concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I agree that “substantial evidence supported] the trial judge’s finding that Dials had a reasonable belief that Keisha Hughes might be inside the apartment and in need of emergency assistance,” 1 and, thus, I believe that the warrantless search of the apartment was reasonable in light of these exigent circumstances. I write separately, however, because the majority disregards its role as a reviewing court when it suggests that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule provides an alternative justification for the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s suppression motion. The trial court’s ruling did not address the inevitable discovery exception, and the parties to this appeal have not alleged that the exception has any relevance to the issues before the Court. In fact, the first suggestion that the inevitable discovery exception had any relevance to this case came during oral argument when the author of today’s majority opinion asked Appellant’s counsel to address the exception’s applicability. Further, the majority’s alternative rationale is, at best, unnecessary because we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the basis of the factual *857findings actually made by the trial court. I write separately, however, because of my concern that the majority opinion creates bad precedent that appears to authorize Kentucky appellate courts to initiate their own factual determinations as to issues of inevitable discovery.
Each of the inevitable discovery cases cited by the majority opinion is similar in at least one (1) respect — they all involve appellate review of a trial court’s determination that evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.2 In addition, I observe that in the only reported Kentucky case addressing the inevitable discovery exception, Commonwealth v. Elliott,3 the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s determination “that the prosecution could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the drugs seized would have been ultimately discovered by lawful means.”4 The reason for the procedural similarity across the board is that an inevitable discovery determination is a mixed question of fact and law,5 and trial courts are responsible for rendering findings of fact after evaluating evidence and witness credibility.6 Although appellate courts review de novo trial courts’ determinations that illegally-obtained evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception,7 the initial determination must be made by the trial court.
In this regard, I find the procedural history of the United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the inevitable discovery exception instructive. In Brewer v. Williams,8 the precursor to Nix v. Williams,9 the Court affirmed a grant of habeas relief where, at trial, the prosecution had introduced Williams’s post-arrest incriminating statements concerning the location of his victim’s body that were obtained in violation of Williams’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Acting upon the information in Williams’s incriminating statements, and with Williams’s assistance, authorities located the body of the fourteen (14) year old girl whom Williams had murdered. Although the Court found that the erroneous admission of the unlawfully-obtained statements deprived Williams of *858due process and entitled him to a new trial, it did not address the admissibility of tangible evidence concerning the victim’s body, and instead suggested that the state courts should address the admissibility of that evidence prior to retrial:
The District Court stated that its decision “does not touch upon the issue of what evidence, if any, beyond the incriminating statements themselves must be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” We, too, have no occasion to address this issue, and in the present posture of the case, there is no basis for the view of our dissenting Brethren, that any attempt to retry the respondent would probably be futile. While neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony describing his having led the police to the victim’s body can constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams. In the event that a retrial is instituted, it will be for the state courts in the first instance to determine whether 'particular items of evidence may be admitted.10
Prior to Williams’s second trial, the state trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce “evidence of the condition of [the victim’s] body as it was found, articles and photographs of her clothing, and the results of post mortem medical and chemical tests on the body,”11 on the theory that the evidence would have been discovered without Williams’s incriminating statements. Williams was again convicted of murder, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the conviction, and Williams again petitioned the federal courts for habeas relief. After its own independent review of the evidence, the United States District Court concluded that the police inevitably would have found the body and therefore denied Williams’s habeas petition. The Court of Appeals reversed because it found the trial court’s findings inadequate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that inevitable discovery represented an exception to the exclusionary rule,12 and, after analyzing the appropriate burden of proof13 and reviewing the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the authorities inevitably would have found the girl’s body:
[T]hree courts independently reviewing the evidence have found that the body of the child inevitably would have been found by the searchers. Williams challenges these findings, asserting that the record contains only the “post hoc rationalization” that the search efforts would have proceeded two and one-half miles into Polk County where Williams had led police to the body.
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On this record it is clear that the search parties were approaching the actual location of the body, and we are *859satisfied, along with three courts earlier, that the volunteer search teams would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the body and the body inevitably would have been found. The evidence asserted by Williams as newly discovered, i.e., certain photographs of the body and deposition testimony of Agent Ruxlow made in connection with the federal habeas proceeding, does not demonstrate that the material facts were inadequately developed in the suppression hearing in state court or that Williams was denied a full, fair, and adequate opportunity to present all relevant facts at the suppression hearing.14
In contrast, today’s majority has before it no trial court determination relating to inevitable discovery, yet nonetheless concludes that the exception supports the trial court’s ruling denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. In doing so, the majority engages in inappropriate appellate fact-finding and offers what is, in essence, an advisory opinion. The majority’s assertion that the evidentiary conclusion it reaches is “indisputable” does not alter the fact that, by evaluating testimony and predicting what would have happened if the officers had not searched the apartment when they did, the majority acts as a fact-finder, not as an appellate court. Accordingly, I write separately from the majority to express my opinion that this Court should limit its consideration of the inevitable discovery exception to those cases where the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law raise an inevitable discovery issue. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”15 Accordingly, if the Commonwealth predicates the admissibility of an item of evidence upon the exception, it should advance that argument — and introduce evidence in support of it — at an evi-dentiary hearing so that the trial court can consider the issue and make a determination subject to meaningful appellate review.
STUMBO, J., joins this concurring opinion.
. Majority Opinion at 87 S.W.3d 850, 852 (2002) (Slip Op. at 4).
. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 438, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 383 (1984) ("The trial court concluded that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, ... if Williams had not led the police to the victim, her body would have been discovered 'within a short time' in essentially the same condition as it was actually found.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir.2001) ("The district court found [the inevitable discovery exception] to apply to Scott’s case, and we agree.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1583, 152 L.Ed.2d 501 (2002); United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 803-04 (6th Cir.2001) ("The magistrate ... concluded ... that the knives were admissible under the "inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule. The magistrate's conclusions were adopted by the district judge.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 823, 151 L.Ed.2d 705 (2002); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir.1999) ("The district court ... [held] that the seized documents would have inevitably been discovered without the illegal search.”), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1161, 120 S.Ct. 1175, 145 L.Ed.2d 1083 (2000).
. Ky.App., 714 S.W.2d 494 (1986).
. Id. at 497.
. United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1119, 116 S.Ct 1351, 134 L.Ed.2d 520 (1996).
. See RCR 9.78; Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1182, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000).
. Id., citing United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.1987).
. 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).
. Supra note 2.
. Brewer v. Williams, supra note 8 at 430 U.S. 387, 406 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 441 n. 12 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
. Nix v. Williams, supra note 2 at 467 U.S. 431, 437, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 383.
. Id. at 467 U.S. 431, 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 390 ("[W]hen ... the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.”).
. Id. at 467 U.S. 431, 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 388 n. 5.
. Id. at 467 U.S. 431, 448-450, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 390-391.
. Id. at 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387-388.