context with two other statutes: Wis. Stat. §§ 102.06 and 102.07(8m). The first statute, § 102.06, reads as follows:
102.06 Joint liability of employer and contractor. An employer shall be liable for compensation to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor under the employer who is not subject to this chapter, or who has not complied with the conditions of s. 102.28 (2) in any case where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such employee had been working directly for the employer, including also work in the erection, alteration, repair or demolition of improvements or of fixtures upon premises of such employer which are used or to be used in the operations of such employer. The contractor or subcontractor, if subject to this chapter, shall also be liable for such compensation, but the employee shall not recover compensation for the same injury from more than one party. The employer who becomes liable for and pays such compensation may recover the same from such contractor, subcontractor or other employer for whom the employee was working at the time of the injury if such contractor, subcontractor or other employer was an employer as defined in s. 102.04. This section does not apply to injuries occurring on or after the first day of the first July beginning after the day that the secretary files the certificate under s. 102.80(3)(a), except that if the secretary files the certificate under s. 102.80(3)(ag) this section does apply to claims for compensation filed on or after the date specified in that certificate.
¶ 144. Section 102.06 has its origin in the original worker's compensation law. Chapter 599, Laws of 1913; Wis. Stat. § 2394-6 (1913). The purpose of this section was explained in Marinette County Fair Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 242 Wis. 552, 8 N.W.2d 268 (1943). It is "to prevent employers from relieving themselves of liability by doing through independent contractors *692what they would otherwise do through direct employees." Id. at 554 (quoting Madison Entm't Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 211 Wis. 459, 463, 248 N.W 415 (1933)).
¶ 145. Section 102.06 was applied somewhat inconsistently2 until this court decided Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976). In Green Bay Packaging, the injured "employee," Siem-zuch, was employed by Majeske to cut hardwood on land for which Majeske owned the "stumpage" rights. The wood was to be delivered to Green Bay Packaging for use in the manufacture of paper. Siemzuch was killed by a falling tree. Majeske had entered into a contract with Green Bay Packaging for the year in which Siemzuch was killed. Id. at 27. But he had failed to carry worker's compensation coverage. Id. at 31. Thus, the issue was whether Majeske, the immediate employer of Siemzuch, was a "contractor under" Green Bay Packaging, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.06, even though Green Bay Packaging had virtually no control over Siemzuch. The court said:
It is clear from the statute that an employer such as GBP shall be liable for compensation to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor under him, such as ... Majeske ... "who has not complied with the conditions of sec. 102.28(2), Stats., in any case where such employer [GBP] would have been liable for compensation if such employe [Marcin Siemzuch] had been working directly for him." Here... Majeske did not carry the required workmen's compensation insurance. The language is crystal clear and does not permit of the *693qualifying restriction. . . that a contractor under be performing part of the "ordinary and usual" business of the principal employer.
Green Bay Packaging, 72 Wis. 2d at 31-32.
¶ 146. To understand the relevance of Green Bay Packaging to the present case, it must be recognized that the court's opinion emphasizes that an employer can take steps to protect against unexpected, imputed worker's compensation liability. The opinion quotes from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 205 Wis. 7, 236 N.W. 575 (1931), as follows:
Thus construed, sec. 102.06 "conserves to the employee the indemnity intended to be given him by the legislature by making contractors liable for injuries received by employees of a subcontractor who is not under the act. They [contractors] will be careful to protect themselves and will also see to it that their subcontractors are protected against such losses."
Green Bay Packaging, 72 Wis. 2d at 29-30 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea, 205 Wis. at 15) (emphasis added).
¶ 147. The Green Bay Packaging court stated that it was "returning to the A. & E standard" and quoted that case to the effect that "sec. 102.06 was not intended to make an employer liable to the injured employees of every one with whom the employer had some sort of contractual relations." Green Bay Packaging, 72 Wis. 2d at 36 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea, 205 Wis. at 11).
¶ 148. The authority of an employer to protect himself from liability was reiterated in a Wisconsin Law Review article analyzing the Green Bay Packaging case. See Stuart B. Eiche, Note, Worker's Compensation— *694Liability Of Principal Employer For Injuries To Employees Of His Contractors Or Subcontractors, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 185:
The court stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured contractors to the same extent that direct employees of the principal employer are protected. Thus, liability is imposed on the principal employer under section 102.06 only when the contractor is not subject to the Worker's Compensation Act or does not carry compensation insurance. To avoid liability, a principal employer need only require his contractors to protect themselves against such losses.
. . . [SJection 102.06 imposes liability on the principal only if his contractor or subcontractor is not subject to the Worker's Compensation Act or is uninsured.
Eiche, supra, at 186, 192 (emphasis added).3
¶ 149. The second statute that must be considered in relation to Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(e) and 102.05(2) is Wis. Stat. § 102.07(8m). Subsection (8m) is *695part of the section that defines "employee." It reads: "An employer who is subject to this chapter is not an employee of another employer for whom the first employer performs work or service in the course of the other employer's trade, business, profession or occupation." (Emphasis added.) This subsection makes the obvious point that a person is not simultaneously an employer and an employee on the same work project.
¶ 150. Applying the law to this case, Olivas elected to become an employer pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(e) and 102.05(2) by entering into contracts with Acuity for the insurance of compensation and liability. He elected to become an employer (and to give up his potential status as a statutory employee) because Tenpas insisted that he purchase worker's compensation and liability insurance as a condition precedent to any contractual and employment relationship that Oli-vas and his friends could have with Tenpas Drywall. It is impossible to imagine that Steve Tenpas insisted that Miguel Olivas be covered personally by worker's compensation insurance but not Olivas's other workers. The fact is, the Acuity policies issued to Olivas covered any workers for whom Olivas could be liable. Those policies were in effect until they were canceled or terminated. Wis. Stat. § 102.05(1).
¶ 151. Acuity is upset not only because it believes Olivas owes the company additional premiums but also because it believes that it would have been liable under Olivas's insurance policies if one of Olivas's workers had been injured on the job. Acuity invokes the familiar principle that an insurer should not be expected to assume risks for which it has not been paid.
¶ 152. The dilemma in this case must be confronted head-on. If one of Olivas's workers — such as Jose Míreles — had been injured, the worker would *696likely have sought worker's compensation benefits from (1) Olivas; (2) Tenpas; or (3) the uninsured employers fund. The most logical candidate is Olivas.
¶ 153. Olivas testified that he was not the employer of these workers. But the question is not whether Olivas believed the workers were his employees; the question is whether they were his employees, for worker's compensation purposes, as a matter of law.
¶ 154. The law often depends upon the facts. If this case were being remanded to the circuit court for additional fact finding, the better course would be to avoid comment on the evidence. But the case is not going back. It is over. This makes comment necessary.
¶ 155. Miguel Olivas elected to become an employer under Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(e) and 102.05(2). He purchased the requisite insurance. The insurance provided coverage for any employees he might have. Miguel Olivas also was an employer by the nature of his relationship with the workers. The workers were in Olivas's service under an implied contract of hire. Olivas played the critical role in securing jobs for his friends. He made the contacts with Tenpas Drywall. He discussed all the details of jobs, including time considerations and compensation. He told the workers where to go on jobs. He worked with them. He received all payments from Tenpas Drywall for jobs, and he disbursed all payments to others for their work.
¶ 156. Olivas and the five other workers were not equals. Because Olivas negotiated all Tenpas job assignments, he probably made sure that he participated in most, if not all, of those assignments. Why? Not every Tenpas job required a full crew of six workers. Because Olivas was the only worker who was certain to be burdened with social security and federal and state income taxes, he was entitled to take any job he wanted. *697One doubts that the relationship among the workers was such that a majority of the workers could exclude Olivas from a job that he had obtained for them. Olivas was their meal ticket. He also participated in deciding on replacements and on any person brought in as an extra. He was not without power. He participated in "hiring."
¶ 157. In 2002 Olivas received payments totaling $193,644.17. In that year, he paid about $3500 in insurance premiums on estimated income of $25,000. If Olivas took money for the insurance premiums off the top, he still had about $190,000 to divide among himself and the five workers. The sum of $190,000 divided by 6 equals $31,666. This amount is obviously more than $25,000 and would trigger an additional premium under the worker's compensation policy, even if the policy covered only Olivas. However, the testimony at trial was clear that the six workers were not paid at the same rate. Olivas had greater skills than some of the other workers and was paid a larger share of the $190,000 than some of the other workers.
¶ 158. Olivas gave each of the workers a Form 1099 at the end of the year. The first box on the 2002 and 2003 1099 forms is for "Payer's name, street address, city, state, ZIP code, and telephone no." We do not have copies of these 1099s in the record, but Deb Seidel testified that she saw them. Olivas must have put his own name and address in the first box in order to show that he did not receive $193,644.17 in 2002 and $191,370.27 in 2003 as taxable income. When Tenpas gave Olivas a Form 1099, Tenpas would have filed that document with both the Internal Revenue Service and the Wisconsin Department of Revenue. Hence, Olivas had good reason to fill out the 1099s he issued to others in a way that showed he was paying out money. In the *698eyes of an auditor like Deb Seidel, such entries would have firmed up Olivas's status as an employer of the workers, especially since Olivas could not produce certificates of insurance from the workers.
¶ 159. Olivas paid the workers each week after he received a check from Tenpas Drywall. Suppose, after putting his friends to work, he refused to pay them. Is there any question who the workers would have gone after for breach of contract? Weren't these workers "in service" under a "contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written"? See Wis. Stat. §§ 102.04(l)(e); 102.07(4)(a); 102.08(8)(a).
¶ 160. The logic and law of this dissent is amply supported by the testimony. Tenpas testified that he required all his subcontractors to obtain worker's compensation and liability coverage for their employees. Olivas acquired such policies, and he showed Tenpas certificates of insurance. The following excerpts from Olivas's own testimony show his intent:
Q And did Steve tell you that you should buy a workers' compensation policy?
A Steve told me that in order for him to be able to give me work, we needed to have a workmen's comp insurance.
A I told him [the insurance agent] that we needed a policy for workmen's comp.
Q ... You bought a policy?
A Yes, we did buy it.
Q And did you tell the insurance agent or salesman that you had a drywall company?
*699A No.
Q Did you tell him that you were a contractor? A That we were a group of workers.
Q Did you show him [Tenpas] the work comp policy before you started working for him?
A Yes. They require that in order for him to give us work. That is when I went to get that insurance.
Q I think you testified that when you met with the insurance agent, you explained to him that you worked with a crew. Is there anything in your policy that talks about any of the other workers besides yourself?
A I explained to them that we were a group of workers, and we were looking — we wanted workmen's comp insurance in order to work. (Emphasis added.)
These many "we" and "us" references show that when Olivas purchased insurance policies, he was intending to obtain coverage for more than himself.
¶ 161. In my view, Olivas was an employer in fact and in law. He purchased worker's compensation and liability policies for himself and his crew. When he ultimately realized the full cost of the policies, he did not want to pay the premiums. He attempted to cancel the policies retroactively.
¶ 162. The majority opinion attempts to derail this analysis by determining, as a matter of law, that Olivas's five workers were simply not employees of Olivas. If this conclusion were correct, it would mean that if a worker like Jose Míreles had been injured, the *700worker would have had to seek worker's compensation benefits from Tenpas or the fund, even though Olivas had a worker's compensation policy.
¶ 163. Arguably, the worker would not seek compensation from the fund because Tenpas would not be an "uninsured employer." Tenpas was insured. However, if the worker went after Tenpas, Tenpas would be citing the same law relied upon by the majority to exempt Olivas. See, e.g., Kress Packing Co. v. Kottwitz, 61 Wis. 2d 175, 212 N.W.2d 97 (1973); Labor Ready, Inc. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 153, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27. See also Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988).
¶ 164. Tenpas would argue that he was more remote than Olivas and had less knowledge about and control over the workers than Olivas. One suspects that if Tenpas visited a job site and saw that the work was unsatisfactory, he had the authority to require changes. But one also suspects that if Olivas saw a worker doing a slipshod job, he could have intervened to correct the problem. Moreover, one suspects that if a worker's performance was consistently inadequate and undermined the position of the whole crew, Olivas would have taken steps to have him eliminated.
¶ 165. There is little or no evidence that Steve Tenpas exercised direct control over the workers. Ten-pas paid Olivas the same way he would pay any subcontractor, that is, he would pay with a single check because he would not know the number of workers on a job or what they should be paid. Tenpas furnished drywall, but he did not furnish equipment or tools. Tenpas did not fire any worker. Presumably, he could have terminated Olivas or declined to give him additional jobs, but he never exercised that control over any of the workers.
*701¶ 166. Tenpas's relationship with Olivas's workers would not exist but for Olivas's assurance that he had worker's compensation and liability coverage for the workers, which he did. Sticking Tenpas with responsibility for a worker's injury, in spite of Olivas's insurance coverage, would wipe out Tenpas's statutory defense against liability and undo decades of worker's compensation law. It is simply mind boggling to believe that a worker like Míreles could be an employee of Tenpas but not of Olivas.
¶ 167. The majority is diverted from basic worker's compensation law by unproven notions about the exploitation of undocumented workers. As a result, it undercuts long-standing presumptions, see majority op. at ¶ 34, and creates uncertainty for employers, insurers, and workers. The majority's decision may force employers like Tenpas to bear responsibility for risks they took careful steps to avoid, and may force insurers to provide coverage of risks for which they have not been paid.
¶ 168. The alternative is to set certain workers adrift in a worker's compensation limbo. In my view, the statutes are not likely to be construed in a way that denies coverage for the workers. Somebody is going to have to pay.
¶ 169. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 170. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion.
Olivas's testimony appears to conflict with Tenpas's testimony. It should be noted, however, that Tenpas testified to what *687he thought occurred in 2003; Olivas may have testified only to what occurred in 2001 and 2002.
Compare Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 205 Wis. 7, 236 N.W. 575 (1931), with Marinette County Fair Ass'n v. Indus. Comm'n, 242 Wis. 552, 8 N.W.2d 268 (1943).
Wisconsin Stat. § 102.06 is presently suspended because the legislature created an uninsured employers fund, 1989 Wis. Act 64, and the fund has a cash balance that equals or exceeds $4,000,000. See Wis. Stat. § 102.80(3). This means that an employee of an uninsured subcontractor will turn to the fund, rather than the remote "contractor," for worker's compensation benefits. Wis. Stat. § 102.81(1). The fund will then seek reimbursement for payments made. The law provides that an uninsured employer shall reimburse the fund for any payments made under § 102.81(1). See Wis. Stat. § 102.82(1). The suspension of § 102.06 does not vitiate the analysis because the principle that a contractor may seek to prevent liability by requiring a subcontractor to provide insurance coverage for the subcontractor's employees remains intact.