{dissenting). ¶ 31. The court has concluded that Attorney Alan D. Eisenberg has satisfied his burden and should be reinstated to practice law in Wisconsin. Based on his behavior during his suspension, I conclude he has fallen well short of the *594burden imposed by SCR 22.31(1). He should not be reinstated at this time. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 32. Before addressing the specifics that support my conclusion that Attorney Eisenberg should not be reinstated, background related to his history of disciplinary problems provides a helpful context.
¶ 33. Four years after being admitted to practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Eisenberg first had his law license suspended in 1970. State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 (1970). He "pursued a course of vindictive and reckless harassment and psychological persecution against the Honorable John E. Krueger, county judge of Milwaukee county, Wisconsin." Id. at 367-68. Attorney Eisenberg hired a private investigator to investigate Judge Krueger. The court made the following findings:
(1) That Alan Eisenberg publicly charged Judge Krue-ger with conduct (unspecified) for which a criminal warrant could issue; (2) That Alan Eisenberg predicted the Judge would resign for "personal reasons" within a short period rather than face prosecution; (3) That Alan Eisenberg arranged for and Sydney signed checks in payment of newspaper advertisements soliciting complaints against Judge Krueger; (4) That in concert the defendants pressured the Judge unwillingly to appoint them to an advisory committee concerning the administration of his court; (5) That in concert the defendants forced the Judge to publicly read a press release announcing their appointment for the purpose of aggrandizing themselves and demonstrating their subjugation of and their dominance over the Judge; and (6) We find that the above acts of the defendants *595constitute unprofessional conduct tending to bring the courts into disrepute and contempt and that such conduct is contrary to the duties of the defendants as licensed attorneys and in violation of their oaths as attorneys, taken pursuant to sec. 256.29, Stats.
Id. at 379. Attorney Eisenberg's "conduct was of such aggravated nature as to cause Judge Krueger great mental suffering and anguish, which culminated in his death by his own hand on August 28,1968." Id. at 368.
¶ 34. The pattern of Attorney Eisenberg refusing to accept responsibility began during his first disciplinary proceeding. "During the[] proceedings Alan Eisen-berg gave testimony which directly conflict[ed] with the testimony of 13 witnesses. The record show[ed] that as to any testimony which supported the allegations of the complaint, Alan refute[d] the same by labeling it to be false." Id. at 377.
¶ 35. Attorney Eisenberg had his law license suspended for the second time in 1988. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988). The court suspended Attorney Eisen-berg for two years for conduct stemming out of two cases. In the first case, Attorney Eisenberg was suspended for:
having made statements to the press prior to a criminal trial which concerned the character, credibility and reputation of the accused, whom he represented, and his opinion of the evidence, the merits of the case and the innocence of his client; having entered into a contract regarding the publication rights to the story of his representation of that criminal defendant; having participated in the preparation and filing of a civil complaint purported to have been prepared and filed by an individual pro se in connection with a pending extradition proceeding against his client; having failed to disclose relevant facts concerning the latter conduct *596in response to inquiries from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility in its investigation; and having made offensive, undignified and discourteous remarks to a prosecutor concerning a witness and in closing argument to a jury concerning a prosecutor.
Id. at 287. In. the second case, Attorney Eisenberg "knowingly made a false statement intended for publication that the Attorney General had written him that counsel for an adverse party in pending litigation was chargeable with false swearing and perjury." Id.
¶ 36. In suspending Attorney Eisenberg, the court lamented that
[b]y that misconduct Attorney Eisenberg has established a pattern of attempting to influence litigation by means prohibited by the rules governing the conduct of attorneys, including misrepresentations to the court and, through the press, to the public. Such abuse of our court system warrants severe discipline. Moreover, as this is not the first occasion we have had to discipline him, Attorney Eisenberg has shown that severe discipline is needed to impress upon him the obligation to comport himself in accord with the ethical standards of the profession.
Id. at 287-88.
¶ 37. Attorney Eisenberg was publicly reprimanded in 1996. He failed to arrange for winding up his practice within 15 days of the effective date of his 1988 suspension, in violation of SCR 22.26(3). In this case, Attorney Eisenberg had until August 1, 1988, to terminate his practice. The Board's investigation showed that the balance in Attorney Eisenberg's trust account on August 31, 1988, was $39,011.75. The account was not closed, and approximately two dozen checks were written on the account after that date. The last check *597cleared the bank in May of 1989, leaving a balance of $34,771.65.
¶ 38. The Board concluded that Attorney Eisen-berg failed to act with diligence in returning client funds to clients at the close of their cases. Attorney Eisenberg, as a partner in a law firm, also failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conformed to the rules of professional conduct. Finally, Attorney Eisenberg failed to close out his trust account, a necessary step in winding up his practice upon suspension of his license to practice law.
¶ 39. Attorney Eisenberg's third suspension, and final to date, occurred in 2004. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court suspended Attorney Eisenberg's license for one year. The court concluded he engaged in nine counts of misconduct.
¶ 40. Two counts involved a client who elected to have one of Attorney Eisenberg's associates continue representing her after the associate left Attorney Eisenberg's firm. Based on testimony, the referee found that Attorney Eisenberg had his staff fabricate billing statements, which he incorporated into his affidavit. Additionally, the referee found that Attorney Eisenberg failed to surrender the unearned retainer and the client's file in a timely manner.
¶ 41. Two counts involved Attorney Eisenberg submitting an affidavit in support of a California application to appear pro hac vice. In the affidavit, he indicated that he had never been suspended from legal practice. In fact, he had been suspended on two previous occasions.
*598¶ 42. Two counts arose from Attorney Eisenberg acting inappropriately at a Department of Transportation hearing. He took over the hearing, refused to follow procedural rules, and left with his client before the hearing was over. The following excerpt from the transcript of the hearing captures some of his inappropriate behavior:
Eisenberg: I'm going to conduct an examination of my client.
Examiner: You will ask the questions after I ask the questions.
Eisenberg: No, I will make a statement.
Examiner: You will, I will give you—
Eisenberg: I, I, I'm not interested in your procedures or your rules. I'm going to make a statement of explanation. I'm going to ask him a question, and then you can ask him whatever you want.
Examiner: I can let you make a statement, but I will ask him the questions first.
Eisenberg: I will ask him the questions first.
Examiner: Mr. Eisenberg, this is, this is the way we do our hearings (inaudible)—
Eisenberg: This is the way I do your hearings.
The hearing continued with a similar tone, until Eisen-berg and his client left before it was over.
¶ 43. Another count involved Attorney Eisenberg entering into a business transaction with a client with whom he had developed an attorney/client relationship when assisting the client with a building code violation. *599The client entered into a listing contract to sell a property through the Alan Eisenberg Real Estate Company. Attorney Eisenberg failed to advise the client of the conflict of interest, the client was not given an opportunity to seek independent advice, and the client did not waive the conflict in writing.
¶ 44. The final two counts arose from a call Attorney Eisenberg placed to the Corvallis, Oregon police dispatch. He told the dispatcher that he had a "life or death emergency" in demanding to speak with an off-duty detective. During the phone call, he also used vulgar language. The following excerpt from the transcript of the call captures some of his inappropriate behavior:
Eisenberg: It's a life or death emergency; if I don't get a call from him, you tell him I'm going to have his badge.
Dispatcher: Can I tell him what it's about?
Eisenberg: You got — It's a life or death emergency.
Dispatcher: Can I tell him what the emergency is?
Eisenberg: I said what
Dispatcher: It may speed up ...
Eisenberg: You get the asshole on the phone, you have him call me now.
The purpose of Attorney Eisenberg's call was to determine why the detective had left a business card at the residence of Attorney Eisenberg's client.
¶ 45. In suspending Attorney Eisenberg for one year, the court "hope[d] that a shorter period of forfeiture [would] suffice to deter other attorneys from *600engaging in similar misconduct and motivate Attorney Eisenberg, if he ever return[ed] to the practice of law, to conduct himself in an ethical manner, without exception." Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43, ¶ 34.
II. EISENBERG’S FAILURE TO SATISFY HIS SCR 22.31(1) BURDEN
¶ 46. SCR 22.31(1) imposes a burden on an attorney seeking reinstatement. Among other things, the attorney must demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence "[t]hat his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest." SCR 22.31(l)(b). Part of satisfying the SCR 22.31(l)(b) burden includes satisfying the requirements under SCR 22.29(4). Majority op., ¶ 14.
¶ 47. In concluding that Attorney Eisenberg had satisfied his burden, the court focused on where it departed from agreement with the referee's rationale for his recommendation. Mainly, it indicates that the referee made his decision based on Attorney Eisenberg neither going to counseling nor having a satisfactory level of contrition related to incidents leading to his latest suspension. The court pointed out that the rules governing reinstatement require neither and that "the record reveals that Attorney Eisenberg has expressed remorse for his past conduct." Majority op., ¶ 25.
¶ 48. Attorney Eisenberg's history alone provides plenty of evidence to garner skepticism about his remorse. Nevertheless, his history of disciplinary problems does not directly affect his petition for reinstatement. Rather, it is his own words during his reinstatement hearing that establish that he falls well short of satisfying his SCR 22.31(1) reinstatement *601burden. Some may dismiss Attorney Eisenberg's testimony as including some "cantankerous and grouchy" remarks, majority op., ¶ 23, but even a small selection of his testimony found in the record leads to the conclusion that he should not be reinstated at this time.
¶ 49. First, Attorney Eisenberg's testimony at the hearing illustrates he lacks "a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards." SCR 22.29(4)(f). A review of his testimony leaves me concluding that his understanding of the rules is distorted and his attitude toward them is hostile. Stated another way, he has an improper understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules.
¶ 50. Attorney Eisenberg's attorney selected an incident that occurred with Attorney Michele Ford for Attorney Eisenberg to express his proper understanding and attitude.1 Attorney Ford appeared at Attorney Eisenberg's reinstatement hearing to oppose his reinstatement. She testified in regard to a phone conversation that she had with Attorney Eisenberg when she was working in her capacity as City Attorney for the City of St. Francis. According to Attorney Ford, after she refused to accept a deal demanded by Attorney *602Eisenberg he said, "I'm going to rip you a new asshole" and slammed down the phone. Attorney Eisenberg disputed whether he used the term "asshole," but conceded that he said he was "going to rip her a new one."
¶ 51. In asking about the incident Attorney Eisenberg's attorney said:
We're obligated, Mr. Eisenberg, to show in connection with our petition that you're mindful of the rules that are — that bind lawyers and are resolved to conform your conduct to them. And with respect to this phone call with Michele Ford — I'd like to have you tell the Referee what you can about the effect of the suspension on your attitude towards those kinds of interchanges and the likelihood that they're going to recur.
Attorney Eisenberg began his response by saying the following: "Well, the effect of the suspension to me felt like an atom smasher on a tsetse fly, and I'm the tsetse fly." He concluded his response with,
I will tell you that I've had discussions with [my attorney], who's told me that if in confession with my priest, I look at the priest and I say, You're an asshole, I stand a good chance of drawing a Bar complaint because there's probably a new set of rules for me.
Attorney Eisenberg chose to say he has a unique set of rules applied to him, rather than discussing his understanding and appreciation of the rules of professional conduct.
¶ 52. Maybe if this were an isolated comment I could be convinced that Attorney Eisenberg was merely making an exaggerated comment for effect. Yet, this was not an isolated comment. Attorney Eisenberg repeatedly forwarded his distorted view that a different set of rules applied to his conduct. When the Office of *603Lawyer Regulation (OLR) attorney cross-examined Attorney Eisenberg, the following exchange occurred:
OLR: Mr. Eisenberg, you mentioned in your testimony that you feel you have to be very circumspect in terms of your professional behavior because there's a, quote, "new set of rules for you," end of quote—
Eisenberg: Right.
OLR: —do you remember that testimony?
Eisenberg: It's accurate, too.
OLR: In a sense you're telling this Referee and us and everyone here that there's a different set of professional code rules for Alan Eisenberg as compared to all other attorneys?
Eisenberg: There sure is.
OLR: There is?
Eisenberg: Yes, there is. Yes. It's called State of Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation versus Alan Eisenberg. Those are the rules. That's the law of the land. That's the case that dictates what I must do, how I must behave. That's the rule of me.
With such a distorted view of the rules of conduct, I cannot agree with the court that Attorney Eisenberg has satisfied his burden of proving that he "has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards." SCR 22.29(4)(f).2
*604¶ 53. Attorney Eisenberg's failure to exhibit a proper understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules of professional conduct alone should be enough for this court to not reinstate him. Nevertheless, his behavior leading up to his reinstatement hearing raises questions about whether his conduct has been "exemplary and above reproach," SCR 22.29(4)(e), and he can "safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them," SCR 22.29(4)(g).
¶ 54. Attorney Eisenberg's conduct leading up to the hearing was described as intimidating. The week before Attorney Ford appeared at the reinstatement hearing in opposition to Attorney Eisenberg's reinstatement, Attorney Eisenberg called her. According to Attorney Ford, Attorney Eisenberg said, "You know, I'm good friends with your law firm." Attorney Ford stated that "during the course of [the] conversation, I started to feel, you know, I got the distinct impression that there was an attempt to intimidate me."
¶ 55. The intimidating phone conversation with Attorney Ford alone may not be enough for this court to not reinstate his license, but it indicates concern about his conduct during his suspension. At the very least, it *605makes me hesitate to join an opinion that declares that Attorney Eisenberg's conduct has been "exemplary and above reproach."
¶ 56. Related to safely recommending Attorney Eisenberg to the legal profession, courts and clients, his testimony at his reinstatement hearing indicates he is ill-equipped to return to his practice. Specifically, he testified that during his suspension he "attempted to stay involved in constructive things that would keep him out of trouble ... in activities that would not be adversarial." He focused on real estate, which he described as "negotiating and bringing people together. It doesn't involve getting people off of anything or advocating for the defense of people or anything like that or plaintiffs or civil cases or anything. It's just the opposite. So that's one of the things that I spent a great deal of time." He also said the following about his latest suspension: "it's brought me to the realization that when people do things to stress me out, I can't handle [them] the way [I did] when I was younger. I'm much more stressed out now about these kinds of things than I was when I was a younger man."
¶ 57. For a person that has such a disastrous history with disciplinary problems, this is more than a little troubling. When he was a "younger man" he got suspended only four years after being admitted to practice law for behavior that is nothing short of offensive. The offensive behavior he exhibited as a "younger man" has remained a hallmark of his practice of law for almost 40 years. A district attorney, in explaining why he had made the effort to oppose Attorney Eisenberg's reinstatement, said, "it's his lack of civility. It is his abrasive approach."
¶ 58. If he has avoided all adversarial situations during his suspension, and gets more stressed out now *606than when he was younger, it seems difficult to conclude that Attorney Eisenberg has satisfied his burden of proving that he "can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts." SCR 22.29(4)(g).
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 59. Based on Attorney Eisenberg's own words at his reinstatement hearing, he failed to satisfy his SCR 22.31(1) burden. First, he has an improper understanding of the rules that apply to attorneys. Second, he failed to exhibit exemplary conduct during his suspension. Finally, he cannot be safely recommended to the profession, the courts, or clients. Accordingly, he should not be reinstated at this time. I respectfully dissent.
¶ 60. I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK CROOKS and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent.
Attorney Eisenberg's testimony relating to the incident with Attorney Ford highlights his improper understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules. Although the incident itself raises unique concerns, my focus is on his testimony. The majority opinion, in reacting to this discussion of the testimony, focuses elsewhere. Specifically, the majority notes that Attorney Eisenberg was representing a poor elderly woman on a pro bono basis. Majority op., ¶ 20. I respect Attorney Eisenberg's pro bono work, but that does not change the fact that his testimony highlights his improper understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules.
The majority opinion points out that Attorney Eisenberg went on to explain the different set of rules that apply to him, *604stating, " Well, it sure has felt that way, but I'm not criticizing them. I think that [the OLR] does [its] job.'" Majority op., ¶ 22. In the remainder of his response to the OLR attorney he said the following: "In your case when I said to be perfectly honest, you made a sarcastic comment to me; in essence, calling me a liar before I testified. So that isn't something that I would ever be able to get away with, but you can. I could never get away with it." I draw no conclusion related to the sincerity of Attorney Eisenberg's compliment of the OLR. However, in context, Attorney Eisenberg's isolated compliment of the OLR does not offset his otherwise improper understanding of the rules of conduct.